- subagents.history computes its projections best-effort on both arms
(a hostile unit's fold rejection serves the page without the block,
matching the session-list precedent) with dual-arm coverage
- the lifecycle-witness spec probes every field of the seven-key
witness, protecting the key list itself
- list-children's own module docs catch up with the seq-gate contract,
and the design note records the rung-two later-event window as an
accepted, self-healing deviation of the corruption class
subagents.history drops its session-query read: a live child serves its
in-memory events with the registry watermark snapshot, a cold child goes
through inspectServable with a detached fold, and the retired
SESSION_QUERY_* arms disappear while every wire face stays put. The
design note records the shared read source.
- the subagent projection's empty state becomes a serializable null
sentinel (undefined fields vanish in JSON push frames, leaving stale
identities in clients); consumers treat null and a missing key alike,
and cached sentinels defer to the authoritative refold
- the tool catalog generator mounts the projection registry for
list_agents; the shared unavailable-error copy goes catalog-neutral
- the design note's verification section records the new
subagent-diagnostic snapshot honestly, the 2026-07-22 note's test
inventory is rewritten to the current mechanism, and the session-store
error code is documented
- listChildren contains per-child projection faults on both ladder rungs
(any registered unit's fold/schema rejection maps to that child's corrupt
diagnostic) and pins the whole-enumeration listing-failure rethrow
- the base bundle mounts session-projection (web-app's own insert retired
to avoid the double mount); stale composition comment updated
- the shared projections-unavailable wire face is pinned across
list/history/prompt; retired session-query arms removed from the catalog
paths
- the design note records the unknown-parent semantics shift and the
fold-fault isolation rule
- listChildren reads the session store via strict ctx.get (property proxy
is caller-scoped), orders candidates branchlessly, narrows the cold-read
return type, and pins the cost model and store/registry composition gaps
with tests; per-file coverage restored
- acp-agent and headless-agent compositions mount session-projection; a
keyless snapshot pins the descriptor-less diagnostic row
- api-proxy cold spec pins header-origin ownership and the legacy
descriptor-only opt-out
- design note ships as implemented with its English pairing; companion
notes and core-data-structures pages synced
All agent/* and agent-loop/config-start-failed events take one payload
object carrying the agent subject; waterfall/serial payloads require a
signal and keep next as the final argument. PreStepContext and
RequestFailureContext are unfolded into payloads and retired.
goal/changed follows the same shape so agentEvents keeps its listener
error containment. ReactLoopAgent builds its scope carrier once in the
constructor. Regenerates scope resolvers, tool-cordis api catalog, and
docs catalogs; updates all affected listeners, tests, and the
core-data-structures docs (en + zh).
Move the claimed-message notification loop out of the loop's pre-step
into Inbox.claim(target, turn), so the step-boundary operation publishes
its own claimed notifications like insertions and discards do.
llm.discoverModels was reachable from any declared trusted host. The
method takes a caller-supplied baseURL and makes the host issue a GET to
it, then reports the status or the parsed body — so on a LAN deployment
an anonymous caller had a probe for whatever the host can reach and the
browser cannot, plus a path that carries a draft credential. The
PRIVILEGED_METHODS doc already states the rule this broke: trustedHosts
is a DNS-rebinding fence, not authentication, so the configuration plane
stays loopback-same-origin. It is in that set now, asserted both against
the hand-built fence and over real HTTP beside the catalog reads that
deliberately stay reachable.
supportsDiscovery and listModelDiscoveryNamespaces are gone. The field
was required on the wire and read by nobody: its own contract said a
surface should offer the action "instead of naming an adapter family it
would have to hardcode", while the surface hardcodes llm-pi-ai in two
places and gates the button on whether there is anything to probe. Its
shape did not fit the second caller either — the create card has no row
to read a per-row field from. Keeping a required field alive for a
consumer that may never arrive costs every producer and fixture a value
nobody consults, which is exactly how the fixtures drifted. The registry
that fed it had no other production consumer, so registration and
disposal are now observed through the offer itself.
The Agent Note claimed the key is never logged, which the wire schema
beside it already contradicts, and predated both the provider field and
the catalog-answer path. The two new public types pointed at core.md
without a type-equiv block or manifest entry, so the generated service
catalog named documentation that did not exist.
Clicking "fetch available models" on a built-in provider went to the
network. That is the wrong source: pi-ai's registry is the authoritative
list for its own providers, and it carries the context windows and output
caps a `GET /models` listing does not disclose. Asking api.deepseek.com
what DeepSeek serves is both slower and worse, and against an endpoint
that answers a different shape it failed outright.
Interrogation is still keyed by settings namespace — the provider being
added has no route — but the request may now name the route it is
editing. An adapter that already describes that route answers from what
it knows, needs no endpoint at all, and never touches the network; only a
route the catalog does not describe reaches the wire, and one naming no
endpoint is told to set one or enter its models by hand.
`ConfigurableProviderView` gained `supportsDiscovery` so a surface offers
the action where a namespace can answer instead of hardcoding an adapter
family.
Three narrower corrections ride along. Discovery no longer claims Azure
or Codex: Azure authenticates with an `api-key` header and an
`api-version` query despite its OpenAI lineage, and Codex uses OAuth, so
both reported an authentication failure as a provider with no models.
Cancellation during the body read escaped as the raw abort reason rather
than a coded ABORTED. And the schema comment claiming the probe key is
never logged overstated it: the host neither stores nor returns it, but
it rides the client's outgoing envelope like every other secret-bearing
payload, and redacting that tap is a configuration-plane-wide change.
Once a pi-ai route became a declaration rather than a catalog lookup,
adding an OpenAI-compatible gateway meant knowing its model ids up
front. Most such endpoints publish that list at `GET /models`, but no
seam operation could ask: every one is keyed by a registered provider
route, and the provider being added has no route, no stored profile,
and no stored credential — the endpoint and key are values in a form.
Interrogation is therefore keyed by settings namespace, which a
configuration surface already holds from the configurable-provider
directory. `registerModelDiscovery` offers it per namespace,
`discoverModels` asks, and the request carries the draft itself. The
reply is candidates, not a catalog: every field but the id is optional
because most listings disclose nothing else, and adopting one is a
settings write like any other. Nothing here reads or writes settings or
credentials, so `settings.yaml` still decides what a route serves.
`llm.discoverModels` carries the same draft over the wire. Its apiKey is
the third and last payload a secret may ride, and it is never stored,
logged, or echoed; every refusal folds into `model-discovery-failed`,
naming the endpoint asked but never the credential offered.
The pi-ai side is a plain GET for OpenAI-compatible protocols only —
their listing shape is the one gateways, self-hosted servers, and the
official endpoints agree on. Others say so, sending the user to
hand-entry rather than reporting a guessed shape as an empty provider.
The reply is read under a four-megabyte ceiling held on the bytes
actually received, because the endpoint is a URL the user typed.
- turn boundary now returns false for an empty admitted batch (claimed
input removed before the wake) instead of opening a turn and spending a
model call on nothing; the step boundary already had the symmetric guard.
- a max-token step stays sticky when steering or injected work continues
the turn: a later completed step no longer downgrades the outcome,
matching the TurnEndReasonMap contract.
- session/queue wire schema accepts the context placement (previously the
zod union rejected injected-context snapshots wholesale and the client
silently dropped the whole frame); schema tests cover all placements.
- headless runs settle at whole-agent idle instead of the first turn/end,
honoring the one-shot idle-to-idle contract.
- flush JSDoc names the real callers (checkpoint policy, goal-session,
teardown, self-flushing consumers); apiproxy zh README loses its stale
duplicate history section; ACP note/README record the delivered error
rejection and turnless-cancelled behaviors.
next-step items now split by origin: user-origin messages keep the
'steering' placement, while agent.inject context (approval notices, task
completion notices, attached snapshots) carries a new 'context' placement
that no surface renders until it is claimed as a durable user/message
context card. Widen the placement unions on the wire and in the client
runtime, add a projection test case, and document the split in the
apiproxy/ui-conversation READMEs and the web-steer chrome agent note.
Steer, inject, and followup now land as durable user/message events on the
session surface; the steering/message event type and its ConversationNode
kind are removed from the client projection. Update tests, docs, generated
catalogs, and agent notes to match, and align the steering e2e fixture and
prompt inventory assertions with the durable user/message landing.
When a generic `agentFor` cold resume loses the identity to a parent's
concurrent `enter()` — the collision rejection arrives from
`ctx.agents.resume` publication after the pre-resume re-check — the error
fell through to the `internal` mapping. Clients retrying then see a
transient-looking internal failure instead of the stable ownership error
that `ensureSession`'s `.catch` already produces for the exact same
published-winner case.
Mirror that re-classification in `agentFor`'s resume error path: after the
typed errors, re-check the registry and attached store and answer
`agent-busy` when the raced winner is subagent-owned. Adds a regression
test whose resume mock publishes the subagent winner before throwing the
ID-collision error.
The fork button on a stopped assistant message was inert. Frozen
interrupted nodes carry a flow-ordering seq of turnEnd.seq - 0.9, and
session.fork takes a non-negative integer on the wire, so every such
request was rejected as invalid-params before reaching the host — where
an aborted turn's logged turn/end has always made it forkable.
SessionsService.fork floors atSeq at the wire boundary. Flooring stays
inside the anchor's own turn (every turn opens with turn/start), so the
host's first-turn/end-at-or-after cut still closes on that turn.
