deepseek-harness/packages/client/connection/src/index.ts

/** Host HTTP bridge for browser-client RPC. */
import type { Context } from 'cordis'
import z from 'schemastery'
import type {} from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-attachment'
// Activates the httpServer Context merge used below.
import type { WebRoute } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-webserver'
import { toFetchHandler } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-host-apiproxy'
import { API_PATH } from './api-path.ts'
import { bridge } from './http-bridge.ts'
import { assertTrustedAuthority, isTrustedApiRequest } from './api-request-trust.ts'

export { API_PATH } from './api-path.ts'

/** Stable Cordis plugin name. */
export const name = 'client-connection'

/** Headroom for RPC JSON fields around the aggregate base64 image payload. */
const REQUEST_ENVELOPE_HEADROOM_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
/** Independent default carrier cap; deployments may raise it for larger valid non-image RPCs. */
const DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES = 32 * 1024 * 1024

/** Services required before mounting the route. */
export const inject = ['httpServer', 'apiProxy', 'attachments']

/** Plugin config: the deployment's non-loopback serving authorities. */
export interface ConnectionConfig {
  /**
   * Authorities this deployment serves beyond loopback: exact `host:port`, or
   * port-less `host` matching any port. The /api trust fence refuses any
   * request whose Host is neither loopback nor listed here, so a
   * non-loopback (`0.0.0.0`) deployment must declare the names it is reached
   * by (the dsh CLI derives the machine's LAN IP literals itself). An entry
   * that is not a bare, canonical authority fails the plugin load.
   */
  trustedHosts?: string[]
  /**
   * Maximum buffered JSON body for every `/api` request. This carrier policy
   * is independent of image limits but must be large enough for the configured
   * aggregate image bytes after base64 and envelope expansion.
   */
  maxRequestBodyBytes?: number
}

export const Config: z<ConnectionConfig> = z.object({
  trustedHosts: z.array(String).default([]),
  maxRequestBodyBytes: z.natural().min(1).default(DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES),
})

/**
 * Methods gated to loopback even on a trusted-host deployment. Native dialogs
 * act on the host machine; the settings and credential domains mutate the
 * user's configuration and secret store, and READING them is equally
 * privileged — `settings.describe` returns every exposed namespace's
 * configuration and `credentials.describe` reports whether an arbitrary
 * environment-variable name is configured and where from, which is
 * reconnaissance no anonymous caller should have. `trustedHosts` is a
 * DNS-rebinding fence, explicitly not authentication, so the whole
 * configuration plane stays loopback-same-origin until a real authentication
 * layer exists. The model catalog (`llm.providers`, `llm.models`) is
 * deliberately NOT here: it carries provider ids, display names, and model
 * lists — no endpoints, keys, or key state — and a LAN client's model picker
 * legitimately needs it.
 */
const PRIVILEGED_METHODS = new Set([
  'host.pickDirectory',
  'host.openPath',
  'settings.describe',
  'settings.update',
  'settings.replace',
  'settings.mutate',
  'credentials.describe',
  'credentials.set',
  'credentials.unset',
])

/**
 * Mounts the API gateway under the browser transport prefix. Every request on
 * the prefix passes the browser-trust fence first (DNS-rebinding and
 * cross-site defense — [api-request-trust](./api-request-trust.ts));
 * privileged methods additionally pass it with an empty trust list, which
 * pins them to loopback.
 * @param ctx - Host plugin context.
 * @param config - resolved plugin config (schema defaults applied).
 */
export function apply(ctx: Context, config?: ConnectionConfig): void {
  // The Loader resolves schema defaults; hand-built test contexts may pass none.
  const trustedHosts = config?.trustedHosts ?? []
  // Config boundary: a malformed entry fails the load loudly here rather than
  // silently authorizing its hostname prefix at request time.
  for (const entry of trustedHosts) assertTrustedAuthority(entry)
  const apiHandler = toFetchHandler(ctx.apiProxy)
  const requiredImageBodyBytes = Math.ceil(
    ctx.attachments.imageLimits.maxMessageImageBytes * 4 / 3,
  ) + REQUEST_ENVELOPE_HEADROOM_BYTES
  const maxRequestBodyBytes = config?.maxRequestBodyBytes ?? DEFAULT_MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES
  if (maxRequestBodyBytes < requiredImageBodyBytes) {
    throw new Error(
      `client-connection maxRequestBodyBytes (${String(maxRequestBodyBytes)}) must be at least `
      + `${String(requiredImageBodyBytes)} for the configured aggregate image limit`,
    )
  }
  const route: WebRoute = {
    kind: 'prefix',
    path: API_PATH,
    handler: async (req, res) => {
      const pathname = new URL(req.url ?? '/', 'http://dsh.internal').pathname
      const method = pathname.startsWith(`${API_PATH}/`)
        ? pathname.slice(API_PATH.length + 1)
        : undefined
      const allowed = method !== undefined && PRIVILEGED_METHODS.has(method)
        ? isTrustedApiRequest(req, [])
        : isTrustedApiRequest(req, trustedHosts)
      if (!allowed) {
        res.writeHead(403)
        res.end('forbidden')
        return
      }
      await bridge(req, res, apiHandler, maxRequestBodyBytes)
    },
  }
  ctx.effect(() => ctx.httpServer.register(route), 'client-connection: /api route')
}