A reviewer read "TypeScript via host-side type-strip" and reasonably
asked what typing buys if nothing checks it — the group README never
said the annotations are advisory by design. The row now states it; the
rationale stays in the RFC and the enforcement story (per-dispatch
validateArgs) in the dsh-tools README.
Two [P1] review findings on the worker runtime:
- maxValueBytes gated and sliced the rendered fallback by UTF-16 code
units, so a multibyte string ("€€€€" under a 4-byte cap) crossed whole
and a truncated multibyte rendering could still run ~3x over budget.
New truncateUtf8Bytes cuts at code-point boundaries under a real byte
budget; prepareValue's fallback and the host's forged-error-text bound
both use it, and the VALUE_RENDER_SLACK comment drops its now-obsolete
"sliced by characters" wrinkle.
- The patched stream write dropped Node's optional encoding/callback
arguments, so a program awaiting flush completion
(write(chunk, resolve)) hung to the wall ceiling and misreported as a
timeout. The shim now fires the callback asynchronously once the chunk
is admitted — including for writes the exhausted budget drops.
The master merge added a code-runtime/ package row while this branch adds
the timeout/ row; together they push packages/README.md over its 605-word
ceiling. Condense the timeout/ row to the terse sibling style and raise the
ceiling 605->610 for the genuinely-new package group, mirroring how the
code-runtime work raised architecture.md's ceiling in the same spirit.
The zero-config enforcer no longer imports schemastery (its Config was
removed); knip flags the stale dependency. Remove it from the manifest
and sync the lockfile.
The RFC's deployment-policy decision is unchanged; state the current
mechanism in place — the per-tool budget is declared on ToolDefinition
(timeoutMs, set by the owning tool plugin from its config) and the
enforcer is zero-config, so a mistyped tool name is impossible.
Regenerate config-catalog (timeout-policy -> no-config; tool-web gains
fetch/searchTimeoutMs), the event graph (tools/change loses its
timeout-policy consumer), the ToolDefinition type-equiv block, and a
source-line drift in the cordis services catalog.
fetchTimeoutMs/searchTimeoutMs (default 30000) resolve to each tool's
ToolDefinition.timeoutMs, moving the budget's declaration home onto the
owning tool plugin and preserving per-tool deployment override without a
mistypable central tool-name map.
The enforcer now reads ctx.tools.get(exec.name).timeoutMs instead of a
free-text tool-name config map, so a mistyped name is impossible and the
tools/change warn-once apparatus is gone. exec.name always resolves in the
registry during dispatch, so there is no unknown-name path to warn about.
A tool declares its cooperative timeout budget on its own definition
rather than a deployment naming it in a central config map. The field
never reaches the model (schemas() whitelists name/description/parameters)
and defineTool rejects a non-positive-finite value at authorship.
Two findings from the GitHub review bot on the ready PR:
The tsdown two-entry build emitted the shared bootstrap module as a
lib/bootstrap-*.js chunk imported by both bundles, which the package.json
files whitelist (deliberately exact) omitted — a packed install had
dangling imports. The package now runs two single-entry builds, so each
bundle inlines its own bootstrap copy and every shipped file is
self-contained.
prepareValue admitted any cloneable value whose BOUNDED inspect rendering
fit maxValueBytes, so a huge container with a compact rendering (a
50k-element array renders as '... N more items') crossed the port raw,
bypassing the cap on both sides. The cap now measures the value's real
cross-boundary size — exact bytes for strings, the structured-clone wire
size (v8.serialize) for everything else — and oversized containers cross
as their bounded rendering instead.
ds-review-bot flagged that a typo'd or stale config key (e.g. web_fech for
web_fetch) silently applies the timeout to nothing — the tools/execute lookup
just never matches. Mirror dsh-tool-subagent's lifecycle-driven handling of a
configured-but-unregistered provider: on every tools/change (and once at load),
logger.warn each configured name still absent from ctx.tools, warning each name
at most once so a late registration silences it. Not a load-time throw — the
tool set is dynamic (cordis.yml load order, HMR), so a real tool may register
later.
Declare inject = ['tools'] since the plugin now reads ctx.tools synchronously
in apply (previously only inside event callbacks). Regenerate config-catalog
(Requires: tools) and event-producer-consumer graph.
The host's message listener trusted the compile-time WorkerToHost shape on
traffic from a peer that runs model code: postMessage(null) threw in the
listener and crashed the host process; forged log/done messages bypassed
maxLogBytes/maxValueBytes (the worker-side LogBuffer and prepareValue cap
only honest flows); and the error-reply renegotiation re-echoed a forged
non-cloneable call id, throwing outside any catch.
Every inbound message now passes a runtime shape gate that validates and
REBUILDS it field by field (junk drops without a throw; call ids must be
numbers, so replies are always clone-plain; forged extra fields never ride
along). One host-side ledger bounds everything landing in logs — honest
port entries, forged ones, and stray pipe bytes — at the single documented
maxLogBytes, with the shared in-band truncation marker emitted host-side
when the ledger trips first; the completion value is re-capped host-side
through the same prepareValue (with exactly the truncation suffix as slack
so honest worker-capped values pass unchanged), and done error text is
bounded. Also folds the stray-capture budget into that shared ledger
(round-1 finding B: it was a second maxLogBytes on top of the documented
shared cap).
The shipped backend of the code-execution seam, per the Code Mode RFC's
worker-thread section: one fresh Node worker per run, executing the
model's TypeScript after a host-side type-strip (wrapped in an
async-function shell so top-level return/await parse, sliced back out
position-preserved), bindings bridged over the message port under
hostile-peer rules (own-property name lookup, at-most-once replies,
post-settlement drops, null-prototype namespaces), logs streamed eagerly
with an in-band truncation marker, and two independent budgets — measured
event-loop busy time (computeMs) plus a never-pausing wall ceiling
(maxWallMs) — funneling into worker.terminate(). env: {} and execArgv: []
keep the isolate hermetic; disposal aborts in-flight runs and awaits
worker exits.
The worker entry loads unbuilt via Node's native type stripping
(src/worker.ts, erasable-only) and ships built as a sibling tsdown bundle
(lib/worker.js); tests/built-lib.e2e.ts pins the built load path under
plain node and joins the built-artifact smoke gate. Unit suites cover the
bootstrap in-process (fake port) and the runtime over real workers,
per-file 100%.
A single stable required check that needs every other job in ci.yml, so
branch protection no longer enumerates matrix leg names that change as
lanes and node versions evolve. if: always() keeps the job running when
a dependency fails (a skipped required check would count as passing);
any non-success result — failure, cancelled, or skipped — fails it.
The seam's structured-clone boundary admits values JSON does not (BigInt,
Map, circulars), while tool/code-dispatch events must be JSON-appendable —
left unhandled, a sub-call could execute and then fail at logging time.
The bridge now JSON-normalizes binding arguments BEFORE dispatch (a value
that does not survive rejects that one call), so the dispatched form and
the logged form are the same JSON value by construction.
Codex flagged that the load-path smoke disposed the fiber only at the end,
so a leaked stale tools/execute wrapper would still pass. Add an explicit HMR
test: after fiber.dispose(), a configured tool receives the caller's own
signal unwrapped (the derived deadline is gone), matching the repo's
"dispose must reach quiescence" rule.
Model-facing tool-call budgets were tangled into each capability's schema
(bash timeoutMs, web_fetch timeout_ms) with no shared home. Add a
tools/execute around-dispatch waterfall to dsh-tools whose base next() is
the dispatch-with-normalization thunk, and a new @deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout-policy
plugin (packages/timeout/) that arms a per-tool deadline on exec.signal and
returns a structured TOOL_TIMEOUT when it wins. Migrate web_fetch (drop the
model-facing timeout_ms) and web_search onto it; the fetch provider keeps its
timeout only as a resource backstop for direct callers. bash and hook command
execution keep BASH_TIMEOUT unchanged.
Named the plugin timeout-policy (not the RFC's tool-timeout) so it does not
trip the gen-tool-catalog packages/*/tool-* completeness guard, and replace
exec.signal by in-place mutation before next() since cordis waterfall next()
ignores passed arguments. RFC moved to implemented/ recording both deviations.
A client-callback throw only becomes a JSON-RPC error RESPONSE to the
agent's session/request_permission — runScenario itself kept going, so a
tolerant agent could treat the error as a denial and the scenario would
pass, or worse, record: the impossible click baked into fixture and
golden, green on every replay. The mismatch is now captured as a harness
error while the agent is answered plain cancelled (a well-defined path
it cannot reinterpret), and the step loop rejects the run on it as soon
as the in-flight step settles. The spec asserts the rejection instead of
the agent-side error echo.
Adds the missing core-data-structures coverage the catalog policy
requires for non-spine seam vocabulary: the code-runtime.md sub-page
with drift-checked type-equiv blocks for all six seam types, the core.md
sub-page row, the type-equiv manifest entries, and LINK_MAP entries so
the generated service signature links CodeRunRequest/CodeRunResult;
cordis/config catalogs regenerated.
The package, coverage, and permission scripting all shipped on this
branch, so the RFC moves to implemented/ with the lifecycle rewrite:
Proposal becomes a present-tense Decision, Acceptance criteria and Risks
fold into Testing/Consequences with what actually pinned each one (the
zero-byte extraction parity, the 100% per-file coverage via the fake
bin, the vitest-in-src caveat, the per-suite pin cost).
InputScript gains an optional permissionAnswers queue, consumed FIFO by
the harness's requestPermission handler. Each entry selects by option
KIND (allow_once, reject_once, …): option ids are agent-issued randoms a
committed script cannot know, while kinds are the ACP-stable vocabulary,
so the client maps kind → the offered optionId at answer time. An absent
or exhausted queue answers cancelled — existing scenarios and goldens
are untouched — and a scripted kind the request never offered throws,
surfacing as a JSON-RPC error on the permission request: the scenario
scripted an impossible click.
This is what lets an approval-flow suite (the sandbox composition) drive
allow/reject round-trips deterministically from input.json, per the
shared-acp-snapshot RFC.
