refactor: hide subagent implementation helpers

This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
2026-07-14 02:41:23 +08:00
parent 225796c90d
commit f85b831bd2
9 changed files with 54 additions and 87 deletions

View File

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ Two sibling provider packages, structural variants of the ACP backend, plus one
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-claude-code` — drives a Claude Code child through `@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk`'s `query()` (the SDK runs in the parent process and spawns its bundled `claude` CLI as the subprocess). Provider name `claude-code`: the child is the Claude Code *product*, not an Anthropic model adapter — "claude" stays reserved for a future `dsh-llm` adapter.
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-codex` — spawns `codex app-server` and drives one thread/turn over its JSON-RPC-over-stdio protocol with a hand-rolled newline-JSON client (~200300 lines) in the package.
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-process` — a pure library (the `subagent-inprocess` precedent) extracting what `dsh-subagent-acp` already carries and both new backends need: the credential env scrub (`SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN`/`buildChildEnv`), the EOF → SIGTERM → SIGKILL dispose ladder, and new isolated-config-dir helpers (`mkdtemp` create, best-effort remove). The ACP backend migrates onto it; `bash-local`'s sibling copy is left alone to bound the change.
- `@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-process` — a pure library (the `subagent-inprocess` precedent) extracting what `dsh-subagent-acp` already carries and both new backends need: the credential env scrub (`buildChildEnv`), the EOF → SIGTERM → SIGKILL dispose ladder, and new isolated-config-dir helpers (`mkdtemp` create, best-effort remove). The ACP backend migrates onto it; `bash-local`'s sibling copy is left alone to bound the change.
Both providers copy the ACP backend's seam posture verbatim: fresh child per `start`, exactly one prompt round-trip, capabilities all `false`, `inheritsParentContext: false`, `request.parent`/`request.agentOptions` ignored, `id = SessionId(randomUUID())`, `result` never rejects — child-level failure flattens to a stop reason and the original error goes to `ctx.logger` via an `onError` spec callback. Model exposure is zero new code: `dsh-tool-subagent` is loaded once per provider with a distinct `toolName` (`subagent_claude_code`, `subagent_codex`). No new session events are needed — the only model-visible artifact is the tool result, so reconstructability holds exactly as it did for ACP. To be explicit about the boundary: the session log reconstructs the model-visible transcript, not workspace mutation history — a child granted write access mutates files as an ambient side effect outside the log, exactly as the bash tools and the ACP backend already do; replay reproduces requests, not the disk.

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'
import SubagentService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent'
import { buildChildEnv, SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-subprocess'
import { buildChildEnv } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-subprocess'
import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
import * as acp from '../src/index.ts'
import { acpStopReason, acpContentText, DEFAULT_DISPOSE_EOF_GRACE_MS, DEFAULT_DISPOSE_GRACE_MS, startAcpRun, toAcpPrompt, type AcpRunSpec } from '../src/run.ts'
@@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ describe('buildChildEnv', () => {
// The explicitly-supplied key survives (an opt-in for the child's creds).
expect(env.DEEPSEEK_API_KEY).toBe('explicit')
// A normal ambient var is forwarded.
expect(SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN.test('PATH')).toBe(false)
expect(env.PATH).toBe(process.env.PATH)
} finally {
delete process.env.DSH_ACP_TEST_SECRET_TOKEN

View File

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ After fulfillment, the caller owns the run. Provider-plugin unload does not revo
`InProcessRunOptions` is `{ seed?: SessionEvent[] }`. Spawn omits it. Fork supplies a balanced completed-turn prefix and records its length so the result reader never mistakes a seeded parent message for child output.
`depthOf(agent)` reads `AgentOptions.subagentDepth`, treating absence as top-level depth zero and rejecting malformed stored values. `SubagentDepthError` reports an attempted child depth above `maxDepth`; an unrepresentable depth above the safe-integer domain is a `RangeError`.
Depth enforcement is internal to `startInProcessRun`: it reads `AgentOptions.subagentDepth`, treats absence as top-level depth zero, rejects malformed stored values, and reports an attempted child depth above `maxDepth`. An unrepresentable depth above the safe-integer domain is a `RangeError`.
## Structured output

View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ declare module '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent' {
* @param agent - the agent whose options carry the depth.
* @returns its non-negative safe-integer depth.
*/
export function depthOf(agent: Agent): number {
function depthOf(agent: Agent): number {
const depth = agent.options.subagentDepth
if (depth === undefined) return 0
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(depth) || depth < 0 || Object.is(depth, -0)) {
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ export function depthOf(agent: Agent): number {
}
/** Thrown when starting a child would exceed the requested depth cap. */
export class SubagentDepthError extends Error {
class SubagentDepthError extends Error {
constructor(public readonly attemptedDepth: number, public readonly maxDepth: number) {
super(`subagent depth ${attemptedDepth} exceeds maxDepth ${maxDepth}`)
this.name = 'SubagentDepthError'

View File

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ import AgentLoop from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent-loop'
import * as Invariants from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants'
import SubagentService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent'
import { MockAdapter, textResponse } from '../../../core/agent-loop/tests/mock-adapter.ts'
import { depthOf, SubagentDepthError, startInProcessRun } from '../src/index.ts'
import { startInProcessRun } from '../src/index.ts'
type Script = ConstructorParameters<typeof MockAdapter>[0]
@@ -37,19 +37,6 @@ function text(blocks: readonly { type: string; text?: string }[]): string {
return blocks.filter(block => block.type === 'text').map(block => block.text).join('')
}
describe('depthOf', () => {
it('reads zero for a top-level agent and an explicit child depth', async () => {
const { parent } = await setup([])
expect(depthOf(parent)).toBe(0)
expect(depthOf({ options: { subagentDepth: 3 } } as unknown as Agent)).toBe(3)
})
it.each([Number.NaN, 1.5, -1, -0, Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER + 1])('rejects malformed depth %s', (value) => {
expect(() => depthOf({ options: { subagentDepth: value } } as unknown as Agent))
.toThrow('non-negative safe integer')
})
})
describe('startInProcessRun', () => {
it('returns only after publication, drives a fresh child, and disposes it', async () => {
const { ctx, parent } = await setup([textResponse('driver answer')])
@@ -58,7 +45,7 @@ describe('startInProcessRun', () => {
const result = await run.result
expect(result.stopReason).toBe('completed')
expect(text(result.output)).toBe('driver answer')
expect(depthOf(ctx.agents.get(run.id)!)).toBe(1)
expect(ctx.agents.get(run.id)!.options.subagentDepth).toBe(1)
await run.dispose()
await run.dispose()
expect(ctx.agents.get(run.id)).toBeUndefined()
@@ -83,7 +70,12 @@ describe('startInProcessRun', () => {
await expect(startInProcessRun({ ...request(parent), maxDepth: -1 }, {}))
.rejects.toThrow('non-negative safe integer')
await expect(startInProcessRun({ ...request(parent), maxDepth: 0 }, {}))
.rejects.toBeInstanceOf(SubagentDepthError)
.rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'SubagentDepthError' })
for (const value of [Number.NaN, 1.5, -1, -0, Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER + 1]) {
const malformed = { options: { subagentDepth: value } } as unknown as Agent
await expect(startInProcessRun(request(malformed), {}))
.rejects.toThrow('agent subagentDepth must be a non-negative safe integer')
}
const maxParent = { options: { subagentDepth: Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER } } as unknown as Agent
await expect(startInProcessRun(request(maxParent), {})).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(RangeError)
})

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ import * as Invariants from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants'
import SubagentService, { type SubagentStartRequest } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent'
import { MockAdapter, maxTokensResponse, textResponse, toolCallResponse } from '../../../core/agent-loop/tests/mock-adapter.ts'
import * as spawn from '../src/index.ts'
import { depthOf, STRUCTURED_OUTPUT_TOOL, SubagentDepthError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-inprocess'
import { STRUCTURED_OUTPUT_TOOL } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-subagent-inprocess'
type Script = ConstructorParameters<typeof MockAdapter>[0]
@@ -118,11 +118,11 @@ describe('dsh-subagent-spawn', () => {
it('stamps child depth = parent depth + 1 (via the merged AgentOptions field)', async () => {
const { ctx, parent } = await setup([textResponse('x')])
expect(depthOf(parent)).toBe(0)
expect(parent.options.subagentDepth).toBeUndefined()
const run = await start(ctx, 'spawn', { prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: 'p' }], parent })
await run.result
const child = ctx.agents.get(run.id)!
expect(depthOf(child)).toBe(1)
expect(child.options.subagentDepth).toBe(1)
await run.dispose()
})
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ describe('dsh-subagent-spawn', () => {
const { ctx, parent } = await setup([])
// parent is depth 0, child would be depth 1 — cap at 0 forbids any child.
await expect(start(ctx, 'spawn', { prompt: [{ type: 'text', text: 'p' }], parent, maxDepth: 0 }))
.rejects.toThrow(SubagentDepthError)
.rejects.toThrow('subagent depth 1 exceeds maxDepth 0')
})
it('maps a child that hit its token ceiling to stopReason "max-tokens"', async () => {

View File

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ Every tunable is a **parameter**: the dispose ladder takes its grace periods per
## What it exports
### `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` / `buildChildEnv(extra)`
### `buildChildEnv(extra)`
The credential env scrub (same pattern as the [bash executor](../../bash/bash-local/README.md)): the child env is the ambient env minus credential-shaped vars (`/KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i`), with `extra` layered on top AFTER the scrub. `PATH`, `HOME`, `TMPDIR`, locale, and proxy vars survive, so the child CLI runs normally; the parent's own secrets never leak implicitly, while an explicitly supplied credential (the child's OWN key in a backend's `env` config) still reaches the child.
@@ -14,10 +14,6 @@ The credential env scrub (same pattern as the [bash executor](../../bash/bash-lo
Spawn-failure capture: a promise that resolves (never rejects) with the child's first `error` event. A spawn failure such as `ENOENT` is an event, not a thrown exception — without a listener Node crashes the parent process — so call this in the same tick as `spawn()` and race it in the run's result path; a bad command then settles as an ordinary child-level failure. For a child that spawns cleanly the promise never settles.
### `waitForExit(child)` / `exitsWithin(child, ms)`
Exit waits over a `ChildProcess`: resolve once the child exits by any code or signal (immediately if it is already gone), or race that against a timer (`true` = exited in time). The race cleans up after itself on both outcomes — the pending timer is `unref()`ed and cleared on exit, the exit listener removed on timeout — so repeated calls (the dispose ladder's tiers, a poll loop) never accumulate listeners on the child.
### `disposeChildProcess(child, graces)`
The three-tier dispose ladder. Resolves only once the child has ACTUALLY exited — quiescence reached, not merely requested (see [defensive patterns](../../../docs/defensive-patterns.md)):
@@ -28,6 +24,8 @@ The three-tier dispose ladder. Resolves only once the child has ACTUALLY exited
The two graces (`DisposeLadderGraces`) come from the consuming plugin's `disposeEofGraceMs`/`disposeGraceMs` Config fields; the EOF window is deliberately a separate — usually wider — grace than the signal tier, since a cooperative child's EOF teardown may itself await a signal-trapping grandchild plus a final flush.
The exit waits are internal to this ladder. They clean up their timer and listener on either outcome, so escalation never accumulates listeners on the child.
### `createIsolatedConfigDir(prefix, pinnedPath?)`
A per-run isolated config directory for an external CLI child (the target of `CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR` / `CODEX_HOME`-style redirection), so child behavior is a function of deployment config alone — never of whatever `~/.claude` / `~/.codex`-style state exists on the host. Returns an `IsolatedConfigDir` handle: `path` goes into the child env, `remove()` runs on dispose.

View File

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ import { join } from 'node:path'
* the scrub, so an intended `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` survives while an incidental
* `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` does not.
*/
export const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN = /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i
const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN = /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i
/**
* The ambient env minus credential-shaped vars, plus the caller's explicit
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ export function spawnFailure(child: ChildProcess): Promise<Error> {
* already gone.
* @param child - the child process to await.
*/
export function waitForExit(child: ChildProcess): Promise<void> {
function waitForExit(child: ChildProcess): Promise<void> {
if (child.exitCode !== null || child.signalCode !== null) return Promise.resolve()
return new Promise<void>(resolve => child.once('exit', () => { resolve() }))
}
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ export function waitForExit(child: ChildProcess): Promise<void> {
* @returns `true` if the child exits within `ms` (immediately if it is
* already gone), `false` on timeout.
*/
export function exitsWithin(child: ChildProcess, ms: number): Promise<boolean> {
function exitsWithin(child: ChildProcess, ms: number): Promise<boolean> {
if (child.exitCode !== null || child.signalCode !== null) return Promise.resolve(true)
return new Promise<boolean>((resolve) => {
const onExit = (): void => {

View File

@@ -9,10 +9,7 @@ import {
buildChildEnv,
createIsolatedConfigDir,
disposeChildProcess,
exitsWithin,
SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN,
spawnFailure,
waitForExit,
} from '../src/index.ts'
// `rm` is wrapped (real-passthrough by default) so ONE test can inject a
@@ -47,6 +44,8 @@ interface FakeChildScript {
diesOn?: LethalTrigger
/** Delay (ms) between the lethal trigger and the exit event. */
delayMs?: number
/** Complete the scripted exit inside the triggering call. */
synchronousExit?: boolean
/** `false` models a child spawned without a stdin pipe. */
stdin?: boolean
}
@@ -80,11 +79,13 @@ class FakeChild extends EventEmitter {
// SIGKILL is uncatchable — it always fells the child; any other trigger
// only when the scenario scripts it as the lethal one.
if (trigger !== 'SIGKILL' && this.script.diesOn !== trigger) return
setTimeout(() => {
const exit = (): void => {
if (trigger === 'eof') this.exitCode = 0
else this.signalCode = trigger
this.emit('exit', this.exitCode, this.signalCode)
}, this.script.delayMs ?? 0)
}
if (this.script.synchronousExit === true) exit()
else setTimeout(exit, this.script.delayMs ?? 0)
}
}
@@ -93,7 +94,7 @@ function asChild(fake: FakeChild): ChildProcess {
return fake as unknown as ChildProcess
}
describe('buildChildEnv / SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN', () => {
describe('buildChildEnv', () => {
it('drops credential-shaped ambient vars (KEY/SECRET/TOKEN, case-insensitive)', () => {
process.env.DSH_PROC_TEST_API_KEY = 'leak'
process.env.dsh_proc_test_secret = 'leak'
@@ -111,7 +112,6 @@ describe('buildChildEnv / SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN', () => {
})
it('forwards normal ambient vars', () => {
expect(SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN.test('PATH')).toBe(false)
expect(buildChildEnv({}).PATH).toBe(process.env.PATH)
})
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ describe('spawnFailure', () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ diesOn: 'SIGTERM' })
const failure = spawnFailure(asChild(fake))
fake.kill('SIGTERM')
await waitForExit(asChild(fake))
await new Promise<void>(resolve => fake.once('exit', () => { resolve() }))
// A clean lifecycle emits `exit`, never `error` — the capture stays
// pending forever, so a race against it is decided by the other arms.
const settled = await Promise.race([
@@ -160,51 +160,6 @@ describe('spawnFailure', () => {
})
})
describe('waitForExit / exitsWithin', () => {
it('resolves immediately for a child that already exited by code', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild()
fake.exitCode = 0
await expect(waitForExit(asChild(fake))).resolves.toBeUndefined()
})
it('resolves immediately for a child that already died by signal', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild()
fake.signalCode = 'SIGTERM'
await expect(waitForExit(asChild(fake))).resolves.toBeUndefined()
})
it('resolves on the exit event of a live child', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ diesOn: 'SIGTERM', delayMs: 5 })
const exited = waitForExit(asChild(fake))
fake.kill('SIGTERM')
await expect(exited).resolves.toBeUndefined()
expect(fake.signalCode).toBe('SIGTERM')
})
it('exitsWithin resolves true immediately for an already-exited child (no listener attached)', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild()
fake.exitCode = 0
await expect(exitsWithin(asChild(fake), 1000)).resolves.toBe(true)
expect(fake.listenerCount('exit')).toBe(0)
})
it('exitsWithin resolves true when the child exits inside the window', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ diesOn: 'SIGTERM', delayMs: 5 })
fake.kill('SIGTERM')
await expect(exitsWithin(asChild(fake), 1000)).resolves.toBe(true)
// The once-listener fired and the grace timer was cleared — nothing lingers.
expect(fake.listenerCount('exit')).toBe(0)
})
it('exitsWithin resolves false on timeout for a child that never exits', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild() // nothing short of SIGKILL fells it; no signal sent
await expect(exitsWithin(asChild(fake), 20)).resolves.toBe(false)
// The timeout arm removed its exit listener: repeated waits (a poll loop,
// the ladder's tiers) never accumulate listeners on the same child.
expect(fake.listenerCount('exit')).toBe(0)
})
})
describe('disposeChildProcess', () => {
it('returns immediately for an already-exited child (no EOF, no signals)', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild()
@@ -230,12 +185,28 @@ describe('disposeChildProcess', () => {
expect(fake.exitCode).toBe(0)
})
it('recognizes a child that exits synchronously on stdin EOF', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ diesOn: 'eof', synchronousExit: true })
await disposeChildProcess(asChild(fake), { disposeEofGraceMs: 1000, disposeGraceMs: 1000 })
expect(fake.exitCode).toBe(0)
expect(fake.listenerCount('exit')).toBe(0)
})
it('tier 2: a child that ignores EOF but honors SIGTERM dies on the middle rung', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ diesOn: 'SIGTERM', delayMs: 5 })
await disposeChildProcess(asChild(fake), { disposeEofGraceMs: 20, disposeGraceMs: 1000 })
expect(fake.stdinEnded).toBe(true)
expect(fake.kills).toEqual(['SIGTERM'])
expect(fake.signalCode).toBe('SIGTERM')
expect(fake.listenerCount('exit')).toBe(0)
})
it('recognizes a child that exits synchronously on SIGTERM', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ diesOn: 'SIGTERM', synchronousExit: true })
await disposeChildProcess(asChild(fake), { disposeEofGraceMs: 20, disposeGraceMs: 1000 })
expect(fake.kills).toEqual(['SIGTERM'])
expect(fake.signalCode).toBe('SIGTERM')
expect(fake.listenerCount('exit')).toBe(0)
})
it('tier 3: a SIGTERM-trapping child is SIGKILLed, and dispose resolves only after the exit', async () => {
@@ -247,6 +218,13 @@ describe('disposeChildProcess', () => {
expect(fake.signalCode).toBe('SIGKILL')
})
it('recognizes a child already gone when the final exit wait begins', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ synchronousExit: true })
await disposeChildProcess(asChild(fake), { disposeEofGraceMs: 20, disposeGraceMs: 20 })
expect(fake.kills).toEqual(['SIGTERM', 'SIGKILL'])
expect(fake.signalCode).toBe('SIGKILL')
})
it('walks the ladder for a child spawned without a stdin pipe', async () => {
const fake = new FakeChild({ stdin: false, diesOn: 'SIGTERM', delayMs: 5 })
await disposeChildProcess(asChild(fake), { disposeEofGraceMs: 20, disposeGraceMs: 1000 })