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https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness
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a90ccc4453
The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install: bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/` read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable). A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer. The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into `process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
7 lines
401 B
YAML
7 lines
401 B
YAML
# Bilingual-pair consistency record (docs/i18n/README.md): the git blob hash of each
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# side as of the last confirmed-consistent state. Both languages carry equal authority;
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# after editing either side, bring the other along and re-record with:
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# pnpm run verify-translation-pairing --write
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sandbox.md: 9bc05fa06f22fdc9ac9e8aacd482c1e7c2f2edec
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sandbox.zh.md: 9a52f126758fe0e7988715c7824e963bd6e6ea84
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