Rewrite the agent-scope RFC with executable examples and an explicit security non-goal. Harden subagent scalar and depth validation, and pin live tool-filter semantics across code, tests, and generated docs.
Queue worker results before settlement cleanup, claim terminal and death boundaries before provider callbacks, and close late-message admission.
Make child cancellation and disposal reentrancy-safe across the workflow bridge and generic subagent wrapper, with adversarial regression coverage and RFC documentation.
Make Cordis construction and teardown ownership reentrancy-safe, then carry caller and provider ownership through reservation, setup, publication, quiescence, and sentinel retirement.
Stabilize registry carriers and factory/workflow boundaries, add adversarial lifecycle regressions, and align the rewritten RFC plus generated contracts with the enforced behavior.
Drain idle injection flushes before agent teardown, snapshot approval and subagent provider inputs, and gate subagent lifecycle events on real child readiness. Align the RFCs and generated contracts with the hardened behavior.
formatSystemPromptSnapshot's insert-join ternary had its already-newline-
terminated arm unexercised (a delta whose insert ends in a blank line),
failing the per-file 100% branch gate on suite.ts (99.24%).
Review follow-up: the blanket 10s default correctly targets worker-thread
cold-start races (starting, first-script-line, async child-registration
messages — genuinely CPU-bound under CI contention), but four waits assert
something different — that the HOST reacted PROMPTLY to an event that
already happened (a settled result, an observed worker death). Those had no
cold-start left to wait on, so the generous default just widened the window
a real regression could hide in.
Verified by injecting a 6s delay into the settle-reap's abort call: the
un-overridden helper's test still passed in ~6s. The same mutation now fails
in ~1s with the explicit 1000ms override restored on all four sites (the
abort-on-settle test's own assertion, the two worker-death cancel/dispose
reap checks, and the dispose-ack-race check). The other 12 waits keep the
10s default — they run BEFORE a result is awaited, waiting on the worker to
actually start rather than on a host reaction. Doc comment corrected to
describe the split instead of claiming every wait is a cold-start race.
The spec's 16 vi.waitFor sites used the 1s default timeout to wait for
worker-thread startup and child registration — CPU-bound work that blows
past 1s on a contended runner. The CI coverage lane (4 vitest workers plus
suites that spawn real subprocesses) hit this 3 times across 4 recent PR
runs, each a different subset of the cancellation/worker-death tests, each
green on rerun.
Every wait now goes through a shared helper with a 10s bound, and the file
sets a 30s test timeout to make room for it. The one deliberately tight
wait keeps its 800ms bound through the helper's override — it proves the
host (not the wedged worker's later loop turn) delivered the cancel, so a
generous bound would erase what it tests. No behavior under test changed.
spec.onError is a caller-supplied callback boundary, but the flattening
catch invoked it unguarded: a throwing sink rejected the whole async result,
breaking the seam's "result never rejects on a child-level failure"
contract (and docs/defensive-patterns.md's contain-callback-exceptions
rule). The sink's own throw is now swallowed — named as such — while the
original child failure still settles as stopReason 'error'. Regression test
drives a spawn failure through a throwing sink and asserts result resolves.
Same defect as the codex backend's, fixed there on PR #240; this is the
symmetric fix for the already-merged ACP backend.
The three wedged-child scenarios busy-spin their worker for 1.5s while the
host waits for the start RPC; under a loaded 2-core CI runner (this branch
adds several parallel suites) the RPC lands after vi.waitFor default 1s,
failing the coverage lane three runs in a row at the same three sites. An
explicit 10s waitFor timeout (well inside each test own 15s budget) makes
the assertions load-tolerant without weakening them. Belongs upstream with
dsh-workflow-workerthread; carried here because it gates this PR.
The three-entry cordis.yml (dsh-sandbox-local + dsh-bash-sandbox at a
read-only default + dsh-approval) served over ACP: the first live approval
composition. Recorded snapshot scenarios pin the wire end to end —
config-options advertisement, the mode-switching arc as the suite pinned
header (both switches, the prompt-section delta, one changed-by-the-user
notice per knob, a confined write landing under the switched mode), and
both escalation branches over scripted permissionAnswers (a grant runs
confined under workspace-write; a rejection executes nothing and pins the
fail-closed text). The with-key escalation e2e drives a real model +
real runner + the real bridge answerer, world-verified; ci.yml snapshot
lane and e2e.yml install bubblewrap so the confined replays actually
execute.
Both RFCs move to implemented/ (Decision/Consequences form, deferred
phases tracked in their own sections), with every cross-reference flipped.
