The Windows platform layer previously kept fs path-rule confinement
(sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox) next to the unconfined pwsh shell. Windows
has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the
shell can bypass fs-only path rules with one command — the policy was
theater. The layer now removes the whole sandbox stack (sandbox,
sandbox-policy, fs-sandbox disabled), mounts the unconfined dsh-fs-local,
and degrades to danger-full-access: permission/ui-permission leave the
roster and the approval policy is 'never'.
dsh-base declares dsh-fs-local so the profile module fallback links it for
cold starts; base.spec.ts pins the shipped Windows roster (disables,
inserts, approval policy); the Agent Note records the rejected fs-only
confinement alternative.
win32 hosts booting a shipped profile now get pwsh-local as the ctx.bash
executor and tool-pwsh as the shell tool through the base bundle's new
windows.cordis.patch.yml platform layer, injected by the launcher between
the bundle layers and the user layers on win32. bash-sandbox, tool-bash,
permission, and ui-permission are disabled there: the POSIX-only executor
cannot run on Windows, and dsh-permission requires a confining executor.
Overriding the default is a composition decision through the user's
cordis.patch.yml; there is no environment override channel.
apps/cli and dsh-base re-declare dsh-pwsh-local/dsh-tool-pwsh so the
profile module fallback links them for cold starts (the profiles rework
had dropped them from the CLI closure).
Promotes the windows-pwsh-default Agent Note from proposed to implemented
and documents the platform layer in the base bundle README.
