Machine-produced by `pnpm run rescope-vendor --apply` plus the regeneration it
prints: `pnpm install` for the lockfile, `pnpm run gen-third-party-notices`,
`verify-translation-pairing --write` for the touched bilingual pairs,
`gen-doc-graphs`, and one typert snapshot whose ids embed character offsets.
`pnpm run rescope-vendor --check` verifies the result.
Renames nine vendored packages (cordis, cosmokit, schemastery and the six
@cordisjs plugins) and every reference that resolves them: manifest names and
dependency keys, module specifiers including declare-module merges, cordis.yml
plugin names, tsconfig paths, every Markdown fence, and `docs/` prose.
Directory names, upstream versions, and dependency ranges are unchanged, so
vendor/README.md still reads as an upstream snapshot; its manifest table gains
an upstream-name column so THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES keeps MIT attribution pointed
at each fork's origin.
The tutorial tier follows the rename end to end: its yaml fences named plugins
the Loader can no longer resolve, its `ts ignore-check` fences disagreed with
the compiled fences beside them, and its prose quoted both. The contracts that
told readers to keep upstream names — the root convention and the vendoring
cookbook's tree comment and manifest invariant — now say to rescope instead.
Two rules read `@deepseek-ai/` as "another workspace plugin": the client bundle
purity gate now names the vendored libraries a browser bundle inlines, and the
files where a bare `cordis` is an agent-preset id keep that product data.
Move the triplet to implemented/architecture/, rewrite Proposal into a
present-tense Decision, fold Acceptance criteria and Risks into
Consequences (recording what pins the result), retitle the migration
section to what the move actually touched, and repoint the seven
inbound FIXME/README links.
The Windows case-folding in the lookup was implemented without a
user-facing contract. Name matching follows the platform, and the
reason it must is the layer ranking it would otherwise invert.
Review found five real defects in the configuration-source work, all confirmed
against the code rather than argued:
1. The note claimed --config outranks settings.yaml. It does not: the settings
seam registers a plugin's cordis entry config as the `base` layer and the
user section layers over it, and the seam cannot tell a shipped value from a
--config one. The note now states shipped reality and names --config-replace
as the lever for a deployment that must win. Separately, a literal `apiKey`
in settings outranked both the environment and .credentials.yaml — the field
is removed, so configuration carries a reference and nothing else.
2. DEEPSEEK_SEARCH_BASE_URL was functionally deleted: the shipped inline went
away without the provider learning to read it. It now resolves from the
environment snapshot, as the README always claimed.
3. The bootstrap deny list missed the interpreter start-up hooks. BASH_ENV is
the sharpest: `bash -c` sources it on every bash tool call, so a project
.env could run a file of its choosing before every command. The list now
covers BASH_ENV and its per-language siblings, the Git hook commands, and
the remaining preload and CA variables, organised by what a variable does
rather than which runtime owns it.
4. YAML parse errors quoted the offending source line — which in a credentials
document is the secret — into boot stderr and the watcher's logger. Only the
error code and position are reported now, in credentials-local and
settings-local alike, pinned by a test that asserts the secret is absent.
5. 0600 governed only files the harness wrote. A hand-created 0644 document was
read normally. POSIX now checks the mode before reading contents, at boot
and on every reload; Windows has no mode to inspect and is skipped rather
than faked.
The project a session is launched in is trusted by default, with no prompt and
no stored trust record: it may supply its own endpoint, ordinary variables, and
a key ranked below the managed store. Trust stops at the harness itself — a
discovered file still cannot set DSH_PERMISSION_MODE, PATH, BASH_ENV, or the
rest, because those take effect with no user action, before any turn, outside
the permission policy and the sandbox.
$DSH_HOME/.env had just become an ordinary environment layer, which left the
harness resolving user-facing values from a flattened process.env that could
no longer say where a value came from. A key stored through the web page
stayed shadowed by an older key in the user's own .env. An endpoint could be
redirected by the project: the invoking directory's .env is materialized like
every other layer, and a base URL decides where a resolved API key is sent, so
a DEEPSEEK_BASE_URL written into a model-editable workspace would send the
user's credential — and the prompts carrying their code — to whatever host
that file named.
Give every user-facing value one ordering, with four kinds of source:
explicit for this run per-operation override, CLI argument
> authored by deployment --config / --config-replace
> this launch's shell inherited process environment
> product-managed store settings.yaml, .credentials.yaml
> discovered file $DSH_HOME/.env
> defaults schema default, shipped base, public default
The domains differ only in which tiers exist. The earlier split — credentials
ranking the environment over the managed file while settings ranked over the
environment — was inconsistent: the distinguishing fact is who authored the
source, not the domain.
packages/util/environment owns an immutable snapshot with per-layer
provenance. getFrom(name, sources) searches only the layers a caller names,
and omitting one is a refusal rather than a demotion: the adapters ask for
['process', 'user-env'], so no reordering can let a project file back into a
decision it was excluded from.
isBootstrapOnly rejects, before anything is materialized, any .env setting a
variable that governs how a process launches (PATH, SHELL, NODE_OPTIONS,
LD_PRELOAD), where code or model-visible instructions load from (the whole
DSH_* namespace, HOME, XDG_*), or how the network is reached (proxy and CA
variables). The namespace is denied wholesale so a switch added later cannot
become settable by being forgotten, and there is no opt-out.
verify-config-source-ownership keeps both rules: no unregistered process.env
read under packages/*/*/src (26 allowlisted with reasons), and no apiKey,
baseURL, or headers inlined from the environment in shipped Cordis config —
removing those inlines is what makes the deployment tier meaningful.
