/** * Local sandbox backend. It selects the platform runner chain (Linux bwrap then * Landlock; macOS Seatbelt), functionally probes competing candidates once, and * reports each wrap's enforcement and stderr classification facts. Missing or unusable * confinement fails closed rather than returning the original argv. * @module @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local */ import { spawnSync } from 'node:child_process' import { LAUNCHER_BIN, LAUNCHER_FAILURE_EXIT, launcherPath as landlockLauncherPath, probe as defaultProbeLandlock, } from 'node-addon-landlock-run' import { Context } from 'cordis' import z from 'schemastery' import { assertNever } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-llm' import { SandboxProvider, SandboxUnavailableError } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox' import type { ConfinedArgv, ConfinedSandboxMode, RunnerFailureRule, SandboxEnforcement, SandboxPolicy } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox' import { bwrapProfileArgs, landlockProfileArgs, seatbeltProfileArgs } from './profiles.ts' /** Plugin config. All optional — `static Config` supplies the defaults. */ export interface Config { /** * Override the runner argv; bwrap-shaped profile arguments are appended. A * non-empty override asserts full enforcement and skips built-in selection and * probing. A runner that starts but refuses its profile must be identifiable by * {@link runnerFailureSignatures}. Consumers classify spawn rejection; only * attributable `ENOENT` or `EACCES` with runner argv[0] provenance becomes an * infrastructure failure. */ runnerCommand?: string[] /** * Case-insensitive stderr substrings emitted when a configured * {@link runnerCommand} refuses its profile before executing the wrapped * command. Required and non-empty with `runnerCommand`; rejected without * it. Each entry is a non-empty, single-line, case-insensitive substring * covering the executable runner's own failure dialect. */ runnerFailureSignatures?: string[] /** Positive timeout for each functional probe; zero would mean unbounded to Node. */ probeTimeoutMs?: number } /** Probe whether `bwrap` can create the profile; the provider caches the bounded result. */ function defaultProbeBwrap(timeoutMs: number): boolean { const probe = spawnSync('bwrap', ['--ro-bind', '/', '/', '--dev', '/dev', '--proc', '/proc', '--die-with-parent', '--', 'true'], { timeout: timeoutMs, stdio: 'ignore', }) return probe.status === 0 } /** * Functional Seatbelt probe: apply the real `read-only` profile through * `sandbox-exec -p` and run `true` under it — exit 0 means the kernel * accepted and enforced the profile (`sandbox-exec` exits non-zero when * `sandbox_init` refuses it). A missing `sandbox-exec` (every non-macOS * host) fails the spawn and probes `unusable`, exactly like the other * rungs' absent binaries. Apple marks the CLI deprecated but ships it on * every macOS; if it ever disappears, this probe is what fails closed. */ function defaultProbeSeatbelt(seatbeltExec: string, timeoutMs: number): boolean { const probe = spawnSync(seatbeltExec, [...seatbeltProfileArgs({ mode: 'read-only', workspaceRoot: '/' }), '--', 'true'], { timeout: timeoutMs, stdio: 'ignore', }) return probe.status === 0 } /** Test seam: inject probe verdicts / a fake launcher / a platform without real runners. */ export interface SandboxInternals { /** Replaces `process.platform` for chain selection (exercise any platform's chain from any host). */ platform?: string /** Replaces the platform's chain wholesale (walk mechanics — e.g. probing a rung the product chains only reach unprobed). */ chain?: readonly SelectedRunner['runner'][] /** Replaces the functional `bwrap` probe (the Linux chain's first rung). */ probeBwrap?: () => boolean /** Replaces the functional Landlock launcher probe (the Linux chain's second rung). */ probeLandlock?: (launcher: string) => SandboxEnforcement | 'unusable' /** Replaces the functional Seatbelt probe (the darwin chain's sole rung — only consulted if that chain ever grows). */ probeSeatbelt?: (seatbeltExec: string) => boolean /** Replaces the resolved `landlock-run` launcher path (a fake launcher script). */ landlockLauncher?: string /** Replaces the `sandbox-exec` executable the probe and wraps invoke (a fake script). */ seatbeltExec?: string } /** The chain's verdict: which runner confines, and how completely it enforces. */ type SelectedRunner = { runner: 'bwrap' | 'landlock' | 'seatbelt'; enforcement: SandboxEnforcement } /** * The runner chain per platform — selection is BY PLATFORM first, probes * second: a platform's chain is probed in preference order only when it has * MORE than one candidate (probing arbitrates; it does not re-validate a * choice that has no alternative). A platform with no chain fails closed at * `confine()`. Linux prefers `bwrap` (its mount profile is closest to the * mode vocabulary) over the Landlock launcher; darwin has exactly one * candidate, selected without any probe. */ const PLATFORM_CHAINS: Record = { linux: ['bwrap', 'landlock'], darwin: ['seatbelt'], // Reserved slot, deliberately empty: Windows support fills it with a confinement runner // (AppContainer / restricted-token family, shipped from its own repository on the // landlock-run template) plus a SelectedRunner['runner'] union member — the switches' // assertNever guards then walk the implementer to every site. win32: [], } /** * Enforcement completeness a rung claims when selected WITHOUT a probe (a * chain of one). `bwrap` and Seatbelt govern every promised file effect by * construction, so the claim is a profile fact; `landlock` is listed for the * table's totality but is unreachable unprobed today (the Linux chain has * two rungs, so it is only ever selected through its probe, whose report is * what distinguishes full from per-ABI-partial — and the launcher additionally * self-reports partial enforcement on stderr at every confined run). */ const STATIC_ENFORCEMENT: Record = { bwrap: 'full', landlock: 'full', seatbelt: 'full', } /** * A probe bound must be a positive finite number: Node treats * `spawnSync({ timeout: 0 })` as NO timeout, so an unvalidated 0 would * silently mean "unbounded" — the opposite of what the field promises. */ function assertPositiveFinite(name: string, value: number): void { if (!Number.isFinite(value) || value <= 0) { throw new Error(`sandbox-local: ${name} must be a positive finite number`) } } /** * The denial dialect each runner's kernel speaks — the case-insensitive stderr substrings a * denied file effect produces under it, carried on every wrap (the seam's * `ConfinedArgv.denialSignatures`). */ const DENIAL_SIGNATURES = { bwrap: ['read-only file system'], landlock: ['permission denied'], seatbelt: ['operation not permitted'], runnerCommand: ['read-only file system', 'permission denied'], } as const satisfies Record /** * Runner-owned fatal diagnostics. Landlock has a versioned exit-125 plus * fatal-line launcher-failure contract. Bubblewrap's current fatal paths exit * 1 but its public contract does not reserve that status, while sandbox-exec * publishes no launcher-failure status; those backends remain signature-only. * Keep the Landlock tuple aligned with the assembled snapshot fixture at * `examples/acp-agent/tests/fixtures/partial-landlock-sandbox.ts`. */ const RUNNER_FAILURE_RULES = { bwrap: [{ fatalSignatures: ['bwrap: '] }], landlock: [{ allowedExitCodes: [LAUNCHER_FAILURE_EXIT], fatalSignatures: [`${LAUNCHER_BIN}: `], informationalLines: [`${LAUNCHER_BIN}: partial enforcement (older Landlock ABI)`], }], seatbelt: [{ fatalSignatures: ['sandbox-exec: '] }], } as const satisfies Record /** * Local process-sandbox provider. Registers as `ctx.sandbox`. Stateless * apart from the cached chain verdict — it spawns nothing but the one-time * probes, so there is no disposal work beyond cordis' own. */ export class LocalSandboxProvider extends SandboxProvider { // Inline schema call: the config catalog walks `static Config` statically. static Config: z = z.object({ runnerCommand: z.array(z.string()).default([]), runnerFailureSignatures: z.array(z.string()).default([]), probeTimeoutMs: z.natural().default(5_000), }) /** Test seam (mirrors the bash executors' `internals`). */ internals: SandboxInternals = {} private readonly runnerCommand: string[] | undefined private readonly configuredRunnerFailureSignatures: string[] private readonly probeTimeoutMs: number /** Cached chain verdict; undefined until the first confined wrap needs it. */ private selectedRunner: SelectedRunner | 'unavailable' | undefined constructor(ctx: Context, config: Config) { super(ctx) // The schema (static Config) defaults every field — the casts record // those runtime facts. An empty runnerCommand means "not configured": // use the platform chain. const runner = config.runnerCommand as string[] const runnerFailureSignatures = config.runnerFailureSignatures as string[] if (runner.length === 0 && runnerFailureSignatures.length > 0) { throw new Error('sandbox-local: runnerFailureSignatures requires runnerCommand') } if (runner.length > 0 && runnerFailureSignatures.length === 0) { throw new Error('sandbox-local: runnerCommand requires at least one runnerFailureSignatures entry') } if (runnerFailureSignatures.some(signature => signature.trim().length === 0 || /[\r\n]/u.test(signature))) { throw new Error('sandbox-local: runnerFailureSignatures entries must be non-empty single-line strings') } this.runnerCommand = runner.length > 0 ? runner : undefined this.configuredRunnerFailureSignatures = runnerFailureSignatures this.probeTimeoutMs = config.probeTimeoutMs as number assertPositiveFinite('probeTimeoutMs', this.probeTimeoutMs) } /** * Wrap `argv` in the selected runner's invocation for `policy` — the configured * `runnerCommand` when present (the operator's assertion, no probe), else the platform * chain's runner speaking its own profile dialect. * * @param argv - the exact argv the caller is about to spawn. * @param policy - the file-effect policy this execution runs under. * @returns the wrapped argv plus the selected backend's enforcement completeness, denial * signatures, and structured runner-failure rules; throws the fail-closed * `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` error when the platform has no usable runner. */ confine(argv: readonly string[], policy: SandboxPolicy): ConfinedArgv { if (this.runnerCommand !== undefined) { return { argv: [...this.runnerCommand, ...bwrapProfileArgs(policy), '--', ...argv], enforcement: 'full', denialSignatures: DENIAL_SIGNATURES.runnerCommand, runnerFailureRules: [{ fatalSignatures: this.configuredRunnerFailureSignatures }], } } const selected = this.selectRunner(policy.mode) const runnerArgv = this.runnerArgv(selected.runner, policy) return { argv: [...runnerArgv, '--', ...argv], enforcement: selected.enforcement, denialSignatures: DENIAL_SIGNATURES[selected.runner], runnerFailureRules: RUNNER_FAILURE_RULES[selected.runner], } } /** The selected rung's runner invocation (program + profile arguments) for one policy. */ private runnerArgv(runner: SelectedRunner['runner'], policy: SandboxPolicy): string[] { switch (runner) { case 'bwrap': return ['bwrap', ...bwrapProfileArgs(policy)] case 'landlock': return [this.landlockLauncher(), ...landlockProfileArgs(policy)] case 'seatbelt': return [this.seatbeltExec(), ...seatbeltProfileArgs(policy)] default: return assertNever(runner) } } /** * Resolve which runner confines commands, once, for the provider's * lifetime: this platform's chain ({@link PLATFORM_CHAINS}), its sole * candidate selected directly, multiple candidates arbitrated by * functional probes in chain order. Fail closed when the platform has no * chain or no candidate passes — the command never runs. */ private selectRunner(mode: ConfinedSandboxMode): SelectedRunner { this.selectedRunner ??= this.chainVerdict() if (this.selectedRunner === 'unavailable') throw new SandboxUnavailableError(mode) return this.selectedRunner } /** Walk this platform's chain: sole candidate unprobed, several probed in order, none usable → unavailable. */ private chainVerdict(): SelectedRunner | 'unavailable' { const chain = this.internals.chain ?? PLATFORM_CHAINS[this.internals.platform ?? process.platform] ?? [] const [first, ...rest] = chain if (first === undefined) return 'unavailable' // A sole candidate needs no arbitration; its execution-time refusal still fails closed. if (rest.length === 0) return { runner: first, enforcement: STATIC_ENFORCEMENT[first] } for (const runner of chain) { const enforcement = this.probeRunner(runner) if (enforcement !== 'unusable') return { runner, enforcement } } return 'unavailable' } /** One rung's functional probe (each at most once, via the chain walk). */ private probeRunner(runner: SelectedRunner['runner']): SandboxEnforcement | 'unusable' { // bwrap's mount profile and Seatbelt's deny-file-write* profile govern // every promised file effect by construction, so their passing probes // are always full enforcement; only the Landlock launcher's probe report // distinguishes full from per-ABI-partial. switch (runner) { case 'bwrap': { const probe = this.internals.probeBwrap ?? (() => defaultProbeBwrap(this.probeTimeoutMs)) return probe() ? 'full' : 'unusable' } case 'landlock': { const probe = this.internals.probeLandlock ?? (launcher => defaultProbeLandlock(launcher, { timeoutMs: this.probeTimeoutMs })) return probe(this.landlockLauncher()) } case 'seatbelt': { const probe = this.internals.probeSeatbelt ?? (exec => defaultProbeSeatbelt(exec, this.probeTimeoutMs)) return probe(this.seatbeltExec()) ? 'full' : 'unusable' } default: return assertNever(runner) } } /** The Landlock launcher to probe and exec (test seam over the resolved one). */ private landlockLauncher(): string { return this.internals.landlockLauncher ?? landlockLauncherPath() } /** The `sandbox-exec` executable to probe and exec (test seam over the system one). */ private seatbeltExec(): string { return this.internals.seatbeltExec ?? 'sandbox-exec' } } export default LocalSandboxProvider