Files
deepseek-harness/packages/core/tools/src/index.ts
Tianyi Cui 3d16026eb0 feat(core): scope-aware registries and session dispatch carriers
dsh-tools and dsh-system-prompt gain a per-scope registration layer over
dsh-scope: a registration through a scoped context files into that scope,
shadows a same-named global contribution for that scope (per-agent persona
and tool variants), and unwinds with the scope. tools.restrict() masks the
global surface per scope (snapshot-at-registration, loud unknown-name
validation, intersection composition; scoped grants bypass). One visibility
function feeds schemas/get/execute, so prompt, presentation, and dispatch
can never disagree; out-of-view executes as UNKNOWN_TOOL.

Prompt tool providers now receive the AssembleContext and return
{schemas, knownNames}: toolOrder validates against the pre-restriction name
universe (a typo fails every assembly loudly) while ordering operates on
the post-restriction schemas (a restricted-away tool is a normal absence).

dsh-session captures each session's dispatch carrier at enter() from the
entering context's scope tag, and the new sessions.flush(session) owns the
awaited session/flush dispatch. tools/pre|post-execute and
system-prompt/assemble dispatch with scope carriers keyed by their subject;
session/created|event|flush by the owning session's scope.
2026-07-09 01:09:21 +08:00

653 lines
30 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Tool registry and execution pipeline. Plugins register tools; the registry
* feeds schemas into the system prompt, and `execute()` dispatches each call
* through `tools/pre-execute` (the allow/deny gate) → core dispatch →
* `tools/post-execute` (inspect/replace the result, attach context) for
* sandbox, permission, and hook plugins to gate or transform a call.
*
* @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-tools
*/
import { Context, Service } from 'cordis'
import { scopeOf, scopeTarget } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope'
import type { ScopeKey, Scoped } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope'
import type { CallId, ContentBlock, ToolSchema } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import { HarnessError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm'
import type { Agent, HookContext } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
import type { ToolCallView, ToolResultView } from './presentation.ts'
export {
defineTool,
schemaSpecToJsonSchema,
validateArgs,
ToolArgsError,
type SchemaSpec,
type SchemaProp,
type SchemaType,
type InferArgs,
type DefineToolOptions,
type JsonSchemaObject,
} from './schema.ts'
export {
assertSupportedOutputSchema,
validateStructuredValue,
OutputSchemaError,
type StructuredOutputSchema,
type StructuredSchemaNode,
type StructuredSchemaType,
type StructuredScalar,
} from './json-schema.ts'
// The render-intent vocabulary a tool declares via `presentCall`/`presentResult`
// lives in its own UI-facing module; re-export it so `@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools`
// stays the single public surface for consumers (producers + the ACP bridge).
export type {
ToolCallKind,
FileLocation,
FileDiff,
ToolCallView,
GenericCallView,
TerminalCallView,
DiffCallView,
ToolResultView,
GenericResultView,
TerminalResultView,
DiffResultView,
} from './presentation.ts'
declare module 'cordis' {
interface Context {
tools: ToolRegistry
}
interface Events {
/**
* Waterfall BEFORE a tool runs — the gate where sandbox, permission, and
* hook plugins allow or deny a call (Claude Code's `PreToolUse`). Listeners
* receive `(exec, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to the default (allow),
* or return a {@link PreToolDecision} without calling `next()` to
* short-circuit. A `deny` skips dispatch and yields an `isError` result; the
* tool body never runs. Input rewrite is deliberately NOT offered here (see
* {@link PreToolDecision}); `ask` degrades to deny until the permission
* system lands (`FIXME(permissions)`).
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): the carrier is keyed by
* `exec.agent` — a listener registered through `agent.ctx` fires only for
* that agent's calls; a plain plugin listener fires for every call
* (including agent-less ones, which dispatch subject-less).
* @param exec - the pending call (name, parsed arguments, caller agent).
* @mode waterfall
*/
'tools/pre-execute'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: ToolExecution, next: () => Promise<PreToolDecision>): Promise<PreToolDecision>
/**
* Waterfall AFTER a tool runs — where hook plugins inspect the result and
* accept it (optionally REPLACING the model-facing content, and/or attaching
* `additionalContext` for the next request) or block it with corrective
* `feedback` (Claude Code's `PostToolUse`). Listeners receive
* `(exec, result, next)`: call `next()` to delegate to the default (accept
* unchanged), or return a {@link PostToolDecision} to override. The core tool
* dispatch sits between the two waterfalls as plain code, all inside
* `execute`'s outer try/catch (and the tool body keeps its own inner
* try/catch, so a thrown tool still reaches `post-execute` as an `isError`
* result).
* Scope-filtered dispatch (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): the carrier is keyed by
* `exec.agent` — a listener registered through `agent.ctx` fires only for
* that agent's calls; a plain plugin listener fires for every call
* (including agent-less ones, which dispatch subject-less).
* @param exec - the call that just ran (name, parsed arguments, caller agent).
* @param result - the dispatch outcome a listener may accept, replace, or block.
* @mode waterfall
*/
'tools/post-execute'(this: Scoped<ToolRegistry>, exec: ToolExecution, result: ToolExecutionResult, next: () => Promise<PostToolDecision>): Promise<PostToolDecision>
/**
* A tool was registered or unregistered, or a scoped restriction changed
* (the available tool set changed — possibly for one scope only). An
* UNFILTERED registry-subject notification, deliberately not scope-filtered
* dispatch: a global change concerns every agent's next assembly, so a
* scoped listener subscribing here sees every change, not just its own
* scope's.
* @mode emit
*/
'tools/change'(): void
}
}
// TODO(review): revisit these shapes when the first real tools and
// sandbox/permission plugins land (e.g. a concurrency-safety hint for
// parallel execution — Claude Code partitions read-only tools; phase 1
// executes sequentially).
/**
* What a tool's `execute` returns. The bare {@link ContentBlock}`[]` form is the
* common case (model-facing content only); the object form additionally attaches
* a tool-private `meta` presentation payload that the registry threads onto the
* `tool/result` session event and hands back to the tool's `presentResult`.
* `meta` is opaque to the core (`unknown` — the tool owns and narrows its shape),
* and MUST be JSON-serializable: it persists on the durable log (the session
* enforces this at `append`), so replay reproduces the card.
*/
export type ToolExecuteReturn = ContentBlock[] | { content: ContentBlock[]; meta?: unknown }
/** A registered tool: its schema plus the execution function. */
export interface ToolDefinition extends ToolSchema {
execute(args: unknown, exec: ToolExecution): Promise<ToolExecuteReturn>
/**
* Optional: how to present the PENDING state of one call in a UI, derived from
* the call's `args` (parsed arguments, `unknown` — the tool validates/narrows
* its own input). Returns a {@link ToolCallView} (a `card`-tagged render intent),
* or `undefined` (or omit the method) to fall back to a generic presentation
* (title = tool name, raw args as input). Pure and side-effect-free: a UI may
* call it during live streaming AND a session-log replay, so it must depend
* only on `args`.
*/
presentCall?(args: unknown): ToolCallView | undefined
/**
* Optional: how to present the COMPLETED state, given the same `args` and the
* `result` (`execute`'s content + whether it errored). Returns a
* {@link ToolResultView}, or `undefined` (or omit the method) to keep the
* pending title and render the raw result content. Pure and side-effect-free
* for the same replay reason.
*/
presentResult?(args: unknown, result: ToolResult): ToolResultView | undefined
}
/** The completed outcome handed to {@link ToolDefinition.presentResult}. */
export interface ToolResult {
/** The model-facing content `execute` returned (or the error text on failure). */
content: ContentBlock[]
/** Whether the call failed. */
isError: boolean
/**
* The tool-private presentation payload the tool attached from `execute` (via
* the object return form), threaded verbatim from the `tool/result` event.
* Opaque (`unknown`); the tool narrows it back to its own shape. Absent when
* the tool attached none.
*/
meta?: unknown
}
/** One pending tool call, as it flows through the execution pipeline (`tools/pre-execute` → dispatch → `tools/post-execute`). */
export interface ToolExecution {
callId: CallId
name: string
/** Parsed JSON arguments (unknown — tools validate their own input). */
arguments: unknown
/** The agent on whose behalf the call runs (set by the agent loop). */
agent?: Agent
signal?: AbortSignal
}
/** Structured error metadata for a failed tool call (alongside the model-facing text). */
export interface ToolErrorInfo {
name: string
code: string
}
/**
* Thrown (internally) when the model requests a tool that isn't registered.
* Extends {@link HarnessError} (`code: 'UNKNOWN_TOOL'`) so an unknown-tool
* failure is as routable as a tool-thrown one — retry/sandbox/replay code can
* distinguish it from a tool body's own error.
*/
export class ToolNotFoundError extends HarnessError {
constructor(public readonly toolName: string) {
super(`unknown tool "${toolName}"`, 'UNKNOWN_TOOL')
this.name = 'ToolNotFoundError'
}
}
/** The outcome of one tool call. */
export interface ToolExecutionResult {
callId: CallId
content: ContentBlock[]
isError: boolean
/**
* Set when the call failed with a {@link HarnessError}: machine-routable
* `{ name, code }` for retry/sandbox plugins and replay. The model-facing
* text in `content` is always present; this is extra structure for code.
*/
error?: ToolErrorInfo
/**
/**
* Extra model-facing context a `tools/post-execute` listener attached for the
* NEXT request (Claude Code's PostToolUse `additionalContext`). It is NOT part
* of this call's `content` — `content`/`feedback` shape the tool RESULT, but
* `additionalContext` is a SEPARATE `context/message`. A step can carry
* multiple tool calls, so the loop BUFFERS every call's `additionalContext`
* and appends them only AFTER all `tool/result`s for the step, keeping
* tool-call/result adjacency intact. Carried on the result purely to ferry it
* from `execute()` up to the loop's per-step buffer.
*/
additionalContext?: HookContext
/**
* The tool-private presentation payload from a successful `execute` (the object
* return form). Threaded onto the `tool/result` session event and back into
* {@link ToolResult} for `presentResult`. Opaque (`unknown`); absent when the
* tool attached none or the call failed.
*/
meta?: unknown
}
/**
* The decision a `tools/pre-execute` listener returns for one pending call.
* Maps onto Claude Code's `PreToolUse` `permissionDecision`.
*
* - `allow` proceeds to dispatch. (Input rewrite — changing `exec.arguments` —
* is deliberately NOT offered: `tool/call` and `assistant/message` are logged
* BEFORE execution and live consumers, e.g. the ACP bridge and `dsh-tool-bash`
* presentation, read the pre-execution arguments, so an execution-only rewrite
* would desync the UI from what RAN. That consistency redesign is its own
* `proposed` RFC; `TODO(pre-tool-input-rewrite)` anchors it at the call site.)
* - `deny` skips dispatch; the loop records an `isError` result carrying `reason`.
* - `ask` is the permission-prompt intent; until the permission system exists it
* degrades to `deny` (`FIXME(permissions)`).
*/
export type PreToolDecision =
| { kind: 'allow' }
| { kind: 'deny'; reason: string }
| { kind: 'ask'; reason?: string }
/**
* The decision a `tools/post-execute` listener returns for one finished call.
* Maps onto Claude Code's `PostToolUse` decision.
*
* - `accept` keeps the call successful; optional `content` REPLACES the
* model-facing result (clean: `tool/result` is logged AFTER `execute()`
* returns, so a replaced result is the single source of truth for both derived
* history and UI). Optional `additionalContext` rides to the next request.
* - `block` turns the call into an `isError` result whose content is the
* corrective `feedback` (the model is told the call was rejected and why),
* optionally also attaching `additionalContext`.
*/
export type PostToolDecision =
| { kind: 'accept'; content?: ContentBlock[]; additionalContext?: HookContext }
| { kind: 'block'; feedback: ContentBlock[]; additionalContext?: HookContext }
/**
* Best-effort human-readable message from an arbitrary thrown value: Error
* instances use `.message`; non-Error objects with a string `message`
* property (e.g. `throw { message: 'denied' }`) use it too; everything else
* is stringified.
*/
function errorMessage(error: unknown): string {
if (error instanceof Error) return error.message
if (typeof error === 'object' && error !== null
&& 'message' in error && typeof error.message === 'string') {
return error.message
}
return String(error)
}
/** Structured `{ name, code }` for a thrown HarnessError, else undefined. */
function errorInfo(error: unknown): ToolErrorInfo | undefined {
return error instanceof HarnessError ? { name: error.name, code: error.code } : undefined
}
/**
* A per-scope restriction over the GLOBAL tool surface, registered via
* {@link ToolRegistry.restrict}. `allow` keeps only the listed global tools;
* `deny` removes the listed ones; both present = allow first, then deny.
* Restrictions never touch scoped registrations — a tool registered through
* the same scope is an explicit grant that bypasses them (which is what keeps
* e.g. a structured-output capture tool alive under an allow-list). Multiple
* restrictions on one scope compose by intersection: every one must admit.
*/
export interface ToolRestriction {
/** Global tool names that stay visible; everything else is removed. */
allow?: string[]
/** Global tool names removed from visibility. */
deny?: string[]
}
/**
* Tool registry (`ctx.tools`): tool plugins register definitions; the agent
* loop executes calls through the `tools/pre-execute` → dispatch →
* `tools/post-execute` pipeline. The registry contributes its schemas into the
* system-prompt assembly.
*
* Two registration layers (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-scope`): a registration through a
* plain plugin context is GLOBAL (visible to every agent); one through a
* scoped context (`agent.ctx`) is filed in that scope's layer — visible to
* that agent alone, disposed with the scope, and SHADOWING a global tool of
* the same name for that agent (most-specific-wins; within one layer a
* duplicate name still throws). {@link restrict} masks the global layer per
* scope. One visibility function ({@link visible}) feeds prompt assembly,
* {@link get}, and {@link execute}, so what the model is shown, what a
* presenter renders, and what dispatches can never disagree.
*/
export class ToolRegistry extends Service {
static inject = ['systemPrompt']
private global = new Map<string, ToolDefinition>()
private scoped = new Map<ScopeKey, Map<string, ToolDefinition>>()
/** Snapshot-at-registration restriction filters, per scope (see {@link restrict}). */
private restrictions = new Map<ScopeKey, ToolRestriction[]>()
constructor(ctx: Context) {
super(ctx, 'tools')
ctx.systemPrompt.tools(context => ({
schemas: this.schemas(context.scope),
knownNames: this.knownNames(context.scope),
}))
}
/**
* Register a tool. The layer is decided by the CALLING context: a plain
* plugin context registers globally; a scoped context (`agent.ctx`)
* registers into that scope's layer — visible to that agent alone, disposed
* with the scope, and shadowing a same-named global tool for that agent.
* Throws if the SAME layer already has the name (cross-layer name twins are
* the shadowing feature, not an error; the global-duplicate message names
* `agent.ctx` as the per-agent alternative). The visible schema set flows
* into prompt assembly automatically. Disposed with the calling fiber.
* Emits `tools/change` on register/unregister.
* @param definition - the tool's schema plus its execute (and optional
* presentation) functions.
* @returns the disposer that unregisters the tool.
*/
register(definition: ToolDefinition): () => void {
const scope = scopeOf(this.ctx)
const dispose = this.ctx.effect(function* (this: ToolRegistry) {
const layer = scope === undefined ? this.global : this.layerFor(scope)
if (layer.has(definition.name)) {
throw new Error(scope === undefined
? `tool "${definition.name}" is already registered (for a per-agent variant, register through that agent's \`agent.ctx\` instead)`
: `tool "${definition.name}" is already registered in this scope`)
}
layer.set(definition.name, definition)
// Yield the rollback BEFORE emitting `tools/change`: a generator effect
// collects each yielded disposer before the next step runs, so a throwing
// `tools/change` listener removes the tool instead of leaking it (a leak
// would wedge the duplicate-name check until restart). The duplicate
// throw above fires before any mutation — it leaks nothing.
yield () => {
layer.delete(definition.name)
// An emptied scope layer is dropped so a disposed scope leaves no
// residue keyed by its (dead) key.
if (scope !== undefined && layer.size === 0) this.scoped.delete(scope)
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}.bind(this), 'tools.register()')
// ctx.effect's disposer returns Promise<void>; our disposer API is
// synchronous fire-and-forget — discard the (always-resolved) promise.
return () => void dispose()
}
/**
* Restrict the GLOBAL tool surface for the calling scope. Must be called
* through a scoped context (`agent.ctx`) — restricting "everyone" is not a
* thing (throw), and an empty filter (neither `allow` nor `deny`) is a no-op
* that can only be a bug (throw — the materialized-empty-config trap).
* Validates every listed name against the scope's CURRENT pre-restriction
* name universe ({@link knownNames}) and throws on an unknown one (fail loud
* beats a typo silently filtering nothing) — register restrictions after the
* global tools they mask exist (the agent-creation `setup` window satisfies
* this). The filter is SNAPSHOT at registration: later caller mutation of
* the arrays changes nothing. Multiple restrictions compose by intersection.
* Scoped registrations bypass restrictions (explicit grants win). Disposed
* with the calling fiber (revocable independently); emits `tools/change`.
* @param filter - global-surface mask: `allow` (keep only) and/or `deny` (remove).
* @returns the disposer that lifts this restriction.
*/
restrict(filter: ToolRestriction): () => void {
const scope = scopeOf(this.ctx)
if (scope === undefined) {
throw new Error('tools.restrict() requires a scoped context (agent.ctx): a context-global restriction would mask every agent — deny the tool for the intended agent instead')
}
if (filter.allow === undefined && filter.deny === undefined) {
throw new Error('tools.restrict({}) is a no-op: pass `allow` and/or `deny` (an empty filter is almost always a materialized-empty-config bug)')
}
// Snapshot BEFORE validation so what was checked is what is enforced.
const snapshot: ToolRestriction = {
...filter.allow !== undefined ? { allow: [...filter.allow] } : {},
...filter.deny !== undefined ? { deny: [...filter.deny] } : {},
}
const known = new Set(this.knownNames(scope))
const unknown = [...snapshot.allow ?? [], ...snapshot.deny ?? []].filter(name => !known.has(name))
if (unknown.length > 0) {
throw new Error(`tools.restrict() names unknown tool${unknown.length > 1 ? 's' : ''} ${unknown.map(n => `"${n}"`).join(', ')}; known tools for this scope: ${[...known].sort().join(', ') || '(none)'}`)
}
const dispose = this.ctx.effect(function* (this: ToolRegistry) {
const list = this.restrictions.get(scope) ?? []
this.restrictions.set(scope, list)
list.push(snapshot)
yield () => {
const index = list.indexOf(snapshot)
/* v8 ignore next 3 -- defensive: the snapshot was pushed, so indexOf is guaranteed >= 0 */
if (index >= 0) list.splice(index, 1)
if (list.length === 0) this.restrictions.delete(scope)
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}
this.ctx.emit('tools/change')
}.bind(this), 'tools.restrict()')
// ctx.effect's disposer returns Promise<void>; our disposer API is
// synchronous fire-and-forget — discard the (always-resolved) promise.
return () => void dispose()
}
/** The (created-on-demand) scoped layer for `scope`. */
private layerFor(scope: ScopeKey): Map<string, ToolDefinition> {
let layer = this.scoped.get(scope)
if (!layer) {
layer = new Map()
this.scoped.set(scope, layer)
}
return layer
}
/** Whether every restriction registered for `scope` admits the global tool `name` (intersection semantics). */
private admits(scope: ScopeKey | undefined, name: string): boolean {
if (scope === undefined) return true
const filters = this.restrictions.get(scope)
if (!filters) return true
return filters.every(filter =>
(filter.allow === undefined || filter.allow.includes(name))
&& (filter.deny === undefined || !filter.deny.includes(name)))
}
/**
* THE visibility function — one resolution feeding prompt assembly,
* {@link get}, and {@link execute}: the global layer masked by the scope's
* restrictions, unioned with the scope's own layer, scoped shadowing global
* on a name conflict. No scope = the unrestricted global view.
* @param scope - the viewing scope (the agent), or undefined for the global view.
* @returns the visible definitions (scoped shadows applied), in per-layer
* registration order, global layer first.
*/
visible(scope?: ScopeKey): ToolDefinition[] {
const layer = scope === undefined ? undefined : this.scoped.get(scope)
const result = new Map<string, ToolDefinition>()
for (const [name, definition] of this.global) {
if (this.admits(scope, name)) result.set(name, definition)
}
// Scoped layer second: same-name entries REPLACE (shadow) the global ones,
// and grants bypass restrictions by construction (never filtered above).
for (const [name, definition] of layer ?? []) result.set(name, definition)
return [...result.values()]
}
/**
* Look up a tool as one scope sees it ({@link visible} semantics: scoped
* shadows global; a restricted-away global reads as absent). Presenters pass
* the calling agent so the rendered card matches the definition that
* actually executed.
* @param name - the tool name as registered.
* @param scope - the viewing scope (the agent); omitted = the global view.
* @returns the definition the scope resolves, or undefined when none is visible.
*/
get(name: string, scope?: ScopeKey): ToolDefinition | undefined {
const shadowed = scope === undefined ? undefined : this.scoped.get(scope)?.get(name)
if (shadowed) return shadowed
if (!this.admits(scope, name)) return undefined
return this.global.get(name)
}
/**
* The model-facing schemas of everything `scope` can see — exactly the
* fields (`name`, `description`, `parameters`) sent to the model via the
* system-prompt assembly. Constructed EXPLICITLY rather than by stripping
* known non-schema members: a `ToolDefinition` also carries `execute` and the
* optional `presentCall`/`presentResult` UI callbacks, and those (especially
* the functions) must never leak into a model request. An allowlist can't
* drift when a new non-schema member is added to the definition; a denylist
* (rest-destructure) would silently leak it.
* @param scope - the viewing scope (the agent); omitted = the global view.
* @returns one deep-cloned schema per visible tool.
*/
schemas(scope?: ScopeKey): ToolSchema[] {
return this.visible(scope).map(({ name, description, parameters }): ToolSchema => ({
name,
description,
parameters: structuredClone(parameters),
}))
}
/**
* The PRE-restriction name universe for `scope`: every global name plus the
* scope's own layer, ignoring restrictions. This is the set configuration
* (`toolOrder`, `restrict()` filters) validates against, so a typo fails
* loud while a restricted-away tool remains a normal, non-erroneous absence.
* @param scope - the viewing scope (the agent); omitted = global names only.
* @returns the known names, deduplicated.
*/
knownNames(scope?: ScopeKey): string[] {
const names = new Set(this.global.keys())
if (scope !== undefined) {
for (const name of this.scoped.get(scope)?.keys() ?? []) names.add(name)
}
return [...names]
}
/**
* Execute one tool call through the `tools/pre-execute` → dispatch →
* `tools/post-execute` pipeline. The two waterfalls are the gate (allow/deny)
* and the inspect/transform seam; core dispatch sits between them as plain
* code. The whole thing is wrapped in one outer try/catch so a throwing
* listener (in either waterfall) becomes an `isError` result instead of
* failing the turn; the tool body ALSO keeps its own inner try/catch, so a
* thrown tool becomes an `isError` result that `post-execute` listeners can
* still inspect. If the tool is not registered, the result is an `isError`
* carrying a `UNKNOWN_TOOL` structured error. A thrown {@link HarnessError}
* surfaces its `{ name, code }` on the result.
* @param exec - the call to run (name, parsed arguments, caller agent, signal).
* @returns the final result after both waterfalls; failures resolve as
* `isError` results, never rejections.
*/
async execute(exec: ToolExecution): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> {
try {
// --- Gate: tools/pre-execute. A deny (or an ask, which degrades to deny
// until the permission system lands) skips dispatch entirely. The
// carrier keys the dispatch by exec.agent, so an `agent.ctx` listener
// gates only its own agent's calls (agent-less calls are subject-less).
const carrier = scopeTarget(this, exec.agent)
const decision = await this.ctx.waterfall(
carrier, 'tools/pre-execute', exec,
() => Promise.resolve<PreToolDecision>({ kind: 'allow' }),
)
if (decision.kind !== 'allow') {
// deny → isError. ask has no permission UI yet, so degrade to deny
// (FIXME(permissions)): a forthcoming permission system turns `ask` into
// a real prompt; today it is the conservative "not allowed".
const reason = decision.kind === 'deny'
? decision.reason
: decision.reason ?? `tool "${exec.name}" requires approval (not yet supported)`
const denied: ToolExecutionResult = {
callId: exec.callId,
content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Error: ${reason}` }],
isError: true,
}
return await this.postExecute(exec, denied)
}
// --- Core dispatch (plain code between the waterfalls). The tool body's
// own try/catch turns a throw into an isError result so post-execute can
// inspect it; an unknown tool routes through the same catch. ---
let result: ToolExecutionResult
try {
// Resolve through the CALLER's visible view ({@link get}): a scoped
// tool shadows its global name-twin for that agent, and a
// restricted-away global tool is exactly as absent as a nonexistent
// one — same UNKNOWN_TOOL result, no capability leak in the error.
const tool = this.get(exec.name, exec.agent)
if (!tool) throw new ToolNotFoundError(exec.name)
// Normalize the two `execute` return shapes: a bare ContentBlock[] (no
// meta) or a { content, meta } object (a tool attaching a private
// presentation payload). An array IS the content; the object carries it.
const returned = await tool.execute(exec.arguments, exec)
const content = Array.isArray(returned) ? returned : returned.content
const meta = Array.isArray(returned) ? undefined : returned.meta
result = { callId: exec.callId, content, isError: false, ...meta !== undefined ? { meta } : {} }
} catch (error: unknown) {
result = toolErrorResult(exec.callId, error)
}
return await this.postExecute(exec, result)
} catch (error: unknown) {
// Outer backstop: a throwing pre/post-execute listener (or the waterfall
// machinery) becomes an isError result, never a turn failure.
return toolErrorResult(exec.callId, error)
}
}
/**
* Run the `tools/post-execute` waterfall over a dispatched `result` and apply
* its {@link PostToolDecision}: `accept` keeps the call successful (replacing
* `content` when given), `block` turns it into an `isError` whose content is
* the corrective `feedback`. Either decision may attach `additionalContext`,
* which is ferried on the returned result for the loop's per-step buffer.
* Runs inside `execute`'s outer try/catch (a throwing listener → isError).
*/
private async postExecute(exec: ToolExecution, result: ToolExecutionResult): Promise<ToolExecutionResult> {
// Snapshot the protected outcome BEFORE the waterfall. A listener receives
// the same `result` reference, so a post-waterfall read of `result.callId`/
// `.isError`/`.error` could carry a listener's mutation — violating the
// authoritative-call-id requirement and the "preserve the dispatched
// isError/error" contract. The decision is the ONLY sanctioned channel for a
// listener to change the outcome (block, or accept-with-replacement); the
// call id is always the authoritative `exec.callId`. `content` is copied into
// a fresh array so a listener's in-place `push`/`splice` on `result.content`
// cannot leak into the returned content either (the elements are the same
// references — the snapshot guards the array structure, not deep immutability).
const dispatched = {
callId: exec.callId,
content: [...result.content],
isError: result.isError,
...result.error ? { error: result.error } : {},
...result.meta !== undefined ? { meta: result.meta } : {},
}
const decision = await this.ctx.waterfall(
scopeTarget(this, exec.agent), 'tools/post-execute', exec, result,
() => Promise.resolve<PostToolDecision>({ kind: 'accept' }),
)
const additionalContext = decision.additionalContext
if (decision.kind === 'block') {
return {
callId: dispatched.callId,
content: decision.feedback,
isError: true,
...additionalContext ? { additionalContext } : {},
}
}
// accept: replace content if supplied, preserve the dispatched isError/error.
return {
...dispatched,
...decision.content ? { content: decision.content } : {},
...additionalContext ? { additionalContext } : {},
}
}
}
function toolErrorResult(callId: ToolExecution['callId'], error: unknown): ToolExecutionResult {
const info = errorInfo(error)
return {
callId,
content: [{ type: 'text', text: `Error: ${errorMessage(error)}` }],
isError: true,
...info ? { error: info } : {},
}
}
export default ToolRegistry