Systematic trace through Zed (crates/agent_ui thread_view.rs +
crates/acp_thread): kind:execute routes a tool call onto the
terminal-card layout, whose header (render_collapsible_command) has NO
disclosure toggle, whose body content renders only when is_open — a
flag only a real terminal entity can ever set — and which suppresses
the Raw Input view outright. Every prior attempt (rawInput, pending
content, completed content) targeted slots that layout structurally
never renders; the one slot it always shows is the TITLE, which said
"Run code". codex-acp confirms the idiom: execute cards are titled
with the command itself.
presentCall now titles the card with the program (rawInput kept as the
canonical input slot); presentResult omits the title — an update
replaces only provided fields, so the program header persists — and
carries the captured output as content. Goldens re-recorded; the unit
test pins title-carries-program on both frames.
The sandbox execute wrapper JSON round-tripped the return and blindly cast it
to ToolExecuteReturn. A JSON-valid but wrong-shape return — a bare string,
{ content: 'ok' }, blocks without a type tag — sailed through: the registry
spreads result.content, so { content: 'ok' } became ['o','k'], passed the
session log's isJsonValue gate, and the DeepSeek serializer then flattened it
to '(no output)' — silent corruption of the next model request and every
replay, instead of a contained tool error.
The round-tripped value is now shape-checked against the two ToolExecuteReturn
forms (array of content blocks, or { content: blocks, meta? }); block checks
are structural only (plain object + string type tag) because the ContentBlock
union is merge-extensible. A wrong shape — and the formerly cryptic
forgot-return/bare-string cases — fails that one call with a teaching error
echoing a truncated preview of what was returned and the two valid forms.
New specs pin the object-form pass-through (meta included), six rejection
shapes, and the preview truncation; per-file 100% coverage holds.
The previous commit put the fenced program only on the pending card —
but an ACP tool_call_update's content REPLACES the card content (Zed
truncates to the new list, crates/acp_thread update_fields), so the
code vanished the moment the run completed and was effectively never
visible. presentResult now re-carries the fenced program before the
captured output via a shared fencedProgram helper; the completed card
body is program + output, rendered by Zed as syntax-highlighted
markdown behind the card disclosure. Goldens re-recorded (filtered
this time: DSH_SNAPSHOT=record vitest -u -t mode-turn); unit test pins
the two-block result content.
The generated program rode only rawInput — the detail/expanded slot
many ACP clients never open — so the code a run executed was invisible
in the UI stream. presentCall now also carries it as a fenced ts block
in the card's content, which the bridge already forwards as tool_call
content. The two code-mode snapshot goldens are re-recorded live and
replay green; the presentation unit test pins the fenced block.
cordis provide() accepts any value and cross-mount composition advertises
ctx.provide('name', value), but the façade's readService unconditionally
proxied every declared service — new Proxy('42') throws "Cannot create proxy
with a non-object as target or handler", so a consumer of a primitive-valued
service crashed on first read with an error naming neither the service nor
the fix. A primitive or null value now passes through unwrapped (after the
denyContext check); only object- and function-valued services are proxied —
a primitive has no method that could hand back a Context, so nothing is lost.
New cross-mount spec pins both read paths (ctx.<name> and ctx.get) for a
number and a null provided value.
The sandbox docs overclaimed a containment contract the design never makes:
"capability access is routed through cordis services, never Node built-ins,
so everything a mounted plugin does stays inspectable and disposable". The
host-realm helpers on the sandbox global (harness, console, btoa) are
reachable functions, so mount code that goes looking can reach the host realm
through one of them — accepted under the trust stance, because the ctx a
mount ultimately receives is fully privileged anyway. Reword the sandbox
module doc, the README trust stance, and the RFC sandbox-semantics section to
say exactly that: the traps and small global surface STEER honest code onto
the cordis services; they are not a security boundary.
Two review findings (#220) on the sandbox context façade:
- Undeclared services were reachable: the façade resolved any live global via
ctx.get(name), so ctx.bash worked without inject: ['bash']. A cross-mount
consumer could then depend on a provider cordis never saw — unmounting the
provider would neither park the consumer nor unwind its registered tools,
leaving a model-visible tool that fails only at execution. The façade now
reads ctx.fiber.inject and refuses any service the mount did not declare
(with a teaching error naming the inject fix), so the dependency is always
visible to cordis and its activation/unload semantics bind.
- ctx.tools.get returned the live ToolDefinition, including execute — mount
code could call another tool directly and bypass ToolRegistry.execute and
its pre/post-execute hooks and accounting. get now returns the same
read-only name/description/parameters view as schemas(), never an invocable.
Adds inject-gate and schema-view regression cases to sandbox-context.spec.ts
(undeclared property/get denied, declared allowed, the cross-mount zombie-tool
scenario refused at call time, get exposes no execute). Package stays at
per-file 100% coverage. RFC, mount description, and tool-catalog updated.
Review finding (#220): the guarded proxy only special-cased ctx.tools, so
mount code could reach an UNGUARDED context through ctx.root, ctx.extend(), or
a service instance's .ctx, then ctx.root.tools.register({…}) to bypass the
marker check and host-realm normalization — a raw vm-realm result would later
error a real agent turn at the session-log plainness check.
The sandbox ctx is now a whitelist façade, not a pass-through proxy: it exposes
only what a mount needs — tools.register (marker-guarded), on/once, provide, the
timer helpers, and injected services resolved through a guarded get — and denies
every framework-plumbing member (root, parent, fiber, reflect, registry, extend,
isolate, intercept, plugin, set, mixin, …) with a teaching error. Injected
services are wrapped so a method returning a Context is rejected on the way back
(the .ctx escape), closing the one indirect leak. There is no context-valued
member left to reach; cross-mount provide/inject is untouched (the plugin's own
inject and the fiber's pending/active gating are unchanged). ctx.plugin (child
plugins) and ctx.set are denied by design; ctx.effect is deferred (FIXME).
Adds tests/sandbox-context.spec.ts covering the escape class (root/extend/fiber/
plugin/set/… denied, the classic root.tools.register bypass, the .ctx escape,
read-only writes) plus the async-service and symbol/in-operator paths for 100%
coverage. RFC/README/tool-catalog/config-catalog updated; api-catalog.ts
regenerated (also picks up the codeRuntime service that entered on the master
merge and was left stale).
The tree SHAPE was the wrong surface for the model: what it needs from
cordis_inspect is what services, plugins, and capabilities are loaded, not the
fiber hierarchy. The plugins section is now a flat name + lifecycle-state list
from ctx.registry (deterministically sorted, one line per instance); the ASCII
tree renderer, the parent→child rebuild, and the dyn-id tree annotation are
deleted — dynamic mounts keep their own richer dynamic section (id, state,
provides, waits). Net -49 lines; RFC and READMEs state the flat-list contract.
Field sessions showed models writing tool schemas in the JSON-Schema dialect
by strong prior — type: 'integer', required: false, then the full
{ type:'object', properties, required: [...] } wrapper — and the rejection
text itself pushed a nearly-correct DSL attempt BACK to raw JSON Schema: one
stats tool cost three consecutive schema errors before mounting. The boundary
now normalizes wherever the input has exactly one meaning (wrapper unwrapped
with the required array becoming per-property flags at any nesting level,
integer → number, required: false → optional, all rebuilt as fresh host-realm
objects) and rejects only genuinely meaningless input, enumerating the valid
vocabulary in the error. Re-running the failing session mounts first-try.
The mount description documents both accepted forms.
The sandbox deliberately provides no Node API, and now says so instead of
letting a bare ReferenceError teach nothing: require, the timers, and fetch
are callable traps whose error redirects to the cordis alternative (inject:
['fs'] + ctx.fs, ['web'] + ctx.web, ['bash'] + ctx.bash, ['timer'] +
ctx.setTimeout — a fiber effect, unwound on unmount). Only function-shaped
globals are trapped; process/Buffer stay undefined so typeof feature probes
stay inert. The mount description and the demo persona state the routing rule,
and the demo mounts ctx.fs (local provider) and ctx.web (seam + keyless local
fetch provider) so agent-built plugins have real capabilities to build on.
Live-validated: a model that reached for Node setTimeout self-corrected to
inject: ['timer'] in one step and built a working ctx.web fetch tool.
Everything outside the package and example that a new top-level group and a
new demo touch: GROUP_ORDER in gen-module-graph and gen-doc-graphs (plus the
tools-service consumers list, the APP_EXAMPLES entry, and the graph-atlas
label/mode rows), the knip e2e entries, the packages/README group row, the
AGENTS.md layout and demo lines, and the regenerated module-graph /
config-catalog / graph-atlas / capability-seams / composition artifacts.
AGENTS.md and examples/AGENTS.md word-budget ceilings rise to current+5%
(1802 / 653): the new group and demo rows are genuine additions to both docs,
not condensable restatements.
Emits packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts (the data cordis_inspect
serves the model) from the same JSDoc-enforcing AST walk as docs/cordis-catalog
(collectServices/collectEvents, plus the now-exported INHERITED_SERVICES
table): service summaries + method signatures, event modes + signatures, and
the transitive closure of type shapes the signatures reference — so a mounted
plugin reads that a bash run's stdout is { text, truncated } instead of
guessing. verify-cordis-api joins doc-sync as the freshness gate.
The coding spine (DeepSeek V4 + local bash on dsh-stdio-agent) plus
@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-cordis loaded by package name, run via demo:cordis.
Ships the keyless Loader smoke (the export-shape / package-name-resolution
guard) and the with-key smoke: a real model mounts a listener whose tagged
console line actually fires, builds and calls its own reverse_text tool, and
composes two mounts via provide/inject — all world-verified against the
registry and session events.
New top-level packages/cordis/ group with the self-referential toolset:
cordis_inspect (services / plugin tree / tools / dynamic mounts / api / events,
the api section intersecting the generated catalog with the live service store),
cordis_mount (model-written code evaluated in a node:vm sandbox, mounted under
one cordis-dynamic group fiber as dyn-<n>), cordis_unmount (awaited disposal to
quiescence). Boundary mechanisms: dual-realm instanceof, JSON realm
normalization of dynamic tool results, marker-guarded registration, SchemaSpec
teaching errors, parse failures surfaced with the offending line + caret and a
line-scoped TypeScript hint, and the unmount-first recipe on tool-name
collisions. Config: vmTimeoutMs (schemastery, default 5000). Design record:
docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md.
The tool-catalog boot manifest, its regenerated output, and the pinned
tool-name list land here rather than with the other repo registration: the
completeness guard globs packages/*/tool-* and fails the generator (and the
core/tools spec) the moment the package directory exists.
The design record for tool-cordis: the three-tool contract, the vm sandbox
trust stance and boundary mechanisms, the dynamic-group lifecycle, cross-mount
provide/inject composition, the generated runtime API catalog, and the
alternatives weighed (per-capability registration tools, hand-maintained API
tables, a mount provenance event, a hardened sandbox).
Move compact-basic's private _extractText/_blocksToText into the interface
package as renderTranscript/renderContentBlocks, so the summarize path and a
future recall read path render one span identically. Byte-identical output
vs the private helpers it replaces; compact-basic delegates.
Both demo:code-mode UIs now share one mechanism: the base example plus a
same-shaped code-mode.cordis.yml include overlay (insert the worker
runtime, flip tools.mode). Previously the REPL side was a hand-forked
example (examples/code-agent) that had also silently diverged — it
dropped compaction and the subagent stack — so the demo's UI argument
switched agents, not just surfaces. The fork is retired: coding-agent
gains the overlay, a Code Mode README section absorbing code-agent's,
and both of its tests (the keyless boot guard, retargeted at the
overlay; the with-key RFC proof, which hand-mounts its own harness and
moves untouched). The RFC's composed-surface and e2e-tier lines, the
examples index, the AGENTS.md smoke table, and the dsh-tools README
link now describe the overlay shape.
Verified live: overlay keyless smoke, with-key code-mode e2e from its
new home, demo:code-mode banner + EOF exit, and the acp handshake.
Code Mode is the point; the UI is just the surface it happens to wear.
demo:code and demo:acp-code collapse into one dispatcher
(scripts/demo-code-mode.mjs): `pnpm run demo:code-mode [repl|acp]` —
repl (default) boots the stdio REPL over examples/code-agent, acp
serves examples/acp-agent's code-mode overlay; each UI runs the exact
node invocation its standalone script ran, and an unknown argument
fails loud with usage. All nine references across READMEs, the RFC,
the overlay header, and the keyless-smoke comment renamed. Smoked all
three paths: usage exit 2, ACP initialize handshake, REPL boot + EOF.
Boots the acp-agent example through the existing code-mode.cordis.yml
overlay (tool surface collapses to run_code + the generated TypeScript
SDK, dispatching through the worker-thread runtime), mirroring how
demo:code relates to demo:repl on the stdio side. The overlay header
and both READMEs now name the demo as a consumer. Smoke: the server
answers an ACP initialize handshake with a clean frame on stdout.