Move the interactive pi-tui front door into @deepseek-ai/dsh-tui while keeping @deepseek-ai/dsh-stdio line-oriented for pipes. Select the terminal package in the demo app, preserve logger ownership, and cover the production Loader composition with a PTY smoke test.
Move the agent-spine bundle and the stdio/ACP/JSON-RPC app packages out of
core/ and ui/ into a new packages/examples/ group, renamed with a -demo
suffix so the npm name marks them as non-product surface:
core/agent-core -> examples/agent-spine-demo (dsh-agent-spine-demo)
ui/stdio-agent -> examples/stdio-demo (dsh-stdio-demo)
ui/acp-agent -> examples/acp-demo (dsh-acp-demo)
ui/jsonrpc-agent -> examples/jsonrpc-demo (dsh-jsonrpc-demo)
Update every code/config/test reference and reference-only doc mentions, and
regenerate module-graph, config-catalog, and doc-graphs. The jsonrpc bin
(dsh-jsonrpc-agent) and single-file exe (dsh-jsonrpc-agent-pkg) keep their
names; the SDK runtime-startup surface is reconciled separately.
A preset names a bundle of the two mechanism knobs — request =
workspace-write + ask, yolo = danger-full-access + never — so the editor
shows ONE 'Permissions' select where the sandbox-mode and approval-policy
tiers stay orthogonal capabilities (the Codex /approvals shape: presets over
two dials). ctx.permission (dsh-permission) owns the config-defined table,
validates the default preset's bundle against the composed knob defaults at
load (fails loud), and writes a switch THROUGH: one log-only
permission/preset event (the audit fact reverse-mapping cannot recover —
the planned 'agent' preset shares request's knob values and differs only in
composed policy) plus each knob event via its own setter, deduped — a
net-zero switch appends nothing. Every knob consumer keeps reading its own
fold, untouched.
The current preset DERIVES from the effective knob values — the fold breaks
bundle ties, a knob state outside the table is the reserved 'custom' value
(a state, not an error: shown while it holds, switchable FROM, never a
target), and defaultPreset disappears (zero-event state reverse-maps from
the composition defaults).
The ACP bridge drops the two per-knob selects for the one preset select
(advertised only when ctx.permission is composed); pending/anchor/no-op
semantics carry over unchanged, with the no-op echo acknowledged before
vocabulary validation so a client re-pushing a derived 'custom' current
never errors. The sandbox variant example composes the
service with a workspace-write default; the permission-switching,
escalation-approved and escalation-rejected scenarios are re-recorded under
it (escalations now target an outside-workspace /tmp path under
danger-full-access, self-cleaning) and config-options is re-authored on the
single-select wire.
Make Cordis construction and teardown ownership reentrancy-safe, then carry caller and provider ownership through reservation, setup, publication, quiescence, and sentinel retirement.
Stabilize registry carriers and factory/workflow boundaries, add adversarial lifecycle regressions, and align the rewritten RFC plus generated contracts with the enforced behavior.
The tool gate advertises sandbox_permissions (an enum of exactly the modes
STRICTLY WIDER than the mounted executor default — the schema makes a
non-widening request inexpressible) plus a required justification, exactly
when ctx.bash.sandboxMode reports a confining mode at registration:
composition truth, never a dead lever. An escalating call resolves
ctx.approval BEFORE anything executes with the audit-self-contained reason
"escalate sandbox to <mode>: <justification>"; allowed-once stamps the
granted mode onto that one bash request (the seam-level per-call override),
while rejected / cancelled / unavailable and the no-service / no-agent
paths each fail closed with their own error text and execute nothing. The
description teaches the flow only when the fields exist: retry the SAME
command once after a real denial, never preemptively; a rejected
escalation is final. No new session events: the attempt is an ordinary
tool/call, the decision is the approval audit pair, the outcome an
ordinary tool/result whose facts name the mode it ran under.
dsh-bash grows the per-call policy carrier: BashExecRequest.sandboxMode
(request-optional, spec required-but-nullable — the owner pattern; resolve()
is the one explicit defaulting step) and the BashExecutor.sandboxMode
capability fact (undefined in the base class — composition truth the tool
layer can read). dsh-bash-local carries the field verbatim and confines
nothing.
dsh-bash-sandbox extends LocalBashExecutor and hands ctx.sandbox the exact
argv it is about to spawn. A denial is a RESULT FACT (the command RAN;
result.sandbox.denied is orthogonal to exitCode/signal), classified
conservatively against the wrap own dialect; a RUNNER failure outranks
denial — foreground re-throws the structured SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE, a settled
background task stamps sandbox.runnerFailed — so a broken sandbox never
reads as a failing command and the command never runs unconfined.
dsh-tool-bash renders the markers and teaches the model not to retry around
a policy denial; escalation and per-session switching are staged follow-ups.
ctx.sandbox (dsh-sandbox): confine(argv, policy) returns the argv to spawn
instead — wrapped so the process and its children run confined — plus the
enforcement completeness and the backend denial/runner-failure dialects;
no usable backend throws the fail-closed SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE. Policy rides
per call. dsh-sandbox-local selects by platform and caches the verdict:
multi-candidate chains probe FUNCTIONALLY in preference order (Linux:
bwrap → the registry-installed node-addon-landlock-run launcher), a sole
candidate is selected unprobed (darwin: sandbox-exec/Seatbelt) and fails
closed at execution via runnerFailureSignatures; win32 is a reserved empty
chain. Profile parity is honest per backend (documented temp-area and ABI
differences; enforcement full|partial is a structured result fact).
CI: the sandbox-e2e matrix proves real-kernel confinement per rung (bwrap,
Landlock per architecture through the registry-installed launcher,
Seatbelt), failing on a silent all-skip; the packed-install rehearsal
installs the launcher family from the registry and asserts the binary
executable apart from kernel enforcement.
The ACP bridge registers the first real approval answerer: an ask for an
agent it owns becomes session/request_permission attached to the already-
streamed tool call (one-shot allow_once/reject_once only), outcomes map
conservatively (unknown optionId never grants, client cancel → cancelled),
and foreign or call-less requests delegate down the waterfall. The snapshot
harness accepts scripted permissionAnswers (FIFO; an unscripted prompt
answers cancelled, fail closed) so recorded scenarios can drive the wire
keylessly.
ctx.approval (dsh-approval): request() dispatches the approval/request
waterfall and always resolves a closed outcome — allowed-once / rejected /
cancelled / unavailable — never rejects; zero listeners fall through to
fail-closed unavailable; abort settles cancelled and discards late answers;
throwing or rogue answerers are contained as unavailable; every ask lands
the log-only approval/asked / approval/decided audit pair. dsh-tools routes
a pre-execute ask through the seam opportunistically (ctx.get) with three
distinct deny reasons, keeping the historical ask→deny degrade when the
seam is absent.
The per-session policy tier, the ACP bridge answerer, and the sandbox
escalation asker are staged follow-ups of the approval-seam RFC.
Adopts #211 (Code Mode tools: run_code + the code/both-mode snapshot
scenarios). Tool-catalog expectations take the union (run_code +
task_*); the two new pinsHeader fixtures (code-mode-turn,
both-mode-turn) were recorded on master without the task runtime, so
they are re-pinned KEYLESSLY by replaying their recorded chunks against
the merged tree (same procedure as text-turn) — the fixture diff is
exactly the header delta: task tool schemas, the tool:tasks prompt
section, and the bash background wording.
Master advanced 11 commits mid-merge (the Code Mode registry integration:
mode config, run_code, the tools:sdk section, the ACP run_code cards and
unified demos). The fusion makes Code Mode scope-aware end to end:
- wireSchemas(scope): the mode-aware wire contribution is computed from the
CALLING SCOPE's visible set (scoped tools join, shadowing and restrictions
apply) and feeds the {schemas, knownNames} provider protocol.
- knownNames under the mode collapse: a per-scope RESTRICTION is runtime
state, so the universe stays pre-restriction (a restricted-away tool in
toolOrder is a normal absence) — but the MODE collapse is deployment
config, so under mode 'code' the universe is [run_code] and a toolOrder
naming a native tool fails every assembly loud (master's tested decision,
kept).
- The tools:sdk section renders per assembly CONTEXT: the SDK declares
exactly the calling agent's callable set, using the section-text provider
signature this branch already had.
- run_code bindings enumerate schemas(exec.agent) — a program can bind
exactly what its prompt promised; sub-dispatches already threaded
exec.agent through registry.execute, so scoped resolution and carriers
flow unchanged.
- dsh-tools declares both sides' new deps (dsh-scope + dsh-session);
lockfile and all generated catalogs/graphs/api-catalog regenerated.
Gates green on the merged tree: typecheck, lint, per-file 100% coverage
(2710 tests), snapshots (41), doc-sync, module graph, build, hygiene, demo
smoke.
Master brought 50 commits (the tool-cordis group, dsh-code-runtime + worker,
the tools/execute around-dispatch seam + timeout-policy, repeat-tool-guard,
agent/session-prefix, the ui reorganization). Beyond the ten textual
conflicts, the merge reconciles master's new seams with this branch's
scoped-registration world:
- tools/execute (new waterfall around core dispatch): dispatched with the
SAME exec.agent carrier as the pre/post waterfalls — an agent.ctx wrapper
times/retries only its own agent's calls — and its base thunk resolves the
tool through the caller's visible view (get(exec.name, exec.agent)), so a
scoped/shadowed tool dispatches and a restricted-away global stays
UNKNOWN_TOOL. Declared this: Scoped<ToolRegistry> with the scope-filtered
doc sentence; invariants table + verify-scoped-dispatch pin it (21 events).
- agent/session-prefix (new waterfall, once per loop instance): composed via
the fused agentEvents dispatcher (scope-filtered like every agent-subject
event), declared this: Scoped<Agent>, table-pinned. agent/pre-step keeps
master's new sessionPrefix parameter with this branch's Scoped this.
- timeout-policy reads the budget through the caller's visible view
(get(exec.name, exec.agent)): a scoped tool's own timeoutMs governs its
calls; a global name-twin's budget is never misapplied to a shadowing
per-agent variant.
- tool-cordis: cordis_inspect's tools section lists the CALLING agent's view
(its description promises "what you can call"); the sandbox tool façade's
reads resolve through the mount's own scope, mirroring where its register
lands writes; sandboxRegisterTool's return type carries the exact-disposer
union honestly. dsh-scope declared as peer+dev with the project reference.
- doc-sync chain unions master's verify-cordis-api with this branch's
verify-scoped-dispatch; the generated catalogs, event matrix (the
zero-dispatcher guard passes over master's new events), module graph, and
the cordis api-catalog are regenerated on the merged surface.
Full gate sequence green on the merged tree: typecheck, lint, per-file 100%
coverage (2668 tests), snapshots (38), doc-sync, module graph, build,
hygiene, demo smoke.
