Machine-produced by `pnpm run rescope-vendor --apply` plus the regeneration it
prints: `pnpm install` for the lockfile, `pnpm run gen-third-party-notices`,
`verify-translation-pairing --write` for the touched bilingual pairs,
`gen-doc-graphs`, and one typert snapshot whose ids embed character offsets.
`pnpm run rescope-vendor --check` verifies the result.
Renames nine vendored packages (cordis, cosmokit, schemastery and the six
@cordisjs plugins) and every reference that resolves them: manifest names and
dependency keys, module specifiers including declare-module merges, cordis.yml
plugin names, tsconfig paths, every Markdown fence, and `docs/` prose.
Directory names, upstream versions, and dependency ranges are unchanged, so
vendor/README.md still reads as an upstream snapshot; its manifest table gains
an upstream-name column so THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES keeps MIT attribution pointed
at each fork's origin.
The tutorial tier follows the rename end to end: its yaml fences named plugins
the Loader can no longer resolve, its `ts ignore-check` fences disagreed with
the compiled fences beside them, and its prose quoted both. The contracts that
told readers to keep upstream names — the root convention and the vendoring
cookbook's tree comment and manifest invariant — now say to rescope instead.
Two rules read `@deepseek-ai/` as "another workspace plugin": the client bundle
purity gate now names the vendored libraries a browser bundle inlines, and the
files where a bare `cordis` is an agent-preset id keep that product data.
write/edit failures with FS_STALE_VERSION or FS_NOT_OBSERVED now reach the
model with the correct recovery instruction appended (re-read / read, then
retry) while preserving the structured code and chaining the cause. The
edit-intent waterfall sits inside the same try, so the policy's
FS_NOT_OBSERVED refusal is remediated too. Re-recorded the fs-policy-reject
keyless snapshot and the bilingual README pairs.
An empty read window (byte cap below the first selected line: `lines: []`
with `totalLines > 0`) dropped `offset` from the persisted presentation
meta, so a replayed read card could not report where the window starts or
where a continuation resumes. Carry `offset` on `FsReadMeta`,
`ReadResultView`, and the `presentationMeta` projection, and validate it in
`readMetaFromMeta` (1-based integer; the first line number may not fall
below it). Re-record the ACP fixtures and the cordis api catalog.
Also correct the Note's `parallel-file-reads` golden path
(examples/tui-agent -> apps/cli) and record the pre-card replay-degradation
tradeoff in the Decision section.
A filename whose extension is an Object.prototype key (foo.constructor,
foo.__proto__) resolved to the inherited member through the plain-object index,
so a function reached the read card's lang hint and failed the tool-output JSON
validation, failing an otherwise successful read. Look the extension up as an
own property only. Added rejection tests, converted the zh Note headings to the
all-English sibling convention, and named the parallel-file-reads terminal
golden as the TUI-unchanged evidence in the Testing section (both languages).
readMetaFromMeta narrows the opaque persisted meta boundary, so beyond
shape it now rejects replayed JSON that is well-typed but semantically
invalid: line numbers must be 1-based integers, totalLines a non-negative
integer, and line numbers must strictly increase without exceeding
totalLines. Any violation declines to the generic fallback.
Sync the public ToolResultView contract across the core/tools and
tool-fs READMEs and docs/core-data-structures/tools for the fourth
result-view member and the ReadFileLine vocabulary, and expand the
Agent Note Testing section with the new rejection paths and the snapshot
evidence this PR carries.
The read tool's result carries structured numbered lines, but only the
model-facing envelope text reached the client. Add a card:'read' result view
(ReadResultView) projecting {path, lines, totalLines, lang} through the tool's
output.presentationMeta so presentResult reproduces it on live and replay
paths; the pending call stays a generic read card. A UI without the read
capability falls back to the envelope-stripped content, so the TUI is
unchanged. The web consumer that renders the line-numbered view is a follow-up.
- fs-sandbox: delegate the mutation with the freshly re-canonicalized target
(not the stale one), so the checked identity is the mutated identity — a
symlink swapped in after resolve() can no longer escape workspace-write.
- tool-fs: map a denial to an FsError carrying FS_SANDBOX_DENIED (not a plain
Error), so ToolRegistry keeps the structured code on result.error for
retry/observers while the message stays the shared marker.
- sandbox-local: derive the Seatbelt writable set from the shared
writableRoots() helper, so the profile and the fs fence cannot drift.
- gen-doc-graphs: ctx.sandboxPolicy is owned by dsh-sandbox-policy and read only
by the sandboxed executor/provider (the tool layers use the pure fold).
- docs: bash-sandbox/bash/permission READMEs and bash.md reflect the relocated
policy home and the sandbox/mode rename; drop the stale stdout.golden.jsonl.
Extend SandboxMode enforcement from bash to the filesystem tools, the sandbox
RFC's deferred cross-family phase.
- dsh-sandbox-policy (new, ctx.sandboxPolicy): the single home for the
deployment default mode + workspaceRoot and the per-session override event,
renamed bash/sandbox-mode -> sandbox/mode and moved here with its fold/setter.
Decouples the bash seam from dsh-session.
- dsh-fs-sandbox (new): SandboxedFileSystem extends LocalFileSystem and fences
write/edit by the per-call mode (read-only denies, workspace-write contains to
the workspace + temp roots via the shared writableRoots, danger passes
through); reads pass through. Structured FS_SANDBOX_DENIED; in-lock parent
re-canonicalization. A policy fence in trusted code, not a kernel boundary.
- dsh-sandbox: the shared escalation kit (writableRoots, the strictly-wider
ladder, denial/hint markers, approveEscalation) both tool families use;
approveEscalation takes a structural approver so dsh-sandbox gains no
approval/agent dependency, and both tools stay duplication-free.
- tool-fs: write/edit advertise sandbox_permissions/justification under a
confining ctx.fs, map FS_SANDBOX_DENIED to the shared [sandbox: ...] marker,
and resolve the same one-approved-wider retry.
- examples/acp-agent: composes sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox, drops the gating
that disabled the fs stack under confined modes.
RFC docs/rfc/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md; the old
sandbox RFC's In-process/deferred/FAQ sections updated to shipped fact.
The read tool's isConcurrencySafe rationale called the fs/observed recorder
"commutative" and said concurrent reads "converge to one observed version",
overstating the guarantee: the WeakMap record is last-writer-wins. Safety comes
from write/edit re-checking the version in their in-lock CAS (a stale
observation only forces a later edit to fail closed with FS_STALE_VERSION), as
the RFC already states. Align the read comment, the ToolDefinition JSDoc, both
READMEs, and the regenerated catalogs.
