The `readDenyPaths` policy field shipped in the previous commit broke Linux
confinement outright. bwrap has to create the `/dev/null` bind's mount point
inside a tree its own profile has already made read-only, so it refused the
entire confinement whenever the parent directory was absent — every host that
has not stored a credential yet, including a fresh install:
bwrap: Can't mkdir parents for /home/runner/.dsh/.env: Read-only file system
which the executor correctly classifies as SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, so every
confined bash call failed closed. Landlock cannot subtract from its own `/`
read grant, so it reported `partial` enforcement on every confined call for a
file it never hid, with no way to switch the denial off (schemastery fills an
omitted array with `[]`, so empty and omitted were indistinguishable).
A protection that breaks confinement where it works and misreports it where it
does not is worse than a documented absence. Revert the field, both expressible
backends, the enforcement downgrade, and the policy default; state the residue
plainly in the credentials-local READMEs — file mode stops other OS users, not
the model — and keep the OS-keychain provider recorded as the real answer.
The narrower discipline stands: no surface hoists the credential document into
`process.env`, and the model is never handed a resolved path to it.
Both provider READMEs state what actually holds: credentials-local now
documents the physical-line editor, the read-modify-write under the
writer lock, and a Security boundary section saying plainly that the file
mode stops other OS users and not the model. sandbox-policy documents
readDenyPaths and its per-backend enforcement. The llm READMEs carry the
registration handle, pi-ai's credential-miss semantics, and DeepSeek's
same-generation snapshot; app-boot and the CLI README stop describing
$DSH_HOME/.env as an environment layer.
A new Agent Note records the round (and the prior seam note cross-links
it); the sandbox and core catalog pages gain readDenyPaths and
AdapterRegistrationHandle with their manifest entries. The headless
missing-credential snapshot re-records for the reworded guidance, pi-ai
gains the Loader-composition guard its twin already had, and the
deliberate provider symmetry is marked for the clone detector.
The policy home's resolve() now stamps readDenyPaths, so every consumer
that pins the resolved shape (bash-sandbox hand-off, tool-fs stamps)
carries it, and three uncovered branches gained real tests: landlock
reporting partial enforcement for a denial it cannot express, the
policy's default under programmatic construction, and both ambient
credential paths in llm-deepseek without a mounted seam.
New credentials data-structure page (type-equiv manifested), group README,
rewritten llm-deepseek/llm-pi-ai READMEs (dynamic configuration, dict
profiles, credential chain), capability-seams/service-role registration,
Agent Note (bilingual), demo compositions mounting settings-local +
credentials-local with no inline key plumbing, installSettingsSection
consumer helper on the settings seam (deduplicating both adapters' wiring),
jscpd symmetry markers for the provider twins, runtime-closure additions for
python/sdk-runtime, and doc-budget ceilings AGENTS.md 1750→1755 /
packages/README.md 850→865 for the structural one-line group rows.
Live environment wins read-only (shadowed writes reject instead of
appearing to succeed); the file is the writable source with byte-preserving
line edits, a quoting ladder dotenv reads back verbatim, atomic 0600
writes, wholesale snapshot replacement on reload, and write-drain
teardown.
