The Gateway serves the goal domain as Remote endpoints, and a Remote method
picks its receiver Service from a generated descriptor — `clear(agent, ref)`
takes its agent as a PARAMETER, so the invocation is direct and the receiver
resolves on the host. Behind the preset's entry-local realm there was nothing
to resolve, and every browser goal call answered `service-unavailable`: the
composer's Clear goal button left the bar on screen.
That is the `bash-env` criterion read from the other side. Injection is not the
only host relationship a Service can have; being READ from a host row is one
too. The registry is keyed by session, so one host instance serves every
session exactly as it did before presets. The preset keeps the model-facing
tool, which is the choice a preset is for.
Also reverts the cold-transcript presenter resolve: resuming an agent to reach
its presenters made the context meter drop its cache and token counts on every
cold-opened session, trading one silent degradation for another. The card
degradation it addressed is diagnosed and still open.
The composer's preset seat stays removed here — this layer moved it to the
hero chip and the session-header action — so only the model seat takes the
`modelSeatLocked` narrowing master introduced.
Conflicts:
apps/web/tests/snapshots/*/*.expected.md
packages/client/connection/README.md
packages/client/connection/README.zh.md
packages/client/ui-conversation/src/client/skeleton/InputBar.tsx
packages/host/apiproxy/src/fetch/client.ts
The Client API carrier's `agentPresets` member was the one member of its class
without an `IApiClient[...]` annotation. Inferring it inlined `AgentPresetEntry`
into the emitted declaration by the specifier TS picks — the host `index.ts` —
dragging the whole gateway, and with it the host `Context` merges, into every
Client program importing the carrier. Annotated like its siblings.
`ApiRemoteAgentOptions.setup` now takes the inspected session rather than its
header alone: this layer resolves a resumed session's preset from the LOG,
because a session that switched while blank ran its turns under the newer
composition and the header is written once at creation.
Conflicts:
apps/web/tests/snapshots/*/*.expected.md
packages/client/ui-conversation/src/client/skeleton/InputBar.tsx
packages/host/apiproxy/src/api-proxy.ts
scripts/doc-budgets.manifest.json
master extracted this layer's inline cold-resume resolver into
@deepseek-ai/dsh-api-remotes, whose `setup` was a fixed AgentSetup. A resumed
session composes the preset ITS header recorded, so the option becomes a
function of that header; the resolver builds the setup before the published
re-checks so those stay adjacent to `resume`.
Conflicts:
docs/cordis-catalog/services.md
docs/module-graph.md
packages/host/apiproxy/package.json
packages/host/apiproxy/src/api-proxy.ts
pnpm-lock.yaml
The self-hosted Linux runners ship no pwsh, and the pwshAvailable probes used spawnSync('where.exe'), which reports a missing binary as status null instead of throwing — the suites never skipped and failed with spawn pwsh ENOENT. Probe with resolvePwshPath() status instead, the same gate the coverage exemption uses. Exempt pwsh-sandbox src from coverage on pwsh-less hosts (its remaining helpers branch and the invariant companion ride the executor suites' real pwsh runs); pwsh-ful hosts keep the full 100% bar. Cover the windows-acl probe case and the runner-entry resolution in sandbox-local on Linux (chain-seam tests plus a windowsAclRunnerEntry seam) — the package's POSIX-only suites are Linux's only chance to cover the new lines. Static gate fixes: declare dsh-pwsh-sandbox in the base bundle, register the runner files entry in constraints, knip entries for the e2e suite and where.exe, regenerate the module graph. Verified in WSL (no-pwsh Linux): pwsh-sandbox 5 pass/13 skip with the exemption active, sandbox-local coverage 100%.
The Windows platform layer re-enables the base fs-sandbox row (removing its disable), but still inserted dsh-fs-local: both extend FileSystem and provide ctx.fs, so every shipped win32 profile failed at load. Delete the insert; fs-sandbox stays the single fs provider exactly as on POSIX. Sync the roster specs, the base/reference README pairs, the sandbox core doc (read-only grants no sink on Windows), the windows-shell JSDoc, and re-record the i18n pairings.
Confine Windows command execution through a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs carry an orphan-SID write allowlist, ported from https://github.com/huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (@ 10e4dfb). Every Win32 call is checked and fails closed - the POC silently ran children with the FULL token when CreateRestrictedToken failed.
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl: koffi primitives verified against the MinGW Windows headers (verify/abi-probe.cpp) plus the confinement runner ([node, runner, --workspace, --temp, --mode, --, argv...]: kill-on-close job, stdio passthrough, exit-code mirroring, windows-acl-run: failure signature, grant revocation). read-only = strict zero grants (NUL device not writable; documented). Windows-only execution: exempted from the Linux coverage lane (windowsOnlyCoverageExclusions).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local: PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32 filled with the windows-acl runner (full enforcement, ACL denial dialect, runner-failure rules).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox: sandbox-consuming pwsh executor (call-for-call mirror of dsh-bash-sandbox) over a new argv-level seam in dsh-pwsh-local; per-file coverage complete via the fake-provider spec.
- bundle/base: the Windows platform layer mounts the confined pwsh roster - sandbox/policy/fs-sandbox/permission/approval re-enabled, the POSIX bash stack stays disabled.
Co-authored-by: Huo Yaoyuan <huoyaoyuan@hotmail.com>
Adapter schemas now carry only credential references, but the Models join, onboarding readiness, shipped overlays, SDK scaffolding, fixtures, and active decision prose still treated a redacted literal apiKey as a supported compatibility state. That residue made an unsupported field look contractual and pinned Schemastery silent-dropping as behavior.
Delete those branches and examples, and let compositions and scaffolds use adapter-owned reference and environment resolution. Do not add a tombstone validator or change generic unknown-key behavior: literal adapter credentials have no migration contract to preserve.
Code already treats $DSH_HOME/.env as ordinary launch environment and stores managed credentials in .credentials.yaml, but public docs still described the old store, old precedence, removed literal adapter keys, and the deleted TUI. That directed users to the wrong file and overstated the supported configuration surface.
Update the existing English and Chinese owners in place, document inherited > managed > project > user credential resolution, and record the loadLayeredEnv export. Regenerate only pairing records and the source-line catalog; add no new section or site route.
- apps/cli/reference/README: state the win32 permission/sandbox/approval
degradation so the workspace-write promise no longer misleads Windows users
- bundle README + agent note: give the complete bash-restore recipe (disable
pwsh-local/tool-pwsh and re-enable bash-sandbox/tool-bash), since both
executors register the same bash service and an incomplete recipe fails
loud at load
- windows.cordis.patch.yml: header comment notes the recipe and that the
ui-permission row belongs to dsh-web-app (base-only profiles get a
harmless no-match warning)
- profile-boot.ts: rewrap composeProfile JSDoc
- re-record i18n hashes for the touched bilingual pairs
The Web picker collapsed onto the directory flow (see the one-route-to-add-a-workspace
Agent Note), leaving workspace.create({ name }) with no product consumer. Delete the
whole feed line: the wire schema's name member and WorkspaceApi spelling, the gateway's
workspaceRoot config/default and the mkdir branch, the client seam that carried the name
(WorkspaceCreateInput, WorkspacesService.create, intentName), the dsh web
--workspace-root flag, and the fixture's name handling. workspace-name-conflict stays as
workspace.rename's duplicate-title error.
Moving the agent plane behind per-session presets took five rows with it that
the host still owns, and the Web surface stopped booting: `host-apiproxy`
injects `subagents`, so with the registry disabled here the entry never
activated and `dsh web` died at plugin-tree load.
The criterion is injection, not subject matter. A host row that injects a
service resolves it before any session exists, so there is no agent to key by:
`bash-env` (which `apps/cli/src/web.ts` injects to publish `DSH_WEB_URL`), the
`subagents` registry and its spawn/fork backends (a process singleton whose
cross-session queries the api-proxy serves, and whose provider names are
globally unique), and `tool-subagent-report` (a continuable setup on that
singleton, registered once per live session by a list that is not scope-aware)
all stay host-plane. What a preset chooses is which delegation TOOLS it sees.
The browser lane needs the second half: skill roots now resolve inside a preset,
a subtree the lane's include patches cannot reach, so the row's documented
environment fallback is pinned for the whole scaffold lifetime — presets mount
when a session is created, not at boot. Without it a developer's real
~/.dsh/skills enters replay requests and goldens while CI sees none.
The Windows layer previously kept the approval service with policy 'never',
which made the approval plugin inject 'Approval prompts are disabled in
this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically'
into the model context. On Windows nothing asks for approval — the
escalation surfaces (sandbox_permissions) do not exist — so the sentence
described a rejection surface that is not there. The layer now disables
the approval row too: the service is absent, the model is never told
approval exists, and the danger-full-access degradation is complete.
base.spec.ts pins approval among the Windows disables; the Agent Note and
bundle README record the absent service.
The Windows platform layer previously kept fs path-rule confinement
(sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox) next to the unconfined pwsh shell. Windows
has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the
shell can bypass fs-only path rules with one command — the policy was
theater. The layer now removes the whole sandbox stack (sandbox,
sandbox-policy, fs-sandbox disabled), mounts the unconfined dsh-fs-local,
and degrades to danger-full-access: permission/ui-permission leave the
roster and the approval policy is 'never'.
dsh-base declares dsh-fs-local so the profile module fallback links it for
cold starts; base.spec.ts pins the shipped Windows roster (disables,
inserts, approval policy); the Agent Note records the rejected fs-only
confinement alternative.
