Files
deepseek-harness/packages/bash/bash-local
Tianyi Cui 7792347c4f simplify(seams): prune dead methods from the persistence and bash seams
Two capability seams carried abstract methods no production consumer calls.
A method no consumer programs against is not a seam — it is speculative
surface every implementation must still provide and test.

- SessionPersistence: remove has() and delete(), the coordinator's
  has/delete/deleteCore, and the PersistenceBackend.deleteStored hook (with its
  jsonl + sqlite + in-spec memory-stub impls). Surviving service surface:
  create/append/load/list. Production uses only load() (resume) and list()
  (ACP session/list).
- BashExecutor: remove get(id) and list(), the abstract decls and the
  LocalBashExecutor impls. The internal tasks map survives (it backs
  ownerOf/readOutput/kill); get/list were pure public accessors over it with no
  shipping caller and no bash_list tool.
- Migrate tests that reached through ctx.bash.get(id) to the public completion
  seam: a doneFor(id) helper over onTaskDone awaits a task by id, and the
  HMR-reload ownership test now proves task survival through A's own bash_output
  ([status: running]) plus ownerOf + B-rejection — a stronger through-the-tool
  assertion than the removed lookup peek.
- Update seam READMEs (six -> four service methods, drop the deleteStored hook
  and the get/list row) and the two implemented persistence RFCs in place.

Implements docs/rfc/implemented/simplification/2026-06-20-prune-dead-seam-methods.md
2026-06-21 02:17:27 +08:00
..

@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local

Local-subprocess implementation of the @deepseek-ai/dsh-bash executor seam: LocalBashExecutor spawns bash -c <command> per call in its own process group, collects bounded output with full-stream spill files, and escalates kills SIGTERM→SIGKILL across the whole group.

Config

- id: bash
  name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local'
  config:
    cwd: /path/to/workspace   # default: process.cwd()
    timeoutMs: 120000          # default foreground timeout
    maxTimeoutMs: 600000       # cap for per-call overrides
    maxOutputBytes: 64000      # per-stream in-memory cap; overflow spills to disk

Behavior (and where it came from)

Design surveyed against the bash tools of Claude Code, OpenCode, Codex, and pi; the notable choices:

  • Spawn per call, no shell state — every call is a fresh non-login bash -c (deterministic; no rc files). All four surveyed tools spawn per call. XXX(stateful-shell) in src/run.ts records the two proven stateful designs (Claude Code's cwd-only persistence; Codex's PTY exec sessions) for when real workflows demand them.
  • Process-group kills with escalation — children are spawned detached (own process group); kills send SIGTERM to the group, then SIGKILL after a 3s grace (OpenCode's escalation; pipelines and subshells die with the parent). ESRCH is tolerated; daemons that re-parent away from the group can still survive — same caveat as the surveyed tools.
  • Tail-keep truncation + spill files — output beyond maxOutputBytes keeps the in-memory TAIL (errors/results cluster at the end — pi/OpenCode rationale) while the FULL stream is appended to a temp file whose path is reported when available. If the final spill close reports a delayed writeback failure, the executor still returns the tail but withholds the path rather than advertising a possibly incomplete file.
  • Model-friendly envNO_COLOR=1 TERM=dumb PAGER=cat GIT_PAGER=cat (Codex's hardcoded set) so pagers and ANSI color don't garble results.
  • Background tasksstart() returns immediately, no timeout applies (Claude Code detaches timeouts when backgrounding), readOutput() is incremental with whole-stream byte offsets, and disposal kills everything. The spec's opaque owner token is stored on the tracked task and returned by ownerOf(id) — the executor never interprets it (the consumer's access policy does), and because it lives with the task here it survives a tool-bash HMR reload.

Sandboxing

TODO(permissions/sandbox): execution policy does NOT belong in this package. Wrap the tools/execute waterfall (veto/ask) or implement a sandboxing BashExecutor — see docs/architecture.md § plugin checklist. Reference points: Claude Code wraps commands in sandbox-exec/bubblewrap; Codex applies seatbelt/landlock plus an execpolicy prefix-rule engine.