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Merge pull request #120 from deepseek-harness/worktree-hooks-b-bash-seam
feat(bash): stdin + extra env on the executor seam (trusted-plugin surface) (hooks stack PR-B)
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
GitHub
@@ -17,6 +17,24 @@ interface BashExecRequest {
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timeoutMs?: number | undefined
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/** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
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signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
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/**
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* Bytes to write to the command's stdin, then close it. Absent leaves stdin
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* closed/empty (the default for model-driven tool calls). Set by in-process
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* plugins (e.g. the hooks bridges, which write a hook command's JSON payload
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* to its stdin); the model-facing bash tool does not expose it as a parameter
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* (a model that needs stdin uses shell syntax like a heredoc or a pipe).
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*/
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stdin?: string | undefined
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/**
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* Extra environment entries for the command, merged AFTER the
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* implementation's credential scrub (so an explicit entry here is honored even
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* when its name matches the scrub pattern — the caller named a value it holds,
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* not the harness's ambient secret). Set by in-process plugins (the hooks
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* bridges set `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`, `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`, …); the model-facing
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* bash tool does not expose it as a parameter (a model that needs an env var
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* uses shell syntax like `FOO=bar cmd`).
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*/
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env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
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/**
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* Opaque OWNER token for a background task — the consumer's isolation key
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* (the tool layer passes the owning agent's `session.header.id`). The
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@@ -36,6 +54,22 @@ interface BashExecSpec {
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timeoutMs: number
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/** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
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signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
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/**
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* Bytes to write to the command's stdin (then close it), carried through
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* verbatim from {@link BashExecRequest.stdin}. OPTIONAL on the resolved spec
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* (unlike `owner`): it has no config default, so a missing one means "no
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* stdin" — the safe, ordinary case — not a silent footgun, so it stays a
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* plain optional rather than required-but-nullable (see the request field).
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*/
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stdin?: string | undefined
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/**
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* Extra environment entries, carried through verbatim from
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* {@link BashExecRequest.env} and merged by the implementation AFTER its
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* credential scrub (an explicit entry wins even when its name matches the
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* scrub pattern). OPTIONAL on the spec for the same reason as `stdin` — no
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* config default, absent means "no extra env".
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*/
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env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
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/**
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* Opaque owner token, REQUIRED-but-nullable (mirrors `workdir`/`timeoutMs`
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* being required on the resolved spec): {@link BashExecutor.resolve} carries
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@@ -50,6 +84,8 @@ interface BashExecSpec {
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The `owner` token is the isolation key: the executor stores it but never interprets it (access policy is the consumer's job), so a background task started by one agent isn't readable cross-session. A required-but-nullable field makes a forgotten owner a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-unowned task.
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`stdin` and `env` are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges, native plugins) to feed a hook command its JSON payload on stdin and its `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`/`CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT` env. The model-facing `dsh-tool-bash` tool does not expose them as parameters — its request is built from `command`/`workdir`/`timeoutMs`/`signal`/`owner` only — because a model already has equivalent power through shell syntax (`FOO=bar cmd`, a heredoc), so duplicating them as tool params would be redundant. This is NOT a security boundary: the credential scrub in `dsh-bash-local` is what stops the harness's ambient secrets reaching a spawned command, and it works regardless of these fields (a model cannot read a value the scrub removed, and tool-call args are static JSON, never shell-evaluated). A guard test asserts the tool doesn't forward model `env`/`stdin` — to catch a future `...args` spread, not to defend a trust wall. `env` is merged AFTER the scrub so an explicit caller entry (a value it already holds) wins even on a credential-shaped name. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
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Both ids the seam handles are [branded](core.md) (zero-cost `string` brands, the same machinery as `SessionId`/`AgentId`): `BashTaskId` (a tracked background task, generated `bash-N` by the local executor) and `OwnerToken` (the opaque isolation key). `OwnerToken` is deliberately a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId`, not an alias: the bash seam is a capability seam that must not know what an owner token *means*, so it never imports `dsh-session`'s vocabulary — the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts the owning agent's `SessionId` into an `OwnerToken`. Branding both stops a raw `string` (or a `BashTaskId` where an `OwnerToken` is expected, or vice versa) from slipping through the type checker on the model-facing `task_id` path.
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## Foreground runs: `BashRunResult`
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@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ Do NOT write one for a mechanical or local choice (a variable name, a one-file r
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| [Web capability seam — provider registry and model-facing web tools](implemented/architecture/2026-06-24-web-capability-seam.md) | 2026-06-24 |
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| [Make `dsh-fs-policy` an event-gate plugin, not a method interface](implemented/architecture/2026-06-26-file-context-as-event-gate.md) | 2026-06-26 |
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| [Event-domain semantics — session is the fact log, agent is the live surface](implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-event-domain-semantics.md) | 2026-06-30 |
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| [stdin + extra env on the bash seam](implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md) | 2026-06-30 |
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| [Resolve filesystem paths against the caller's session cwd](implemented/architecture/2026-07-02-fs-per-session-cwd.md) | 2026-07-02 |
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| [Tagged render-intent union for tool-call presentation](implemented/architecture/2026-07-02-tool-render-intent-union.md) | 2026-07-02 |
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| [Result-time applied-hunk diffs for file mutations](implemented/architecture/2026-07-02-result-time-applied-hunk-diffs.md) | 2026-07-02 |
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@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
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# RFC: stdin + extra env on the bash seam
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Status: implemented (accepted 2026-06-30)
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<!-- XXX: legacy ADR/RFC body format, not yet normalized to a unified RFC template. -->
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## Context
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The hooks subsystem runs external hook commands the way Claude Code and Codex do: a hook is a shell command that receives its event payload as **JSON on stdin** and reads context from a handful of **environment variables** (`CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`, `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`, `PLUGIN_ROOT`, …). The harness already has a perfectly good command runner behind the `ctx.bash` capability seam ([dsh-bash](../../../../packages/bash/bash) → [dsh-bash-local](../../../../packages/bash/bash-local)), with process-group kills, output truncation/spill, and a credential scrub. Reusing it for hook execution means a hook bridge does not re-implement subprocess plumbing — but the seam had no way to write stdin or set extra env. This RFC adds those two inputs.
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**These fields are NOT a new security boundary.** It is tempting to frame arbitrary-stdin / arbitrary-env as "dangerous, so gate who may use them" — but that framing is wrong, because a model driving the `bash` tool **already** has equivalent power through ordinary shell syntax: `FOO=bar cmd` sets an env var, a heredoc or `printf … | cmd` feeds arbitrary stdin. Adding `env`/`stdin` as seam fields grants the model no capability it lacks. In particular they cannot exfiltrate the harness's ambient credentials: the real control for that is the **credential scrub** in [dsh-bash-local](../../../../packages/bash/bash-local)'s `childEnv()`, which strips `*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*` from `process.env` before the child sees it (see [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § Defensive patterns, "Never hand untrusted/model output the ambient environment or predictable paths"). The scrub works regardless of these fields — a model cannot read a value that is not in the environment, and tool-call arguments are static JSON, never shell-evaluated, so a model cannot write `env: {LEAK: $DEEPSEEK_API_KEY}` and have it expand. So the security question is already answered by the scrub; this RFC is only about giving trusted in-process callers a clean way to pass a JSON payload + `CLAUDE_*` vars without routing them through model-visible shell text.
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## Decision
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Add `stdin?: string` and `env?: Record<string, string>` to **both** `BashExecRequest` (the model-/plugin-facing request) and `BashExecSpec` (the resolved spec `run`/`start` act on), and thread them through `dsh-bash-local`: `resolve()` carries them verbatim, `run()`/`start()` pass them to `runBash`, which writes the bytes to the child's stdin and merges the extra env.
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Three deliberate choices:
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1. **The model-facing `bash` tool simply does NOT expose `stdin`/`env` as parameters** — not as a security wall, but because bash syntax already covers the model's needs, so duplicating them as tool params would be redundant surface. [dsh-tool-bash](../../../../packages/bash/tool-bash)'s `bash` tool builds its `BashExecRequest` from `command`/`workdir`/`timeoutMs`/`signal`/`owner` only; a model that includes `env`/`stdin` keys in its tool-call arguments simply has them ignored. A regression guard (`tool-bash` "does not forward env/stdin" tests) drives the real tool with those extra args and asserts the recorded request carries neither field — its purpose is to catch a future refactor that blindly spreads `...args` into the request and silently starts forwarding model input into the post-scrub `env` merge, NOT to defend a trust boundary. In-process plugins (the hooks bridges, native plugins) that construct a `BashExecRequest` directly set the fields; the seam imposes no access policy (consistent with how `owner` works — the executor stores but never interprets it).
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2. **`env` merges AFTER the credential scrub, so an explicit caller entry always wins** — even a credential-shaped name. This is correct because the scrub's job is narrow: stop the harness's *ambient* `process.env` credentials from leaking into a spawned command. A caller that explicitly sets a var has named a value it already holds (not the ambient secret), so the scrub is not a constraint on it. `childEnv(extra?)` layers `scrub(process.env)` → `ENV_OVERRIDES` (the model-friendly `TERM=dumb` etc.) → `extra`, last-wins.
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3. **`stdin`/`env` are required-absent-OK (plain optional) on the resolved spec, NOT required-but-nullable like `owner`.** `owner` is required-but-nullable because a *silently* missing owner yields an unowned, cross-session-readable task — a security footgun that a visible `undefined` guards against. `stdin`/`env` have no such hazard: a missing one means "no stdin / no extra env", which is the safe, ordinary case (every model-driven call). So they stay plain optionals, matching `signal`.
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`dsh-bash-local` spawns stdin as a `'pipe'` (writing the supplied bytes, then closing) ONLY when a caller set `stdin`; with none supplied it uses `'ignore'` — fd 0 → `/dev/null` — the exact pre-seam default. This distinction is observable and deliberate: a closed empty pipe and `/dev/null` are NOT the same file type (node's spawn pipe is an `AF_UNIX` socket, so `test -c /dev/stdin` holds for `/dev/null` but not for an empty pipe), so the no-stdin path — every model-driven call — must keep `/dev/null` rather than regress to an always-open pipe. Each branch's `stdio` tuple is a literal, which preserves the typed `spawn` overload that guarantees non-null `stdout`/`stderr`. When stdin IS written, a child that exits without reading makes the write fail EPIPE; that error is swallowed (the command's outcome rides on its exit code/output, not the write) so it never crashes the host or rejects `done`.
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## Scope: configurable scrub pattern is NOT included
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An earlier sketch of this work also proposed making `SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN` configurable. Validating against the code, that is **speculative and already subsumed**: `run.ts` documents a configurable whitelist as future work, and the new explicit `env` field — merged after the scrub — already gives a caller full control, including over credential-shaped vars. There is no current caller that needs to *broaden* the ambient scrub (the hazard runs the other way). Adding a config knob now would be a feature with no consumer, against [AGENTS.md](../../../../AGENTS.md) § "Don't add features beyond what the task requires". If a real workflow ever needs to forward a specific ambient credential, the explicit `env` field is the supported path; a configurable scrub can be reconsidered then.
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## Consequences
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A hook bridge builds a `BashExecRequest` with the hook's JSON payload as `stdin` and its `CLAUDE_*`/`PLUGIN_ROOT` vars as `env`, and runs it through the same `ctx.bash` everything else uses — no bespoke subprocess code, and the full process-group-kill / truncation / spill machinery for free. The model-facing attack surface is unchanged (the credential scrub, not these fields, is what bounds it), and the `bash` tool's request-building stays the single place that decides which fields a model call carries — guarded by a test that fails if a refactor starts forwarding model input. The vocabulary addition is documented in [docs/core-data-structures/bash.md](../../../core-data-structures/bash.md) (the `type-equiv` request/spec blocks) and the three bash-package READMEs.
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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi;
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- **Spawn per call, no shell state** — every call is a fresh non-login `bash -c` (deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call. `XXX(stateful-shell)` in `src/run.ts` records the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them.
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- **Process-group kills with escalation** — children are spawned `detached` (own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after a 3s grace (OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools.
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- **Tail-keep truncation + spill files** — output beyond `maxOutputBytes` keeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file.
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- **Model-friendly env** — `NO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat` (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results.
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- **Model-friendly env + credential scrub** — `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars (`*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*`), then `NO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat` (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. This scrub is the security control that keeps the harness's *ambient* credentials out of a spawned command. A spec's `env` is merged LAST (after the scrub), so a caller's explicit entry — a value it already holds — wins even on a credential-shaped name. The spec's `stdin`, when supplied, is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, fd 0 is `/dev/null` — the exact pre-seam default, so a command that probes stdin's file type is unaffected. Both `env`/`stdin` are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges); the model-facing tool doesn't expose them. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
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- **Background tasks** — `start()` returns immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding), `readOutput()` is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills everything. The spec's opaque `owner` token is stored on the tracked task and returned by `ownerOf(id)` — the executor never interprets it (the consumer's access policy does), and because it lives with the task here it survives a `tool-bash` HMR reload.
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## Sandboxing
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@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
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workdir: request.workdir ?? this.config.cwd ?? process.cwd(),
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timeoutMs,
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...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
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// Carry stdin/env through verbatim — optional, no config default (absent
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// means none). env merges AFTER the scrub in run.ts.
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...request.stdin !== undefined ? { stdin: request.stdin } : {},
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...request.env !== undefined ? { env: request.env } : {},
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// Carry the owner through verbatim (required-but-nullable on the spec):
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// the executor never interprets it — the consumer's access policy does.
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owner: request.owner,
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@@ -129,6 +133,8 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
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timeoutMs: spec.timeoutMs,
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maxOutputBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
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signal: spec.signal,
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stdin: spec.stdin,
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env: spec.env,
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}, this.internals).done
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return { ...outcome, timeoutMs: spec.timeoutMs }
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}
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@@ -145,6 +151,8 @@ export class LocalBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
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timeoutMs: 0,
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maxOutputBytes: this.config.maxOutputBytes,
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signal: spec.signal,
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stdin: spec.stdin,
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env: spec.env,
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}, this.internals)
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const id = BashTaskId(`bash-${this.nextTaskId++}`)
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@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@
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* @module dsh-bash-local/run
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*/
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import { spawn } from 'node:child_process'
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import { type ChildProcessByStdio, spawn } from 'node:child_process'
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import type { Readable, Writable } from 'node:stream'
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import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'
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import { closeSync, mkdtempSync, openSync, writeSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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@@ -42,13 +43,26 @@ export const ENV_OVERRIDES = {
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*/
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export const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN = /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i
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/** process.env minus credential-shaped vars, plus the model-friendly overrides. */
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export function childEnv(): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
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/**
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* `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars, plus the model-friendly
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* overrides, plus any caller-supplied `extra` entries.
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*
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* Layering matters: the scrub drops `process.env` credentials, then
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* `ENV_OVERRIDES` forces the model-friendly terminal vars, then `extra` is
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* merged LAST so an explicit caller entry wins even when its name matches the
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* scrub pattern (the scrub is the control that stops the HARNESS's ambient
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* credentials leaking into a spawned command; a caller that explicitly sets a
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* var named a value it already holds, not that ambient secret). `extra` is set
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* by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges), not the model — `dsh-tool-bash`
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* builds its request from named fields only and does not forward model input
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* here (see its README, § "The tool builds its request from named args only").
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*/
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export function childEnv(extra?: Record<string, string>): NodeJS.ProcessEnv {
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const env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = {}
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for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(process.env)) {
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if (!SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN.test(key)) env[key] = value
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}
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return { ...env, ...ENV_OVERRIDES }
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return { ...env, ...ENV_OVERRIDES, ...extra }
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}
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/** What to run and under which limits (resolved — no defaults in here). */
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@@ -61,6 +75,19 @@ export interface SpawnSpec {
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maxOutputBytes: number
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/** Abort signal — kills the process group when fired. */
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signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
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/**
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* Bytes to write to the child's stdin, then close it. Absent (or empty)
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* leaves stdin closed/empty. Set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges);
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* the model-facing `dsh-tool-bash` tool does not thread model input here.
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*/
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stdin?: string | undefined
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/**
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* Extra environment entries, merged onto the scrubbed env AFTER the
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* credential scrub and the model-friendly overrides (so an explicit entry
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* wins). Set by in-process plugins; the model-facing tool does not forward
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* model input here.
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*/
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env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
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}
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/** Raw outcome of one closed process (before result shaping). */
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@@ -272,12 +299,20 @@ export function runBash(spec: SpawnSpec, internals: RunInternals = {}): RunningB
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throw new Error(`aborted before spawn: ${String(spec.signal.reason ?? 'aborted')}`)
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}
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const child = spawn('bash', ['-c', spec.command], {
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cwd: spec.cwd,
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env: childEnv(),
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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detached: true,
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})
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// stdin is a pipe ONLY when the caller supplied bytes; with none it is `ignore`
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// (fd 0 → /dev/null) — the exact pre-seam default. This matters: a spawn pipe
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// and /dev/null are NOT observationally identical (node's pipe is an AF_UNIX
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// socket, so a command that probes stdin's type — `test -c /dev/stdin`, `stat
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// /proc/self/fd/0` — sees a char device vs a socket), so the no-stdin path
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// (every model-driven call) must keep /dev/null rather than regress to a socket.
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// Two LITERAL `stdio` tuples (not one variable tuple): only a literal lets the
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// typed `spawn` overload infer non-null stdout/stderr, which the
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// `ChildProcessByStdio` annotation captures (stdin `Writable | null`; stdout/
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// stderr the non-null `Readable` the collectors attach to without a cast).
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const env = childEnv(spec.env)
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const child: ChildProcessByStdio<Writable | null, Readable, Readable> = spec.stdin !== undefined
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? spawn('bash', ['-c', spec.command], { cwd: spec.cwd, env, stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'], detached: true })
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: spawn('bash', ['-c', spec.command], { cwd: spec.cwd, env, stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'], detached: true })
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const stdout = new OutputCollector(spec.maxOutputBytes, 'stdout', spillDir)
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const stderr = new OutputCollector(spec.maxOutputBytes, 'stderr', spillDir)
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@@ -312,6 +347,24 @@ export function runBash(spec: SpawnSpec, internals: RunInternals = {}): RunningB
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}
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spec.signal?.addEventListener('abort', onAbort, { once: true })
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// Write stdin and close it, but ONLY when the caller supplied bytes — with no
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// stdin, fd 0 is `ignore` (/dev/null) and `child.stdin` is null. The error
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// handler must exist whenever we write: an unhandled 'error' on the stream
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// would throw and crash the host. We swallow the error rather than reject
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// `done`, and that is correct for ANY stdin-write error, not just the common
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// one — the stdin write is BEST-EFFORT, while the command's authoritative
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// outcome is its exit code + captured output, which the `close` handler reports
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// regardless of whether the write landed. The expected case is EPIPE (the child
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// exited without reading, so closing our end of a still-full pipe fails); a rare
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// non-EPIPE pipe fault means the command ran with incomplete stdin, and it
|
||||
// surfaces that itself through its own exit/output (e.g. a hook that gets
|
||||
// truncated JSON errors out) — rejecting here would instead discard that real
|
||||
// output and turn it into an opaque infrastructure error, which is worse.
|
||||
if (child.stdin !== null) {
|
||||
child.stdin.on('error', () => { /* stdin write is best-effort; outcome rides on exit/output. */ })
|
||||
child.stdin.end(spec.stdin)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const done = new Promise<SpawnOutcome>((resolve, reject) => {
|
||||
child.on('error', (error) => {
|
||||
// Spawn-level failure (ENOENT cwd, EACCES, …): no close event with
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,6 +106,23 @@ describe('LocalBashExecutor.run', () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
await expect(bash.run(bash.resolve({ command: 'true', workdir: '/nonexistent-dsh' }))).rejects.toThrow(/ENOENT/)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('resolve() carries stdin/env onto the spec, and run() threads them to the command', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const spec = bash.resolve({ command: 'cat; echo "[$DSH_SEAM_VAR]"', stdin: 'piped\n', env: { DSH_SEAM_VAR: 'env-ok' } })
|
||||
// resolve() keeps the stdin/env fields verbatim (optional, no default).
|
||||
expect(spec.stdin).toBe('piped\n')
|
||||
expect(spec.env).toEqual({ DSH_SEAM_VAR: 'env-ok' })
|
||||
const result = await bash.run(spec)
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('piped\n[env-ok]\n')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('resolve() omits stdin/env when the request supplies neither', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const spec = bash.resolve({ command: 'true' })
|
||||
expect('stdin' in spec).toBe(false)
|
||||
expect('env' in spec).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('LocalBashExecutor background tasks', () => {
|
||||
@@ -131,6 +148,19 @@ describe('LocalBashExecutor background tasks', () => {
|
||||
await Promise.all([first.done, second.done])
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('threads stdin and extra env into a background task', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({
|
||||
command: 'cat; echo "[$DSH_BG_VAR]"',
|
||||
stdin: 'bg-stdin\n',
|
||||
env: { DSH_BG_VAR: 'bg-env' },
|
||||
}))
|
||||
const read = await readUntil(bash, task.id, '[bg-env]')
|
||||
expect(read.delta).toContain('bg-stdin')
|
||||
await task.done
|
||||
expect(task.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('readOutput returns increments without re-delivery', async () => {
|
||||
const { bash } = await setup()
|
||||
const task = bash.start(bash.resolve({ command: 'echo first; sleep 1; echo second' }))
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,6 +158,62 @@ describe('runBash', () => {
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('stdin and extra env (set by in-process plugins)', () => {
|
||||
it('writes stdin to the command and closes it', async () => {
|
||||
const result = await runBash(spec('cat', { stdin: 'hello from stdin\n' })).done
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('hello from stdin\n')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a command that reads stdin sees EOF when none is supplied', async () => {
|
||||
// No stdin → fd 0 is /dev/null, so `cat` reads EOF and exits 0 with no
|
||||
// output (it does NOT block).
|
||||
const result = await runBash(spec('cat')).done
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(0)
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('gives fd 0 the exact pre-seam type: /dev/null when no stdin, a pipe when supplied', async () => {
|
||||
// The no-stdin path must stay observationally identical to the pre-seam
|
||||
// `ignore` default: a command that probes stdin's file type sees a char
|
||||
// device (/dev/null). Regressing to an always-open pipe would make fd 0 a
|
||||
// socket (node's spawn pipe is an AF_UNIX socket, not a FIFO), flipping
|
||||
// `test -c /dev/stdin` for every model-driven call. When bytes ARE supplied,
|
||||
// fd 0 is that pipe (a socket), as it must be to carry them.
|
||||
const none = await runBash(spec('test -c /dev/stdin && echo char || echo other')).done
|
||||
expect(none.stdout.text).toBe('char\n')
|
||||
const piped = await runBash(spec('test -S /dev/stdin && echo socket || echo other', { stdin: 'x' })).done
|
||||
expect(piped.stdout.text).toBe('socket\n')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('merges extra env entries onto the scrubbed environment', async () => {
|
||||
const result = await runBash(spec('echo "$DSH_EXTRA_ONE/$DSH_EXTRA_TWO"', {
|
||||
env: { DSH_EXTRA_ONE: 'alpha', DSH_EXTRA_TWO: 'beta' },
|
||||
})).done
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('alpha/beta\n')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('an explicit extra env entry overrides the model-friendly override and the scrub', async () => {
|
||||
// TERM is a model-friendly OVERRIDE (dumb); an explicit extra entry wins.
|
||||
// DSH_OVERRIDE_KEY matches the credential scrub pattern, yet an explicit
|
||||
// entry is still honored — the scrub only drops AMBIENT process.env creds.
|
||||
const result = await runBash(spec('echo "$TERM/$DSH_OVERRIDE_KEY"', {
|
||||
env: { TERM: 'xterm-256color', DSH_OVERRIDE_KEY: 'explicit-wins' },
|
||||
})).done
|
||||
expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('xterm-256color/explicit-wins\n')
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not crash or reject when the child ignores a large stdin (EPIPE)', async () => {
|
||||
// The child exits immediately without reading; closing our end of a stdin
|
||||
// pipe still holding ~1MiB triggers EPIPE on the write. The handler must
|
||||
// swallow it: `done` resolves normally with the child's real exit.
|
||||
const big = 'x'.repeat(1024 * 1024)
|
||||
const result = await runBash(spec('exit 7', { stdin: big })).done
|
||||
expect(result.exitCode).toBe(7)
|
||||
expect(result.aborted).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('output truncation and spill', () => {
|
||||
it('keeps the tail and spills the full stream to disk', async () => {
|
||||
// 200 numbered lines of ~10 bytes; cap at 500 bytes keeps a late tail.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,4 +28,6 @@ Implementations subclass `BashExecutor`, implement the abstract methods, and cal
|
||||
|
||||
## Vocabulary
|
||||
|
||||
`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, owner?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, owner) before execution; `owner` is optional on the request and **required-but-nullable** (`OwnerToken | undefined`) on the resolved spec, so a forgotten owner is a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-absent property. The task id (`BashTaskId`) and the `owner` token (`OwnerToken`) are [branded](../../util/brand) — `OwnerToken` is a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId` (the seam never imports `dsh-session`; the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts its `SessionId` into one). `run()` returns `BashRunResult` (exitCode, signal, timedOut, aborted, timeoutMs, stdout/stderr as `CollectedOutput`) and `start()`/`readOutput()` use `BashTask`/`BashTaskRead` for the background side. See `src/types.ts` for the full contracts.
|
||||
`BashExecRequest` (command, workdir?, timeoutMs?, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner?) resolves to `BashExecSpec` (command, workdir, timeoutMs, signal?, stdin?, env?, owner) before execution; `owner` is optional on the request and **required-but-nullable** (`OwnerToken | undefined`) on the resolved spec, so a forgotten owner is a visible `undefined` rather than a silently-absent property. The task id (`BashTaskId`) and the `owner` token (`OwnerToken`) are [branded](../../util/brand) — `OwnerToken` is a DISTINCT brand from `SessionId` (the seam never imports `dsh-session`; the `dsh-tool-bash` consumer is the single boundary that casts its `SessionId` into one). `run()` returns `BashRunResult` (exitCode, signal, timedOut, aborted, timeoutMs, stdout/stderr as `CollectedOutput`) and `start()`/`readOutput()` use `BashTask`/`BashTaskRead` for the background side. See `src/types.ts` for the full contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
`stdin` and `env` are set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges, native plugins) to feed a hook command its JSON payload on stdin and its `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`/`CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT` env. The model-facing `dsh-tool-bash` tool does not expose them as parameters — a model already has equivalent power through shell syntax (`FOO=bar cmd`, a heredoc), so they would be redundant tool params. This is not a security boundary: the implementation's credential scrub (not these fields) is what keeps the harness's ambient secrets out of a spawned command. They are plain optionals on the resolved spec (unlike `owner`'s required-but-nullable): a missing one means "none", the safe default. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,24 @@ export interface BashExecRequest {
|
||||
timeoutMs?: number | undefined
|
||||
/** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
|
||||
signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Bytes to write to the command's stdin, then close it. Absent leaves stdin
|
||||
* closed/empty (the default for model-driven tool calls). Set by in-process
|
||||
* plugins (e.g. the hooks bridges, which write a hook command's JSON payload
|
||||
* to its stdin); the model-facing bash tool does not expose it as a parameter
|
||||
* (a model that needs stdin uses shell syntax like a heredoc or a pipe).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
stdin?: string | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Extra environment entries for the command, merged AFTER the
|
||||
* implementation's credential scrub (so an explicit entry here is honored even
|
||||
* when its name matches the scrub pattern — the caller named a value it holds,
|
||||
* not the harness's ambient secret). Set by in-process plugins (the hooks
|
||||
* bridges set `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR`, `CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT`, …); the model-facing
|
||||
* bash tool does not expose it as a parameter (a model that needs an env var
|
||||
* uses shell syntax like `FOO=bar cmd`).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Opaque OWNER token for a background task — the consumer's isolation key
|
||||
* (the tool layer passes the owning agent's `session.header.id`). The
|
||||
@@ -70,6 +88,22 @@ export interface BashExecSpec {
|
||||
timeoutMs: number
|
||||
/** Abort signal — implementations kill the command when it fires. */
|
||||
signal?: AbortSignal | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Bytes to write to the command's stdin (then close it), carried through
|
||||
* verbatim from {@link BashExecRequest.stdin}. OPTIONAL on the resolved spec
|
||||
* (unlike `owner`): it has no config default, so a missing one means "no
|
||||
* stdin" — the safe, ordinary case — not a silent footgun, so it stays a
|
||||
* plain optional rather than required-but-nullable (see the request field).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
stdin?: string | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Extra environment entries, carried through verbatim from
|
||||
* {@link BashExecRequest.env} and merged by the implementation AFTER its
|
||||
* credential scrub (an explicit entry wins even when its name matches the
|
||||
* scrub pattern). OPTIONAL on the spec for the same reason as `stdin` — no
|
||||
* config default, absent means "no extra env".
|
||||
*/
|
||||
env?: Record<string, string> | undefined
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Opaque owner token, REQUIRED-but-nullable (mirrors `workdir`/`timeoutMs`
|
||||
* being required on the resolved spec): {@link BashExecutor.resolve} carries
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ These tools own how their calls render in a UI (an editor's tool-call card) via
|
||||
|
||||
When a background task finishes, a short notice is injected into the owning agent's session (`agent.inject()`, source `{kind: 'plugin', plugin: 'tool-bash'}`). The owning agent is found by its session token: the listener reads `ctx.bash.ownerOf(task.id)` and scans `ctx.get('agents')?.list()` for an agent whose `session.header.id` matches (read via `ctx.get` — `onTaskDone` runs on the bash fiber, a foreign fiber, so the `ctx.agents` proxy would throw). If no live agent carries that token — e.g. the owning session disconnected and its agent was disposed while the task ran on — the notice is dropped cleanly. Injection is **durable context for the next model request, not a wake-up** — an idle agent stays idle until something sends a message. That's why the tool descriptions tell the model to poll with `bash_output`.
|
||||
|
||||
## The tool builds its request from named args only
|
||||
|
||||
The `BashExecRequest` seam carries optional `stdin` and `env`, used by the hooks bridges to feed a hook command its JSON payload and `CLAUDE_*` env. This tool does **not** expose them as parameters: its request is built from `command`/`workdir`/`timeoutMs`/`signal`/`owner` only, so a model that includes `env` or `stdin` keys in its tool arguments has them ignored. This is not a trust boundary — a model already has equivalent power through shell syntax (`FOO=bar cmd`, a heredoc), and the real defense against leaking the harness's ambient secrets is `dsh-bash-local`'s credential scrub, which works regardless. A regression guard drives the real tool with those extra args and asserts the resulting request carries neither field — its job is to catch a future refactor that blindly spreads `...args` into the request (which would silently forward model input into the post-scrub `env` merge), not to defend a wall. See [the bash-stdin-env RFC](../../../docs/rfc/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Permissions
|
||||
|
||||
`TODO(permissions)`: commands run with the executor's full authority. The permission/sandbox seam is the `tools/execute` waterfall (veto or ask) plus sandboxing `BashExecutor` implementations — see docs/architecture.md. `@cordisjs/plugin-capability` (a named-permission service with a session `test()`) is a candidate building block for that work.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -857,3 +857,105 @@ describe('tool-owned UI presentation (presentCall / presentResult)', () => {
|
||||
expect(ctx.tools.get('bash')?.presentCall?.({ command: 'ls' })).toBeUndefined()
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no {...args} forward)', () => {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Records every {@link BashExecRequest} the consumer hands to `resolve()`, so a
|
||||
* test can assert what the model-facing tool DID and DID NOT forward. The `bash`
|
||||
* tool does not expose `stdin`/`env` as parameters (bash syntax already gives a
|
||||
* model that power), so it must build its request from named args only and
|
||||
* never spread unknown tool-call keys into it. This guard's job is to catch a
|
||||
* future refactor that blindly forwards `...args` — which would silently thread
|
||||
* model input into the post-scrub `env` merge — NOT to defend a trust boundary
|
||||
* (the credential scrub in dsh-bash-local is the security control; see the
|
||||
* bash-stdin-env RFC). Foreground `run()` returns a canned result; `start()` is
|
||||
* unused here.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class RecordingBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
|
||||
readonly requests: BashExecRequest[] = []
|
||||
resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
|
||||
this.requests.push(request)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
command: request.command,
|
||||
workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
|
||||
timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
|
||||
...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
|
||||
...request.stdin !== undefined ? { stdin: request.stdin } : {},
|
||||
...request.env !== undefined ? { env: request.env } : {},
|
||||
owner: request.owner,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
run(): Promise<BashRunResult> {
|
||||
return Promise.resolve({
|
||||
exitCode: 0, signal: null, timedOut: false, aborted: false, timeoutMs: 0,
|
||||
stdout: { text: 'ok', truncated: false }, stderr: { text: '', truncated: false },
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
start(): BashTask { throw new Error('unused') }
|
||||
get(): BashTask | undefined { return undefined }
|
||||
ownerOf(): OwnerToken | undefined { return undefined }
|
||||
list(): BashTask[] { return [] }
|
||||
readOutput(): BashTaskRead { throw new Error('unused') }
|
||||
kill(): boolean { return false }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async function setupRecording() {
|
||||
const ctx = new Context()
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(RecordingBashExecutor)
|
||||
await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
|
||||
return { ctx, bash: ctx.bash as RecordingBashExecutor }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
it('does not forward env/stdin even when the model includes them as extra arguments', async () => {
|
||||
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
|
||||
// Extra args: the model includes `env` and `stdin` keys hoping they reach the
|
||||
// executor. The bash tool's schema ignores unknown keys, and execute() builds
|
||||
// the request from only command/workdir/timeoutMs/signal — so the recorded
|
||||
// request carries NEITHER. (Not a security wall — the model could set an env
|
||||
// var or feed stdin via shell syntax anyway; this just keeps the request
|
||||
// shape honest so a future `...args` spread can't silently forward input.)
|
||||
await ctx.tools.execute({
|
||||
callId: CallId('no-forward-1'),
|
||||
name: 'bash',
|
||||
arguments: {
|
||||
command: 'echo hi',
|
||||
description: 'echo',
|
||||
env: { SNEAKY_API_KEY: 'leak' },
|
||||
stdin: 'malicious payload',
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(bash.requests).toHaveLength(1)
|
||||
const request = bash.requests[0]!
|
||||
expect(request.command).toBe('echo hi')
|
||||
expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
|
||||
expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
it('a background bash call likewise carries no env/stdin', async () => {
|
||||
const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
|
||||
// start() throws in this recorder, but resolve() runs first and records the
|
||||
// request — which is all this no-forward assertion needs.
|
||||
await ctx.tools.execute({
|
||||
callId: CallId('no-forward-2'),
|
||||
name: 'bash',
|
||||
arguments: {
|
||||
command: 'sleep 1',
|
||||
description: 'sleep',
|
||||
run_in_background: true,
|
||||
env: { TOKEN: 'leak' },
|
||||
stdin: 'x',
|
||||
},
|
||||
})
|
||||
expect(bash.requests).toHaveLength(1)
|
||||
const request = bash.requests[0]!
|
||||
expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
|
||||
expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
|
||||
// The owner token IS set on a background call (the isolation fence) — proving
|
||||
// the recorder sees the real request the consumer built, so the absent
|
||||
// env/stdin above is a real negative, not a recorder that drops everything.
|
||||
expect('owner' in request).toBe(true)
|
||||
})
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user