mirror of
https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness
synced 2026-08-15 21:04:50 +00:00
Every packages/*/* README now carries a canonical '## Known Limitations and
Deferred Work' section: condensed, evidence-backed bullets for consumer-visible
gaps (unimplemented features, platform caveats, MVP cuts) and consciously
postponed work (TODO/FIXME/XXX markers, RFC deferrals still open). The ten
pre-existing ad-hoc variants ('What is NOT here (TODO)', 'Deferred',
'Limitations (MVP)', 'Known limitations (tracked TODOs)', ...) are normalized
into the canonical heading.
A new doc-sync gate, scripts/verify-readme-limitations.ts, enforces the shape:
exactly one limitations-like heading per package README, byte-equal to the
canonical h2, with at least one bullet; near-miss headings fail so variants
cannot creep back. Packages with genuinely nothing to declare (dsh-brand,
dsh-timeout, dsh-subagent-mock, dsh-app-boot) are whitelisted in the script and
must NOT carry the section; whitelist entries are validated against the scanned
package set so a rename fails loud.
Wired into the doc-sync chain (package.json) and the run-gates doc-sync leaf
set; the standing rule lands in packages/AGENTS.md and the adding-a-package
cookbook; decision record in
docs/rfc/implemented/process/2026-07-10-readme-known-limitations-gate.md
(RFC index regenerated).
Also fixes two stale '(deferred)' markers claiming dsh-compact-basic is
unimplemented (the dsh-compact seam README's package table and the seam's
module doc comment).
4.4 KiB
4.4 KiB
@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local
Local-subprocess implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash executor seam: LocalBashExecutor spawns bash -c <command> per call in its own process group, collects bounded output with full-stream spill files, and escalates kills SIGTERM→SIGKILL across the whole group.
Config
- id: bash
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
config:
cwd: /path/to/workspace # default: process.cwd()
timeoutMs: 120000 # default foreground timeout
maxTimeoutMs: 600000 # cap for per-call overrides
maxOutputBytes: 64000 # per-stream in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk
graceMs: 3000 # SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation grace on kills
Behavior (and where it came from)
Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi; the notable choices:
- Spawn per call, no shell state — every call is a fresh non-login
bash -c(deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call.XXX(stateful-shell)insrc/run.tsrecords the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them. - Process-group kills with escalation — children are spawned
detached(own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after thegraceMsgrace (default 3s — OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools. - Tail-keep truncation + spill files — output beyond
maxOutputByteskeeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file. - Model-friendly env + credential scrub —
process.envminus credential-shaped vars (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*), thenNO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat(Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results. This scrub is the security control that keeps the harness's ambient credentials out of a spawned command. A spec'senvis merged LAST (after the scrub), so a caller's explicit entry — a value it already holds — wins even on a credential-shaped name. The spec'sstdin, when supplied, is written to the child and closed; with none supplied, fd 0 is/dev/null— the exact pre-seam default, so a command that probes stdin's file type is unaffected. Bothenv/stdinare set by in-process plugins (the hooks bridges); the model-facing tool doesn't expose them. See the bash-stdin-env RFC. - Background tasks —
start()returns immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding),readOutput()is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills everything. The spec's opaqueownertoken is stored on the tracked task and returned byownerOf(id)— the executor never interprets it (the consumer's access policy does), and because it lives with the task here it survives atool-bashHMR reload.
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- Unconfined by itself — this executor always runs commands with the harness process's authority; deployments needing confinement compose
dsh-bash-sandbox, while per-call allow/deny/ask policy belongs ontools/pre-execute. - POSIX-only — the
bashbinary, detached process groups, group kills, and SIGTERM→SIGKILL escalation are hardcoded; Windows is unsupported. - The credential scrub is a name heuristic —
*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*only; differently-named secrets (e.g.*PASSWORD*) pass through, and a whitelist for over-scrubbed vars is noted future work. - Spill files are never deleted — full-output recovery files (and the private per-process spill dir) accumulate under the OS tmpdir until something external cleans them.
- Finished background tasks are never evicted — they stay in the task map, retaining their in-memory output tails, until executor disposal.
The raw process handling lives in src/run.ts; src/index.ts is the service wiring.