8190016e2b
Model-facing tool-call budgets were tangled into each capability's schema (bash timeoutMs, web_fetch timeout_ms) with no shared home. Add a tools/execute around-dispatch waterfall to dsh-tools whose base next() is the dispatch-with-normalization thunk, and a new @deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout-policy plugin (packages/timeout/) that arms a per-tool deadline on exec.signal and returns a structured TOOL_TIMEOUT when it wins. Migrate web_fetch (drop the model-facing timeout_ms) and web_search onto it; the fetch provider keeps its timeout only as a resource backstop for direct callers. bash and hook command execution keep BASH_TIMEOUT unchanged. Named the plugin timeout-policy (not the RFC's tool-timeout) so it does not trip the gen-tool-catalog packages/*/tool-* completeness guard, and replace exec.signal by in-place mutation before next() since cordis waterfall next() ignores passed arguments. RFC moved to implemented/ recording both deviations.
3.9 KiB
@deepseek-ai/dsh-web-fetch-local
An anonymous public HTTP(S) WebFetchProvider for the harness web capability seam (ctx.web). It retrieves a concrete URL and returns a status code plus bounded decoded content.
This is an implementation package: it registers a provider into ctx.web, it does not own the key and it does not register a model-facing tool. It is a function/namespace plugin (inject: ['web']).
Responsibility split
The provider owns safe resource retrieval: URL validation, HTTP transport, redirect policy, a resource-backstop timeout, abort propagation, byte caps, charset decoding, content-type classification, and binary rejection. @deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-web owns presentation (HTML→markdown, truncation formatting). A non-2xx HTTP response is a result (status code + decoded body), not an error; WebError is reserved for failures to safely retrieve or represent the resource.
The provider's timeoutMs/maxTimeoutMs is a resource backstop for direct ctx.web.fetch() callers and misconfigured deployments — it is NOT the model-facing tool-call budget. The tool-call budget for web_fetch is deployment policy owned by @deepseek-ai/dsh-timeout-policy, which arms a per-call deadline on exec.signal. A shipped web-tool deployment sets the provider backstop above the tool-timeout budget, so the tool-call policy normally wins for model calls (returning TOOL_TIMEOUT); when the outer deadline signal reaches this provider first, it classifies as WEB_ABORTED and the outer wrapper replaces the result with TOOL_TIMEOUT. The provider's own WEB_FETCH_TIMEOUT only fires for a direct seam caller whose own budget elapsed.
Transport hygiene
- Accepts only
http:andhttps:URLs; rejects credentials in URLs (WEB_BLOCKED_URL) and over-long/malformed URLs (WEB_INVALID_URL). - Enforces a max URL length, response byte cap (
WEB_FETCH_TOO_LARGE), decoded body character cap, timeout (WEB_FETCH_TIMEOUT), and redirect hop cap. - Propagates the caller's abort signal (
WEB_ABORTED) into the network request and the streaming read. - Follows only same-origin redirects; a cross-origin redirect fails with
WEB_REDIRECT_BLOCKED, requiring a fresh tool call (the model of Claude Code's WebFetch). - Sends an explicit product
User-Agent, never a browser disguise. - Rejects unsupported (e.g. binary) content types with
WEB_UNSUPPORTED_CONTENT_TYPE.
Config
| Key | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
maxUrlLength |
2048 |
Maximum accepted request URL length. |
maxResponseBytes |
5_000_000 |
Maximum response body size in bytes. |
maxBodyChars |
100_000 |
Maximum decoded body length in characters. |
timeoutMs |
30_000 |
Default fetch timeout — a resource backstop for direct ctx.web.fetch() callers, not the model-facing tool-call budget (that is dsh-timeout-policy). |
maxTimeoutMs |
120_000 |
Upper bound for a per-request timeout override (direct callers). |
maxRedirects |
5 |
Maximum same-origin redirect hops (0 follows none). |
userAgent |
deepseek-harness/… |
User-Agent header. |
The numeric limits are validated at plugin construction: every cap except maxRedirects must be a positive finite number, and maxRedirects must be a non-negative integer. An invalid value throws rather than silently constructing a provider with nonsensical limits.
Security note
SSRF / private-network protection (blocking private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and otherwise non-public destinations, with DNS-resolve-then-validate and per-hop re-validation) is deferred — see the web capability seam RFC. Until it lands, this provider is an SSRF primitive and must not be enabled in a deployment that can reach sensitive internal network targets.