6478da61e3
Durable record: bound to the owning session id and validated at the fold (orphan-SID shape, temp path inside the host temp root) — a fork's copied parent record no longer provisions the child, and a tampered record fails loud. Private temp dir: random unguessable name persisted in the record, created exclusively (pre-existing entries and reparse points fail EEXIST). Persistence: a fresh provision kicks an immediate flush (no write-behind debounce), narrowing the crash window to the flush latency — documented as the one self-healing gap. Runner-failure rules: exit-gated on 127 so a confined command that prints the signature on a non-127 exit is never misclassified. Spawn: AssignProcessToJobObject failure terminates the suspended child (no hanging orphans). SandboxExecutionPolicy.sessionId is the branded SessionId. Boundary docs: qualifying clause on the absolutist sentences, NULL-DACL Known Limitation, 'full' scoped to the supported NTFS surface, CLM gate comment.
@deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox
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Sandbox-consuming PowerShell implementation of the ctx.bash executor seam: every command runs as pwsh -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command <command> confined through ctx.sandbox, with the selected mode, enforcement, and denial facts stamped on each settled result. The pwsh twin of @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox, a call-for-call mirror per the pwsh executor and tool decision — the confinement substance is platform-neutral: on Windows the sandbox seam resolves to the ACL restricted-token runner chain (@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl), on Linux/macOS to bwrap/Landlock/Seatbelt.
The executor inherits @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-local's process mechanics and consumes its argv-level seam (argv() / runArgv() / startArgv() / onProcessDone()) to wrap the exact pwsh invocation through the provider. The sandbox policy (mode + workspace root) is NOT this package's config: it rides each call from ctx.sandboxPolicy (tool calls pass the calling session's resolved policy; direct calls fall back to deployment policy).
Behavior
danger-full-access: commands run through the local executor unchanged; results carrysandbox: { mode, denied: false }.- Confined modes (
read-only,workspace-write): the pwsh argv is wrapped byctx.sandbox.confine(); runner-launch refusal fails closed withSANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE(foreground throw, backgroundrunnerFailedfact), and a denied write classifies against the selected backend'sdenialSignaturesintosandbox.denied.
Model Experience
Confinement works, denial surfaces as command failure
What the model sees
The confined command's own stderr (e.g. Access to the path '...' is denied. under the Windows ACL runner); the tool layer converts classified denials into the standard permission-denied surface exactly as it does for the bash tool.
Token effect
No model-visible text beyond the command's stderr and the tool layer's standard denial surface.
KV Cache effect
None directly; the denial surface belongs to the tool layer.
Known Limitations and Deferred Work
- Reads are unrestricted on Windows (the ACL runner restricts writes only); the read boundary is documented in
@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl. - The Windows workspace-write temp area is the real temp directory (
GetTempPathW). This is a deliberate backend-defined choice, the same decision Landlock makes (readWrite: ['/tmp', ...]): the seam's "backend-defined temp area" permits it, and the escape probe intests/acl.e2e.tslives outside the temp tree for exactly that reason. A per-run private temp (bwrap's--tmpfs /tmpsemantics) would additionally need an environment-block rewrite in the runner; it is an optional future hardening, not a correctness gap. - Windows read-only is strict zero-grant — not even the NUL device is writable;
> $nullredirection still works (documented in the backend package).