The Windows platform layer re-enables the base fs-sandbox row (removing its disable), but still inserted dsh-fs-local: both extend FileSystem and provide ctx.fs, so every shipped win32 profile failed at load. Delete the insert; fs-sandbox stays the single fs provider exactly as on POSIX. Sync the roster specs, the base/reference README pairs, the sandbox core doc (read-only grants no sink on Windows), the windows-shell JSDoc, and re-record the i18n pairings.
Confine Windows command execution through a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs carry an orphan-SID write allowlist, ported from https://github.com/huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (@ 10e4dfb). Every Win32 call is checked and fails closed - the POC silently ran children with the FULL token when CreateRestrictedToken failed.
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl: koffi primitives verified against the MinGW Windows headers (verify/abi-probe.cpp) plus the confinement runner ([node, runner, --workspace, --temp, --mode, --, argv...]: kill-on-close job, stdio passthrough, exit-code mirroring, windows-acl-run: failure signature, grant revocation). read-only = strict zero grants (NUL device not writable; documented). Windows-only execution: exempted from the Linux coverage lane (windowsOnlyCoverageExclusions).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local: PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32 filled with the windows-acl runner (full enforcement, ACL denial dialect, runner-failure rules).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox: sandbox-consuming pwsh executor (call-for-call mirror of dsh-bash-sandbox) over a new argv-level seam in dsh-pwsh-local; per-file coverage complete via the fake-provider spec.
- bundle/base: the Windows platform layer mounts the confined pwsh roster - sandbox/policy/fs-sandbox/permission/approval re-enabled, the POSIX bash stack stays disabled.
Co-authored-by: Huo Yaoyuan <huoyaoyuan@hotmail.com>
The Windows layer previously kept the approval service with policy 'never',
which made the approval plugin inject 'Approval prompts are disabled in
this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically'
into the model context. On Windows nothing asks for approval — the
escalation surfaces (sandbox_permissions) do not exist — so the sentence
described a rejection surface that is not there. The layer now disables
the approval row too: the service is absent, the model is never told
approval exists, and the danger-full-access degradation is complete.
base.spec.ts pins approval among the Windows disables; the Agent Note and
bundle README record the absent service.
The Windows platform layer previously kept fs path-rule confinement
(sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox) next to the unconfined pwsh shell. Windows
has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the
shell can bypass fs-only path rules with one command — the policy was
theater. The layer now removes the whole sandbox stack (sandbox,
sandbox-policy, fs-sandbox disabled), mounts the unconfined dsh-fs-local,
and degrades to danger-full-access: permission/ui-permission leave the
roster and the approval policy is 'never'.
dsh-base declares dsh-fs-local so the profile module fallback links it for
cold starts; base.spec.ts pins the shipped Windows roster (disables,
inserts, approval policy); the Agent Note records the rejected fs-only
confinement alternative.
A profile manifest and a bundle manifest are different kinds and shared one
flat `dsh` section: `dsh.plugins` listed bundles (not plugins) and `dsh.patch`
declared a bundle's layer. Each kind now names its role — a bundle declares
`dsh.bundle.patch`, a profile declares `dsh.profile.bundles` — so a
package.json states which role it plays and the list name matches its contents.
`DEFAULT_PROFILE_PLUGINS` becomes `DEFAULT_PROFILE_BUNDLES`, and
`DshManifestSection` splits into `DshBundleManifest`/`DshProfileManifest`.
Pre-release: no compatibility shim; turtle-ui moved with it (bd5ff10).
- composeProfile keeps layers as bundle/user/overlay+flags segments instead
of one flat list later re-sliced by index arithmetic; the row index drops
the group-walk (profile trees are flat patch compositions) and the double
composition.
- The config dump anchors on the profile's real empty root (written by the
shared prepareProfile) instead of materializing a temp file, so dump and
boot compose over the identical base by construction.
- dsh-base drops its patchPath export: the dsh.patch manifest field is the
one contract; the package carries no runtime API.
- packageDirFromAnchor is paths-probe only (the require.resolve fast path
duplicated the probe's outcome); basename() replaces hand-rolled path
splitting; verify-cordis-config stops re-reading bundle manifests in-loop.
Profile bundles are npm packages declaring dsh.patch in their manifest:
dsh-base carries the former base.cordis.yml rows as one insert over the empty
profile root; dsh-web-app carries the web overlay plus a runtime glue plugin
owning what used to be launcher code (frontend dist resolution via
frontend-static, the web-surface prompt section, bash runtime variables, the
readiness-gated URL line); dsh-headless carries the one-shot runner driving a
task turn through the in-process API carrier under the launcher-provided
ctx.headlessIo seam.
