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https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness
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d12cb45838
The documented vm escape reaches process, and the worker inherited the harness's env - so a buggy or prompt-injected script could read and exfiltrate ambient credentials (DEEPSEEK_API_KEY et al.) without touching a single file (ds-review-bot finding on #233). Spawn with env: {} and a hermetic execArgv on both runtime shapes, the same stance as dsh-code-runtime-worker and stronger than the scrubbed env the defensive-patterns rule requires for spawned commands (a shell needs PATH; this worker needs nothing). Ambient-channel hardening only: an escapee keeps the process-wide privileges the trust premise already admits - the genuine sandbox remains an engine swap.