The Windows platform layer re-enables the base fs-sandbox row (removing its disable), but still inserted dsh-fs-local: both extend FileSystem and provide ctx.fs, so every shipped win32 profile failed at load. Delete the insert; fs-sandbox stays the single fs provider exactly as on POSIX. Sync the roster specs, the base/reference README pairs, the sandbox core doc (read-only grants no sink on Windows), the windows-shell JSDoc, and re-record the i18n pairings.
Confine Windows command execution through a WRITE_RESTRICTED token whose restricting SIDs carry an orphan-SID write allowlist, ported from https://github.com/huoyaoyuan/windows-acl-restrict-poc (@ 10e4dfb). Every Win32 call is checked and fails closed - the POC silently ran children with the FULL token when CreateRestrictedToken failed.
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-windows-acl: koffi primitives verified against the MinGW Windows headers (verify/abi-probe.cpp) plus the confinement runner ([node, runner, --workspace, --temp, --mode, --, argv...]: kill-on-close job, stdio passthrough, exit-code mirroring, windows-acl-run: failure signature, grant revocation). read-only = strict zero grants (NUL device not writable; documented). Windows-only execution: exempted from the Linux coverage lane (windowsOnlyCoverageExclusions).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-sandbox-local: PLATFORM_CHAINS.win32 filled with the windows-acl runner (full enforcement, ACL denial dialect, runner-failure rules).
- @deepseek-ai/dsh-pwsh-sandbox: sandbox-consuming pwsh executor (call-for-call mirror of dsh-bash-sandbox) over a new argv-level seam in dsh-pwsh-local; per-file coverage complete via the fake-provider spec.
- bundle/base: the Windows platform layer mounts the confined pwsh roster - sandbox/policy/fs-sandbox/permission/approval re-enabled, the POSIX bash stack stays disabled.
Co-authored-by: Huo Yaoyuan <huoyaoyuan@hotmail.com>
- apps/cli/reference/README: state the win32 permission/sandbox/approval
degradation so the workspace-write promise no longer misleads Windows users
- bundle README + agent note: give the complete bash-restore recipe (disable
pwsh-local/tool-pwsh and re-enable bash-sandbox/tool-bash), since both
executors register the same bash service and an incomplete recipe fails
loud at load
- windows.cordis.patch.yml: header comment notes the recipe and that the
ui-permission row belongs to dsh-web-app (base-only profiles get a
harmless no-match warning)
- profile-boot.ts: rewrap composeProfile JSDoc
- re-record i18n hashes for the touched bilingual pairs
The Windows layer previously kept the approval service with policy 'never',
which made the approval plugin inject 'Approval prompts are disabled in
this session: actions that require approval are rejected automatically'
into the model context. On Windows nothing asks for approval — the
escalation surfaces (sandbox_permissions) do not exist — so the sentence
described a rejection surface that is not there. The layer now disables
the approval row too: the service is absent, the model is never told
approval exists, and the danger-full-access degradation is complete.
base.spec.ts pins approval among the Windows disables; the Agent Note and
bundle README record the absent service.
The Windows platform layer previously kept fs path-rule confinement
(sandbox-policy + fs-sandbox) next to the unconfined pwsh shell. Windows
has no OS sandbox runner (landlock/bwrap/seatbelt are POSIX-only), so the
shell can bypass fs-only path rules with one command — the policy was
theater. The layer now removes the whole sandbox stack (sandbox,
sandbox-policy, fs-sandbox disabled), mounts the unconfined dsh-fs-local,
and degrades to danger-full-access: permission/ui-permission leave the
roster and the approval policy is 'never'.
dsh-base declares dsh-fs-local so the profile module fallback links it for
cold starts; base.spec.ts pins the shipped Windows roster (disables,
inserts, approval policy); the Agent Note records the rejected fs-only
confinement alternative.
win32 hosts booting a shipped profile now get pwsh-local as the ctx.bash
executor and tool-pwsh as the shell tool through the base bundle's new
windows.cordis.patch.yml platform layer, injected by the launcher between
the bundle layers and the user layers on win32. bash-sandbox, tool-bash,
permission, and ui-permission are disabled there: the POSIX-only executor
cannot run on Windows, and dsh-permission requires a confining executor.
Overriding the default is a composition decision through the user's
cordis.patch.yml; there is no environment override channel.
apps/cli and dsh-base re-declare dsh-pwsh-local/dsh-tool-pwsh so the
profile module fallback links them for cold starts (the profiles rework
had dropped them from the CLI closure).
Promotes the windows-pwsh-default Agent Note from proposed to implemented
and documents the platform layer in the base bundle README.
