fix(subprocess): scrub ambient password variables

packages/lsp/lsp-local/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
-#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-README.md: 85254eea2bb74df277be6fd5de1529b5da4ea178
-README.zh.md: 290601d455ba2012d0c1f5c97503ae87304881cb
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/lsp/lsp-local/README.md
+README.md: 40515ad173dec8cfe6a0937525612b7f18d22fb8
+README.zh.md: fdd0673a6291bdadb8a583fcade5d96e26c7757b

packages/lsp/lsp-local/README.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ The `servers` record key is the stable provider id reserved on `ctx.lsp`; each v
 |---|---|---|
 | `command` | (required) | Executable to spawn — absolute, or resolved on the child PATH at load. Launch uses no shell. |
 | `args` | `[]` | Arguments passed to the executable. |
-| `env` | `{}` | Extra env merged on top of the credential-scrubbed ambient env (vars matching `KEY`/`SECRET`/`TOKEN` are not forwarded); an explicit `DSH_*` entry merges after the seam's scrub of ambient ones. |
+| `env` | `{}` | Extra env merged on top of the credential-scrubbed ambient env (vars matching `KEY`/`PASSWORD`/`SECRET`/`TOKEN` are not forwarded); an explicit `DSH_*` entry merges after the seam's scrub of ambient ones. |
 | `extensionToLanguage` | (required) | Lowercase leading-dot extension → LSP language id (e.g. `{ '.ts': 'typescript' }`). |
 | `initializationOptions` | `null` | Static `initialize` options forwarded to the server. |
 | `configuration` | `null` | Static answer to every `workspace/configuration` item. |

packages/lsp/lsp-local/README.zh.md

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Namespace 插件（`name`／`inject`／`Config`／`apply`，无默认导出）
 |---|---|---|
 | `command` | （必填） | 要 spawn 的可执行文件：绝对路径，或在加载时从子进程 PATH 解析。不使用 shell 启动。 |
 | `args` | `[]` | 传给可执行文件的参数。 |
-| `env` | `{}` | 合并到已清理 credential 的环境之上的额外 env（匹配 `KEY`／`SECRET`／`TOKEN` 的变量不会转发）；显式 `DSH_*` 条目在 seam 清除环境中同名值之后合并。 |
+| `env` | `{}` | 合并到已清理 credential 的环境之上的额外 env（匹配 `KEY`／`PASSWORD`／`SECRET`／`TOKEN` 的变量不会转发）；显式 `DSH_*` 条目在 seam 清除环境中同名值之后合并。 |
 | `extensionToLanguage` | （必填） | 小写、以点开头的扩展名 → LSP language id（例如 `{ '.ts': 'typescript' }`）。 |
 | `initializationOptions` | `null` | 转发给服务器的静态 `initialize` 选项。 |
 | `configuration` | `null` | 每个 `workspace/configuration` 配置项的静态答案。 |

packages/subprocess/subprocess-local/README.i18n.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
 # side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
 # after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
-#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
-README.md: a4e20b5c64afd14cb9dce9f8cc46fa96a1f5f19d
-README.zh.md: 2bd7ebe7c3407a4ad6a86c520594465f7f1e710c
+#   pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write packages/subprocess/subprocess-local/README.md
+README.md: 202fc57080400afcbf5a65c17ea6bc8ac758c96f
+README.zh.md: 93770f3c33ae3b8880bbf007586a3a9531602f5e

packages/subprocess/subprocess-local/README.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Local implementation of the [`@deepseek-ai/dsh-subprocess`](../subprocess/README
 
 - **Detached process trees with platform-correct signalling** — POSIX children are spawned `detached` (own process group) and signalled by negative pgid with a direct-child fallback; Windows terminates the tree via `taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` (injectable for tests). `terminate()` — the handle's only termination verb — sends SIGTERM then SIGKILL after the spec's grace (OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent) and is a no-op once the tree is gone; `waitForExit()` polls whole-tree liveness so consumer teardown confirms real quiescence. After the leader exits, still-open pipes receive the same bounded drain grace so a surviving descendant cannot hold the outcome open indefinitely. ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — the same caveat as the surveyed tools.
 - **Per-stream dispositions** — `'pipe'` hands the raw stream to the caller untouched (protocol framing stays consumer-owned); `'inherit'` passes the parent descriptor through; collect mode keeps the in-memory TAIL beyond its cap (errors and results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a private temp file when a spill cap is configured — omitting `spill` keeps only the tail, the diagnostic shape. A stream larger than the spill cap discards its now-incomplete spill and returns only the marked truncated tail; spill fds are sealed at settlement, and a failed final close withholds the path rather than advertising an incomplete file. Spill files are `0600` with random names under a lazily-created `0700` per-process directory.
-- **Credential scrub + explicit merge** — `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars (`*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*`) and all ambient `DSH_*` names; the spec's explicit `env` merges after that scrub with no namespace validation, so a deliberately supplied credential or current `DSH_*` fact wins while stale nested-harness identity cannot leak in ambiently. Supplied stdin is written and closed; otherwise fd 0 is `/dev/null`. See the [stdin/env Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md) and [managed environment Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-10-agent-session-identity-and-log-location.md).
+- **Credential scrub + explicit merge** — `process.env` minus credential-shaped vars (`*KEY*`/`*PASSWORD*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*`) and all ambient `DSH_*` names; the spec's explicit `env` merges after that scrub with no namespace validation, so a deliberately supplied credential or current `DSH_*` fact wins while stale nested-harness identity cannot leak in ambiently. Supplied stdin is written and closed; otherwise fd 0 is `/dev/null`. See the [stdin/env Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md) and [managed environment Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-10-agent-session-identity-and-log-location.md).
 - **Offset-based reads** — collect-mode readers return deltas in whole-stream byte coordinates; the service never holds a cursor, so consumer-owned cursors (the bash background read path) and full-stream re-reads coexist, before and after settlement.
 - **Terminate-and-join disposal** — the service retains live handles only so its own disposal can escalate every running tree and await its exit; settled and spawn-failed handles leave the live set on settlement.
 
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ No direct invalidation; the named consumers own any request-prefix changes.
 ## Known Limitations and Deferred Work
 
 - **Windows tree support is best-effort and untested in CI** — termination routes through `taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` with all outcomes contained (absent tree, races, missing binary), and liveness falls back to the direct-child boundary; the suites cover the routing through an injected runner only, and `packages/subprocess/*` is excluded from the Windows test matrix.
-- **The credential scrub is a name heuristic** — `*KEY*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*` only; differently-named secrets (e.g. `*PASSWORD*`) pass through, and a whitelist for over-scrubbed vars is noted future work.
+- **The credential scrub is a name heuristic** — `*KEY*`/`*PASSWORD*`/`*SECRET*`/`*TOKEN*` only; differently-named secrets (e.g. `*PASSPHRASE*`) pass through, and a whitelist for over-scrubbed vars is noted future work.
 - **Completed spill files are not deleted** — bounded full-output recovery files (and the private per-process spill dir) accumulate under the OS tmpdir until something external cleans them; oversize incomplete spills are discarded and deletion is attempted immediately, but a cleanup failure can leave a bounded file behind.
 
 The raw process handling lives in `src/spawn.ts`; `src/index.ts` is the service wiring.

packages/subprocess/subprocess-local/README.zh.md

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 - **带平台正确信号发送的 detached 进程树**：POSIX 子进程使用 `detached` spawn（拥有独立进程组），信号以负 pgid 发送并以直接子进程作为回退；Windows 通过 `taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` 终止进程树（可为测试注入）。`terminate()`（句柄唯一的终止动词）先发送 SIGTERM，经过 spec 的宽限期后再发送 SIGKILL（沿用 OpenCode 的升级策略；管道与子 shell 会随父进程一起结束），进程树消亡后为空操作；`waitForExit()` 轮询整棵进程树的存活状态，使消费方的拆卸能确认真正的完全停稳。组长进程退出后，仍然打开的管道也只获得同样有界的排空宽限期，因此存活的后代进程无法无限期地拖住结果不结算。系统会容忍 ESRCH；脱离该组重新挂载的 daemon 仍可能存活，这与调研工具的局限相同。
 - **按流划分的处置方式**：`'pipe'` 把原始流原样交给调用方（协议分帧仍归消费方所有）；`'inherit'` 直通父进程的描述符；收集模式（collect）在输出超过上限后于内存中保留尾部（错误与结果通常聚集在末尾，沿用 pi/OpenCode 的理由），并在配置了 spill 上限时把完整流追加到一个私有临时文件；省略 `spill` 则只保留尾部，即诊断尾部的形状。某条流大于 spill 上限时，会丢弃已不完整的 spill，仅返回带截断标记的尾部；spill 文件描述符在结算时封存，最终关闭失败时则不公布路径，以免声称存在不完整的文件。spill 文件权限为 `0600`、名称随机，位于按需延迟创建的 `0700` 每进程目录之下。
-- **凭据清除 + 显式合并**：以 `process.env` 为基础，移除形似凭据的变量（`*KEY*`／`*SECRET*`／`*TOKEN*`）和所有环境中已有的 `DSH_*` 名称；spec 的显式 `env` 在该清除之后合并且不做命名空间校验，因此有意提供的凭据或当前 `DSH_*` 事实会胜出，而陈旧的嵌套 harness 身份无法从环境中隐式漏入。提供的 stdin 会被写入后关闭；否则 fd 0 指向 `/dev/null`。参见 [stdin/env Agent Note（agent 决策记录）](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md)与[受管环境 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-10-agent-session-identity-and-log-location.md)。
+- **凭据清除 + 显式合并**：以 `process.env` 为基础，移除形似凭据的变量（`*KEY*`／`*PASSWORD*`／`*SECRET*`／`*TOKEN*`）和所有环境中已有的 `DSH_*` 名称；spec 的显式 `env` 在该清除之后合并且不做命名空间校验，因此有意提供的凭据或当前 `DSH_*` 事实会胜出，而陈旧的嵌套 harness 身份无法从环境中隐式漏入。提供的 stdin 会被写入后关闭；否则 fd 0 指向 `/dev/null`。参见 [stdin/env Agent Note（agent 决策记录）](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/architecture/2026-06-30-bash-stdin-env-trusted-plugin-surface.md)与[受管环境 Agent Note](../../../.agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-10-agent-session-identity-and-log-location.md)。
 - **基于偏移量的读取**：收集模式的读取器以全流字节坐标返回增量；服务自身从不持有游标，因此消费方自有的游标（bash 的后台读取路径）与完整流重读可以共存，结算前后皆然。
 - **先终止再等待退出的 dispose**：服务保留存活句柄，只为让自身的 dispose 能对每个仍在运行的进程树执行升级并等待其退出；已结算与 spawn 失败的句柄在结算时即离开存活集合。
 
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
 ## 已知限制与暂缓事项
 
 - **Windows 进程树支持仅为尽力而为，且未经 CI 测试**：终止经由 `taskkill /PID <pid> /T /F` 完成，所有结果都被就地吸收，不向外抛出（进程树已不存在、竞态、二进制缺失），存活探测则回退到直接子进程边界；测试套件只通过注入的运行器覆盖这条路由，且 `packages/subprocess/*` 被排除在 Windows 测试矩阵之外。
-- **凭据清除依赖名称启发式规则**：只匹配 `*KEY*`／`*SECRET*`／`*TOKEN*`；名称不同的 secret（例如 `*PASSWORD*`）会继续传递，对误删变量引入白名单属于已记录的后续工作。
+- **凭据清除依赖名称启发式规则**：只匹配 `*KEY*`／`*PASSWORD*`／`*SECRET*`／`*TOKEN*`；名称不同的 secret（例如 `*PASSPHRASE*`）会继续传递，对误删变量引入白名单属于已记录的后续工作。
 - **不会删除已完成的 spill 文件**：有界的完整输出恢复文件（以及每个进程的私有 spill 目录）会在 OS tmpdir 下累积，直到外部机制进行清理；超大的不完整 spill 会被丢弃并立即尝试删除，但清理失败可能留下一个有界文件。
 
 原始进程处理位于 `src/spawn.ts`；`src/index.ts` 负责服务接线。

packages/subprocess/subprocess-local/tests/spawn.spec.ts

@@ -255,10 +255,10 @@ describe('stdin and extra env (set by in-process plugins)', () => {
   })
 
   it('an explicit extra env entry overrides the credential scrub', async () => {
-    // EXPLICIT_OVERRIDE_KEY matches the credential scrub pattern, yet an explicit
+    // EXPLICIT_OVERRIDE_PASSWORD matches the credential scrub pattern, yet an explicit
     // entry is still honored — the scrub only drops AMBIENT process.env creds.
-    const result = await finish(spawnSubprocess(spec('echo "$EXPLICIT_OVERRIDE_KEY"', {
-      env: { EXPLICIT_OVERRIDE_KEY: 'explicit-wins' },
+    const result = await finish(spawnSubprocess(spec('echo "$EXPLICIT_OVERRIDE_PASSWORD"', {
+      env: { EXPLICIT_OVERRIDE_PASSWORD: 'explicit-wins' },
     })))
     expect(result.stdout.text).toBe('explicit-wins\n')
   })
@@ -748,13 +748,17 @@ describe('environment and spill-file hardening', () => {
   it('scrubs credential-shaped and ambient DSH env vars from child processes', async () => {
     process.env.DSH_TEST_API_KEY = 'super-secret'
     process.env.DSH_TEST_TOKEN = 'also-secret'
+    process.env.SUBPROCESS_TEST_PASSWORD = 'password-secret'
     process.env.DSH_TEST_PLAIN = 'visible'
     try {
-      const result = await finish(spawnSubprocess(spec('echo "[${DSH_TEST_API_KEY:-absent}|${DSH_TEST_TOKEN:-absent}|${DSH_TEST_PLAIN:-absent}]"')))
-      expect(result.stdout.text.trim()).toBe('[absent|absent|absent]')
+      const result = await finish(spawnSubprocess(spec(
+        'echo "[${DSH_TEST_API_KEY:-absent}|${DSH_TEST_TOKEN:-absent}|${SUBPROCESS_TEST_PASSWORD:-absent}|${DSH_TEST_PLAIN:-absent}]"',
+      )))
+      expect(result.stdout.text.trim()).toBe('[absent|absent|absent|absent]')
     } finally {
       delete process.env.DSH_TEST_API_KEY
       delete process.env.DSH_TEST_TOKEN
+      delete process.env.SUBPROCESS_TEST_PASSWORD
       delete process.env.DSH_TEST_PLAIN
     }
   })

packages/subprocess/subprocess/src/index.ts

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ export type {
  * deliberately supplied entry survives because explicit env layers merge
  * after the scrub.
  */
-export const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN = /KEY|SECRET|TOKEN/i
+export const SENSITIVE_ENV_PATTERN = /KEY|PASSWORD|SECRET|TOKEN/i
 
 /**
  * The ambient parent environment minus credential-shaped names and minus all

packages/subprocess/subprocess/tests/service.spec.ts

@@ -55,16 +55,19 @@ describe('SubprocessService seam', () => {
   it('scrubbedParentEnv drops credential-shaped and DSH_ names but keeps PATH', () => {
     process.env.DSH_SCRUB_PROBE = 'stale'
     process.env.SCRUB_PROBE_TOKEN = 'secret'
+    process.env.SCRUB_PROBE_PASSWORD = 'secret'
     process.env.SCRUB_PROBE_PLAIN = 'visible'
     try {
       const env = scrubbedParentEnv()
       expect(env.DSH_SCRUB_PROBE).toBeUndefined()
       expect(env.SCRUB_PROBE_TOKEN).toBeUndefined()
+      expect(env.SCRUB_PROBE_PASSWORD).toBeUndefined()
       expect(env.SCRUB_PROBE_PLAIN).toBe('visible')
       expect(env.PATH).toBeDefined()
     } finally {
       delete process.env.DSH_SCRUB_PROBE
       delete process.env.SCRUB_PROBE_TOKEN
+      delete process.env.SCRUB_PROBE_PASSWORD
       delete process.env.SCRUB_PROBE_PLAIN
     }
   })