fix(code-runtime): reject a maxWallMs above Node's maximum timer delay

`config.maxWallMs` is only checked for positivity, and it is handed to
`setTimeout`, which clamps any delay above 2^31-1 ms to 1 ms. A deployment
configuring a 25-day wall ceiling therefore gets the opposite of what it asked
for: every run times out on the first tick. The runtime now range-checks the
field at load against MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS from dsh-timeout and throws, so the
misconfiguration fails loud where it is self-contained instead of silently
inverting the budget.

`computeMs` needs no matching bound: it is compared against measured event-loop
utilization rather than fed to a timer.

The test asserts both the rejection and that the boundary value itself loads.

packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker/README.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Every field is validated and defaulted; `maxOutputBytes` is a safe integer of at
 - **Type-strip host-side, in execution context** — the program is wrapped in an async-function shell, stripped with `node:module`'s `stripTypeScriptTypes` (erasable syntax only — `enum`/namespaces are rejected as a program `exception` and no worker spawns), and sliced back out byte-positioned; it then executes as the body of an `AsyncFunction`, so top-level `await`/`return` work.
 - **The port assumes a hostile peer** — model code can reach `parentPort` and forge traffic, so every inbound message is shape-validated and REBUILT before anything reads it (`null`, primitives, junk types, and malformed payloads drop without a throw; forged extra fields never ride along), the host answers each call id at most once, resolves binding names as OWN properties only (a forged `constructor` cannot walk a prototype chain), drops post-settlement replies, and validates every binding resolution and completion as lossless JSON. Forged `log`/`done` messages cannot bypass the outer cap: the host repeats validation and accounts every admitted log plus the completion or diagnostic. Worker-side namespaces are null-prototype with `defineProperty`, so `__proto__`-shaped binding names are ordinary keys.
 - **Binding rejection classes are request data** — an optional namespace descriptor names the constructor global and the own property that receives the failed member name. The worker materializes and injects that real class, so `instanceof` works without hardcoding `tools` or `ToolCallError`; declarations with invalid or colliding globals fail before a worker spawns. Failures use module-captured error and property-definition intrinsics plus null-prototype descriptors, so later model mutations cannot turn a rejected binding into a worker crash.
-- **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`).
+- **Two independent budgets, because the peer is hostile** — `computeMs` meters the worker's MEASURED busy time (`worker.performance.eventLoopUtilization()` polling): a hot loop cannot hide behind a pending decoy dispatch, and a program awaiting a slow tool accrues nothing. `maxWallMs` backstops what busy time cannot see (awaiting a promise nobody resolves). Both funnel into `worker.terminate()`, which ends hot synchronous loops too; heap overflow surfaces as the worker's OOM exit (`kind: 'worker-exit'`). `maxWallMs` is range-checked at load against `MAX_TIMER_DELAY_MS`: `setTimeout` clamps a longer delay to 1 ms, so a positivity check alone would accept a ceiling that expires on the first tick. `computeMs` needs no such bound, being compared against measured utilization rather than fed to a timer.
 - **Intermediate binding values are complete JSON** — binding arguments and resolutions undergo iterative lossless-JSON validation. Before program execution, the worker captures its own realm's plain-container prototype identities plus the native function-source check used only for foreign realms, so constructor-slot mutation and user-authored impostors cannot change container classification. It also captures every structural and metering intrinsic used by this JSON boundary, creates property descriptors without a prototype, and bypasses mutable collection prototypes for private traversal state; model mutations of globals, prototype methods, or descriptor-shaped `Object.prototype` fields therefore cannot alter validation, wire transport, or byte accounting. Values flatten into a bounded-depth pre-order wire value for structured clone and rebuild iteratively on the other side. They have no byte, JavaScript call-stack, or nested structured-clone depth cap. They never enter the outer-output ledger or model context; provider/executor acquisition bounds and process/worker memory remain the limits.
 - **Logs stream eagerly into one outer ledger** — console/stdout/stderr text crosses the port in emission order, so a timed-out or killed program still shows what it printed. The worker charges exact JSON-string bytes and preflights completion values and exception diagnostics against the remaining combined budget before posting them; a thrown million-byte stack therefore becomes the fixed `output-limit` diagnostic at the worker boundary. Native writes that bypass the patched stream slots arrive on pipes independent of the completion port, so the host repeats the ledger for those bytes and hostile forged traffic; settlement continues bounded pipe capture until worker termination completes before materializing the result. `maxOutputBytes` accounts the JSON serialization of the outer `logs` array plus the completion value or failure-message payload; fixed `CodeRunResult` field names, braces, the bounded error-kind tag, and later presentation whitespace are outside that variable-payload ledger. At or below the cap the exact value returns; a lossy completion is `invalid-output`, and a combined overflow is `output-limit` rather than a substituted inspected string. The failure retains the fitting captured prefix and later follows the normal outer `run_code` spill policy.
 - **Empty environment** — the worker gets `env: {}` and `execArgv: []`: no ambient credentials (stronger than the scrubbed-env rule for spawned commands) and no inherited loader flags.