mirror of
https://github.com/deepseek-ai/deepseek-harness
synced 2026-08-15 21:04:50 +00:00
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into codex/simp-prune-bash-surface
This commit is contained in:
Tianyi Cui
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ A harness is one [Cordis](cordis-primer.md) context. Packages contribute service
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| `ctx.subagents` | [`subagent/`](../packages/subagent/README.md) | named delegation providers |
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| `ctx.workflows` | [`workflow/`](../packages/workflow/README.md) | script-driven multi-agent orchestration |
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| `ctx.sessionPersistence` | [`session-persistence/`](../packages/session-persistence/README.md) | durable storage for session logs |
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| `ctx.sessionQuery` | [`session-query/`](../packages/session-query/README.md) | live-preferred logical-corpus and exact-event reads |
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## Event
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|
||||
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@@ -18,12 +18,14 @@ flowchart LR
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svc_sessions["ctx.sessions<br/>In-memory session store"]
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pkg_agent["agent"]
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pkg_session_persistence["session-persistence"]
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pkg_session_query["session-query"]
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pkg_subagent_inprocess["subagent-inprocess"]
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pkg_invariants["invariants"]
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svc_sessionPersistence["ctx.sessionPersistence<br/>Durable session persistence seam"]
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pkg_session_persistence_jsonl["session-persistence-jsonl"]
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pkg_session_persistence_sqlite["session-persistence-sqlite"]
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pkg_acp["acp"]
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svc_sessionQuery["ctx.sessionQuery<br/>Exact session-history reads"]
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pkg_system_prompt["system-prompt"]
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svc_systemPrompt["ctx.systemPrompt<br/>System prompt assembly registry"]
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pkg_tools["tools"]
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@@ -56,6 +58,8 @@ flowchart LR
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pkg_sandbox_local["sandbox-local"]
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pkg_approval["approval"]
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svc_approval["ctx.approval<br/>Approval seam"]
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pkg_permission["permission"]
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svc_permission["ctx.permission<br/>Permission presets"]
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pkg_code_runtime["code-runtime"]
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svc_codeRuntime["ctx.codeRuntime<br/>Code-execution seam"]
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pkg_code_runtime_worker["code-runtime-worker"]
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@@ -99,12 +103,14 @@ flowchart LR
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pkg_llm_deepseek --> svc_llm
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pkg_llm_pi_ai --> svc_llm
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pkg_llm_replay --> svc_llm
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pkg_permission --> svc_permission
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pkg_sandbox --> svc_sandbox
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pkg_sandbox_local --> svc_sandbox
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pkg_session --> svc_sessions
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pkg_session_persistence --> svc_sessionPersistence
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pkg_session_persistence_jsonl --> svc_sessionPersistence
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pkg_session_persistence_sqlite --> svc_sessionPersistence
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pkg_session_query --> svc_sessionQuery
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pkg_skill --> svc_skills
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pkg_skill_local --> svc_skills
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pkg_stdio_agent --> svc_userInteraction
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@@ -139,13 +145,16 @@ flowchart LR
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svc_fs --> pkg_tool_fs
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svc_llm --> pkg_agent_loop
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svc_llm --> pkg_compact_basic
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svc_permission --> pkg_acp
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svc_sandbox --> pkg_bash_sandbox
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svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_acp
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svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_agent_loop
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svc_sessionPersistence --> pkg_session_query
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svc_sessions --> pkg_agent
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svc_sessions --> pkg_agent_loop
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svc_sessions --> pkg_invariants
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svc_sessions --> pkg_session_persistence
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svc_sessions --> pkg_session_query
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svc_sessions --> pkg_subagent_inprocess
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svc_skills --> pkg_tool_skill
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svc_subagents --> pkg_tool_subagent
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@@ -174,8 +183,9 @@ flowchart LR
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| ctx key | Role | Owner | Implementations | Direct consumers | Companion plugins | Note |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| `ctx.llm` | `seam` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) | [`llm-deepseek`](../packages/llm/llm-deepseek), [`llm-pi-ai`](../packages/llm/llm-pi-ai), [`llm-replay`](../packages/support/llm-replay) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | - | Adapters register provider implementations; the loop and compaction call the provider-neutral stream service. |
|
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| `ctx.sessions` | `core` | [`session`](../packages/core/session) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`subagent-inprocess`](../packages/subagent/subagent-inprocess), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) | - | Owns append-only Session instances and emits the durable session event feed. |
|
||||
| `ctx.sessionPersistence` | `seam` | [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) | [`session-persistence-jsonl`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl), [`session-persistence-sqlite`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | Backends persist the same SessionEvent vocabulary; apps choose a backend at composition time. |
|
||||
| `ctx.sessions` | `core` | [`session`](../packages/core/session) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query), [`subagent-inprocess`](../packages/subagent/subagent-inprocess), [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) | - | Owns append-only Session instances and emits the durable session event feed. |
|
||||
| `ctx.sessionPersistence` | `seam` | [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) | [`session-persistence-jsonl`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl), [`session-persistence-sqlite`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite) | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp), [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query) | - | Backends persist the same SessionEvent vocabulary; apps choose a backend at composition time. |
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| `ctx.sessionQuery` | `seam` | [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query) | - | - | - | Resolves live and optional persisted logs into one logical corpus for exact reads. |
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| `ctx.systemPrompt` | `core` | [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs), [`tool-web`](../packages/web/tool-web) | - | Collects prompt sections and model-facing tool schemas for each step. |
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| `ctx.tools` | `core` | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | - | [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop), [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`tool-cordis`](../packages/cordis/tool-cordis), [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs), [`tool-skill`](../packages/skill/tool-skill), [`tool-subagent`](../packages/subagent/tool-subagent), [`tool-todo`](../packages/todo/tool-todo), [`tool-web`](../packages/web/tool-web), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | Registers capabilities, owns Code Mode transport, and routes calls through pre-policy, monotonic guards, around dispatch, post-policy, and final-result observation. |
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| `ctx.userInteraction` | `seam` | [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) | [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user), [`stdio-agent`](../packages/ui/stdio-agent), [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | UI front doors provide the active human-answer provider; tool-ask-user pauses a tool call on the provider-neutral ask() promise. |
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@@ -185,6 +195,7 @@ flowchart LR
|
||||
| `ctx.bash` | `seam` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash) | [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local), [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash), [`hooks-claude`](../packages/hooks/hooks-claude), [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | - | The model-facing bash tools and hook bridges consume this seam; sandboxed or remote executors replace bash-local without touching them. |
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||||
| `ctx.sandbox` | `seam` | [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) | [`sandbox-local`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox-local) | [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | - | Consumers hand over the exact argv they are about to spawn; same-world backends wrap it under a per-call policy and report enforcement. |
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| `ctx.approval` | `seam` | `approval` | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | - | One-shot permission decisions dispatched over the `approval/request` waterfall; answerers are listeners (the ACP bridge for its own agents), absence fails closed to `unavailable`. |
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||||
| `ctx.permission` | `core` | [`permission`](../packages/ui/permission) | - | [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | - | User-facing preset table (`workspace-write`/`danger-full-access`) bundling the sandbox-mode and approval-policy knobs; a switch writes one `permission/preset` event through to both knob events. |
|
||||
| `ctx.codeRuntime` | `seam` | [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime) | [`code-runtime-worker`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime-worker) | [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | - | Runs one model-written program against host-provided async bindings; backends differ by substrate and language (the tool registry consumes it for Code Mode). |
|
||||
| `ctx.fs` | `seam` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs) | [`fs-local`](../packages/fs/fs-local) | [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) | [`fs-policy`](../packages/fs/fs-policy) | tool-fs executes read/write/edit through ctx.fs; fs-policy contributes observed-state checks through the fs/* event gate. |
|
||||
| `ctx.compact` | `seam` | [`compact`](../packages/compact/compact) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | [`compact-basic`](../packages/compact/compact-basic) | - | The basic backend currently consumes the pre-step event directly; a model-facing compact tool remains deferred. |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export interface AcpConfig {
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||||
|
||||
Depends on: `Stream` (`@agentclientprotocol/sdk`)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts:250`](../packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts)
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts:248`](../packages/ui/acp/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -444,6 +444,41 @@ export interface Config {
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/support/llm-replay/src/index.ts:429`](../packages/support/llm-replay/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `bash` · `approval`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** The {@link PermissionService} config: the deployment's preset table. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* The preset table: name → knob bundle. Defaults to `workspace-write`
|
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* (workspace-write + ask) and `danger-full-access` (danger-full-access +
|
||||
* never). The name `custom` is reserved for the derived not-a-preset state.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
presets?: Record<string, PresetSpec>
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* One preset's knob bundle — the sandbox mode and approval policy a session
|
||||
* runs under while the preset is active — plus its presentation.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export interface PresetSpec {
|
||||
/** The `bash/sandbox-mode` value the preset writes through. */
|
||||
sandbox: SandboxMode
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||||
/** The `approval/policy` value the preset writes through. */
|
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approval: ApprovalPolicy
|
||||
/** The display label a client shows for this preset; the raw table key when omitted. */
|
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name?: string
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/** One user-facing sentence on what the preset means; omitted when not configured. */
|
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description?: string
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}
|
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```
|
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|
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Depends on: [`ApprovalPolicy`](core-data-structures/approval.md) · [`SandboxMode`](core-data-structures/sandbox.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts:97`](../packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-repeat-tool-guard`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
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@@ -576,6 +611,20 @@ export type JournalMode = 'wal' | 'delete' | 'truncate' | 'persist'
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite/src/index.ts:50`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-query`
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: `sessions`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
||||
/** Configuration for exact session-query reads. */
|
||||
export interface Config {
|
||||
/** Maximum accepted raw read context on either side. Defaults to 50. */
|
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readWindowMax?: number
|
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}
|
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```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/session-query/session-query/src/config.ts:9`](../packages/session-query/session-query/src/config.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `@deepseek-ai/dsh-skill`
|
||||
|
||||
```ts config-catalog
|
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|
||||
@@ -161,6 +161,21 @@ Types: [GenerateOptions](../core-data-structures/core.md) · [StreamChunk](../co
|
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|
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Source: [`packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts:88`](../../packages/llm/llm/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.permission` — `PermissionService`
|
||||
|
||||
The permission service (`ctx.permission`). Owns the deployment's preset table and THE write path for preset switches; presentation layers (the ACP bridge's single `Permissions` select) advertise names and call set. Composing it REQUIRES both mechanism knobs — a confining `ctx.bash` executor and the `ctx.approval` seam. A knob state matching no table entry is not an error but the derived CUSTOM_PRESET state: shown as the current value, never a switch target.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
current(events: readonly SessionEvent[]): string
|
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resolve(name: string): PresetSpec
|
||||
optionOf(name: string): PresetOption
|
||||
set(session: Session, name: string): void
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Types: [SessionEvent](../core-data-structures/core.md)
|
||||
|
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Source: [`packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts:115`](../../packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.sandbox` — `SandboxProvider` (abstract seam)
|
||||
|
||||
Abstract process-sandbox service. Subclass, implement confine, and load the subclass as a plugin — it registers as `ctx.sandbox` (one implementation per context; loading a second throws, cordis' standard duplicate-service behavior).
|
||||
@@ -201,6 +216,18 @@ Types: [SessionEvent](../core-data-structures/core.md)
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/src/index.ts:102`](../../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.sessionQuery` — `SessionQueryService`
|
||||
|
||||
Live-preferred logical-corpus and exact-event read service.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts cordis-catalog
|
||||
listSessions(): Promise<SessionRecord[]>
|
||||
async listEvents(sessionId: SessionId): Promise<SessionEventRecord[]>
|
||||
async readEvent(request: SessionEventReadRequest): Promise<SessionEventWindow>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/session-query/session-query/src/index.ts:35`](../../packages/session-query/session-query/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## `ctx.sessions` — `SessionStore`
|
||||
|
||||
In-memory session store (`ctx.sessions`).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ Everything else is documented on a **sub-page**, not here. The rule that draws t
|
||||
| [scope.md](scope.md) | scoped registration identity, dispatch carriers, and the owned `Scope` context |
|
||||
| [session.md](session.md) | the full `SessionEventMap` variant catalog, `TurnTrigger`/`TurnEndReason`, `deriveMessages()`, the turn-enclosure invariant |
|
||||
| [persistence.md](persistence.md) | the durability seam: `SessionPersistence`, JSONL + SQLite backends, `session/flush`, crash recovery, `SessionHeader` |
|
||||
| [session-query.md](session-query.md) | logical session/event records and bounded exact-event reads |
|
||||
| [system-prompt.md](system-prompt.md) | per-assembly context, tool-provider results, prompt sections, and cooperative assembly |
|
||||
| [tools.md](tools.md) | `ToolDefinition` full fields, the schema DSL, `ToolExecution`/`ToolResult`, tool-presentation UI types, and the guarded execution pipeline |
|
||||
| [user-interaction.md](user-interaction.md) | the UI-backed human question/answer seam: `AskUserQuestionRequest`, answer/options vocabulary, provider API, error taxonomy |
|
||||
|
||||
69
docs/core-data-structures/session-query.md
Normal file
69
docs/core-data-structures/session-query.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
||||
# Session Query
|
||||
|
||||
Exact reads over the live-preferred logical session corpus. The [package contract](../../packages/session-query/session-query) owns source precedence, dynamic optional persistence, cloning, surface classification, bounded windows, and typed failures. Full-text search is a separate proposed SQLite phase.
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/session-query/session-query/src/types.ts`](../../packages/session-query/session-query/src/types.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
## Logical records
|
||||
|
||||
`SessionRecord` is returned by the cross-corpus list. It exposes source availability independently from the cloned live-preferred header. `SessionEventRecord` is a lightweight raw-log projection; classification uses the same `foldSurface()` transitions as model-history derivation.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export type SessionEventSurface = 'current' | 'shadowed' | 'log-only'
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export interface SessionRecord {
|
||||
header: SessionHeader
|
||||
live: boolean
|
||||
persisted: boolean
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export interface SessionEventRecord {
|
||||
sessionId: SessionId
|
||||
seq: number
|
||||
type: SessionEventType
|
||||
time: number
|
||||
surface: SessionEventSurface
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Bounded event reads
|
||||
|
||||
The request addresses one raw seq and optional neighboring counts. The result carries a `SessionHeader` rather than availability flags so a known live target can remain independent of persistence health.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export interface SessionEventReadRequest {
|
||||
sessionId: SessionId
|
||||
seq: number
|
||||
before?: number
|
||||
after?: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export interface SessionEventWindow {
|
||||
session: SessionHeader
|
||||
target: SessionEvent
|
||||
events: SessionEvent[]
|
||||
startSeq: number
|
||||
endSeq: number
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Errors
|
||||
|
||||
The closed code union distinguishes request validation, missing targets, malformed surface logs, optional-backend failure, and contradictory source metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export type SessionQueryErrorCode =
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_EVENT_NOT_FOUND'
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_INVALID_CONFIG'
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_INVALID_SURFACE'
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_INVALID_WINDOW'
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_PERSISTENCE_FAILED'
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_SESSION_NOT_FOUND'
|
||||
| 'SESSION_QUERY_SOURCE_CONFLICT'
|
||||
```
|
||||
@@ -196,6 +196,26 @@ export interface SurfaceNode {
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### `SurfaceFoldReplacement` and `SurfaceFoldResult` — a complete surface replay
|
||||
|
||||
`foldSurface(events)` returns detached current nodes together with the actual node seqs shadowed by each declared replacement range. `SurfaceManager` uses the same transition functions for its incremental cache.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export interface SurfaceFoldReplacement {
|
||||
seq: number
|
||||
start: number
|
||||
end: number
|
||||
shadowedSeqs: number[]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
```ts type-equiv
|
||||
export interface SurfaceFoldResult {
|
||||
nodes: SurfaceNode[]
|
||||
replacements: SurfaceFoldReplacement[]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Derived history: `deriveMessages()` and `deriveEventMessage()`
|
||||
|
||||
`Session.deriveMessages()` projects the event log into the `Message[]` the model sees — cached (each surface node projected once, when first seen; a surface rewrite rebuilds) and frozen (a fresh array per call over shared, deep-frozen messages, so mutating logged history through a projection is unrepresentable). `deriveEventMessage(event)` is the per-node pure function the fold applies — public so external reconstructors and the dev invariant project a log prefix with exactly the same rules and cannot disagree with the cache. The projection rules:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_jsonl["session-persistence-jsonl"]
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_sqlite["session-persistence-sqlite"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_session_query["packages/session-query"]
|
||||
pkg_session_query["session-query"]
|
||||
end
|
||||
subgraph group_support["packages/support"]
|
||||
pkg_acp_snapshot["acp-snapshot"]
|
||||
pkg_invariants["invariants"]
|
||||
@@ -94,6 +97,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_app_boot["app-boot"]
|
||||
pkg_jsonrpc["jsonrpc"]
|
||||
pkg_jsonrpc_agent["jsonrpc-agent"]
|
||||
pkg_permission["permission"]
|
||||
pkg_stdio_agent["stdio-agent"]
|
||||
pkg_tool_ask_user["tool-ask-user"]
|
||||
pkg_user_approval["user-approval"]
|
||||
@@ -164,6 +168,9 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_jsonl --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_sqlite --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_session_persistence_sqlite --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
pkg_session_query --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_session_query --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_session_query --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
pkg_invariants --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_invariants --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_invariants --> pkg_scope
|
||||
@@ -189,6 +196,10 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_bash_local
|
||||
pkg_bash_sandbox --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_permission --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_permission --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_permission --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_permission --> pkg_user_approval
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_agent_loop --> pkg_scope
|
||||
@@ -236,6 +247,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_agent
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_bash
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_llm
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_permission
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_sandbox
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_session
|
||||
pkg_acp --> pkg_session_persistence
|
||||
@@ -359,12 +371,14 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
| [`hook-protocol`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol) | `hooks` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`session-persistence-jsonl`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-jsonl) | `session-persistence` | [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| [`session-persistence-sqlite`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence-sqlite) | `session-persistence` | [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| [`session-query`](../packages/session-query/session-query) | `session-query` | [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence) |
|
||||
| [`invariants`](../packages/support/invariants) | `support` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session) |
|
||||
| [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt) |
|
||||
| [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) | `workflow` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`brand`](../packages/util/brand), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm) |
|
||||
| [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`code-runtime`](../packages/code-runtime/code-runtime), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
|
||||
| [`bash-sandbox`](../packages/bash/bash-sandbox) | `bash` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`bash-local`](../packages/bash/bash-local), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox) |
|
||||
| [`permission`](../packages/ui/permission) | `ui` | [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
|
||||
| [`agent-loop`](../packages/core/agent-loop) | `core` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-bash`](../packages/bash/tool-bash) | `bash` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval) |
|
||||
| [`tool-fs`](../packages/fs/tool-fs) | `fs` | [`fs`](../packages/fs/fs), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
@@ -375,7 +389,7 @@ flowchart TD
|
||||
| [`tool-todo`](../packages/todo/tool-todo) | `todo` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-cordis`](../packages/cordis/tool-cordis) | `cordis` | [`scope`](../packages/core/scope), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`hooks-codex`](../packages/hooks/hooks-codex) | `hooks` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`hook-protocol`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
|
||||
| [`acp`](../packages/ui/acp) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`bash`](../packages/bash/bash), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`permission`](../packages/ui/permission), [`sandbox`](../packages/sandbox/sandbox), [`session`](../packages/core/session), [`session-persistence`](../packages/session-persistence/session-persistence), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-approval`](../packages/ui/user-approval), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
|
||||
| [`tool-ask-user`](../packages/ui/tool-ask-user) | `ui` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`user-interaction`](../packages/ui/user-interaction) |
|
||||
| [`repeat-tool-guard`](../packages/guard/repeat-tool-guard) | `guard` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools) |
|
||||
| [`tool-workflow`](../packages/workflow/tool-workflow) | `workflow` | [`agent`](../packages/core/agent), [`llm`](../packages/llm/llm), [`system-prompt`](../packages/core/system-prompt), [`tools`](../packages/core/tools), [`workflow`](../packages/workflow/workflow) |
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -153,6 +153,18 @@ A hook command's outcome — log-only, paired with a prior `hook/invoked` (same
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/hooks/hook-protocol/src/types.ts:45`](../packages/hooks/hook-protocol/src/types.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `permission/*`
|
||||
|
||||
#### `permission/preset` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
The session's permission preset was switched — log-only (the `bash/sandbox-mode` precedent): durable and replayable, never in the model transcript. The LAST such event is the session's preset (effectivePermissionPreset); the knob events the switch wrote through follow it in the same turn, and they — not this record of the user's choice — are what execution reads.
|
||||
|
||||
```ts persistence-catalog
|
||||
'permission/preset': { preset: string }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Source: [`packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts:42`](../packages/ui/permission/src/index.ts)
|
||||
|
||||
### `prompt/*`
|
||||
|
||||
#### `prompt/blocked` — log-only
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Generated by `pnpm run gen-rfc-index` from the RFC tree — never edit by hand;
|
||||
| [Pre-tool input rewrite — a consistent design](proposed/feature/2026-06-30-pre-tool-input-rewrite.md) | 2026-06-30 |
|
||||
| [Claude Code and Codex subagent backends (out-of-process delegation to external coding agents)](proposed/feature/2026-07-07-claude-code-and-codex-subagent-backends.md) | 2026-07-07 |
|
||||
| [Interactive side sessions and merge-back](proposed/feature/2026-07-08-interactive-side-sessions.md) | 2026-07-08 |
|
||||
| [SQLite FTS5 session search](proposed/feature/2026-07-10-sqlite-session-query-provider.md) | 2026-07-10 |
|
||||
| [Stream workflow progress through tool calls](proposed/feature/2026-07-13-stream-workflow-progress-through-tool-calls.md) | 2026-07-13 |
|
||||
|
||||
### Simplification
|
||||
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ Generated by `pnpm run gen-rfc-index` from the RFC tree — never edit by hand;
|
||||
| [The session prefix — request-only messages in front of the derived history](implemented/feature/2026-07-07-session-prefix.md) | 2026-07-07 |
|
||||
| [Repeat-tool-call guard plugin](implemented/feature/2026-07-08-repeat-tool-guard.md) | 2026-07-08 |
|
||||
| [The self-referential cordis toolset](implemented/feature/2026-07-08-self-referential-cordis-toolset.md) | 2026-07-08 |
|
||||
| [Exact session query service](implemented/feature/2026-07-10-session-query-service.md) | 2026-07-10 |
|
||||
| [Configure subagent persona, tool visibility, and depth](implemented/feature/2026-07-12-subagent-persona-tool-filter-and-depth.md) | 2026-07-12 |
|
||||
|
||||
### Simplification
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Tool-call presentation remains tool-owned. A tool's `presentCall` and `presentRe
|
||||
|
||||
Permission handling is an answerer on the [user-approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md), not an ask-every-tool policy in ACP. An `approval/request` for a bridge-owned agent with a call id becomes `session/request_permission` on that agent's editor session, with one-shot allow/reject choices. Foreign or call-less requests delegate; a missing or failed answerer remains fail-closed. The plugin that asks—such as a pre-execute policy or bash escalation—owns the decision to ask.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge advertises ACP config options instead of session modes. `sandbox-mode` exists only when the mounted bash executor reports sandbox capability, and `approval-policy` exists only when `ctx.approval` is composed. Each option is an independent select whose current value is the session event fold over the composition default. `session/set_config_option` validates against the owning domain vocabulary and writes through `setSandboxMode` or `setApprovalPolicy`. An open-turn switch appends immediately; an idle switch is overlaid in the response and anchored at the next turn start. Until that anchor it is memory-only and a crash reverts to the durable fold. ACP session modes are deliberately not modeled because one mode list cannot represent these orthogonal knobs and config options are the forward protocol surface. Runtime model selection remains outside this decision; `AcpConfig.model` is connection-wide.
|
||||
The bridge advertises ACP config options instead of session modes. When `ctx.permission` is composed, it exposes one `permission` select whose options come from the deployment's preset table; the shipped presets are `workspace-write` and `danger-full-access`, and each bundles a sandbox mode with an approval policy. The current value comes from `PermissionService.current()`, including the derived switch-away-only `custom` state when the effective knobs match no preset. `session/set_config_option` validates through `PermissionService.set()` and writes the chosen preset through to both owning knob events. An open-turn switch appends immediately; an idle switch is overlaid in the response and anchored at the next turn start. Until that anchor it is memory-only and a crash reverts to the durable fold. ACP session modes are deliberately not modeled because config options are the forward protocol surface. Runtime model selection remains outside this decision; `AcpConfig.model` is connection-wide.
|
||||
|
||||
The bridge also provides the ACP-backed `UserInteractionProvider`: `ask_user_question` requests become form elicitations on the owning session. Select, multi-select, option descriptions, and custom-answer override semantics are preserved.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The precise supported and deferred protocol rows live in [`packages/ui/acp/acp-f
|
||||
|
||||
**Execute bash through ACP `terminal/*`** — rejected. That would move execution outside the harness and bypass its sandbox, credential scrub, task ownership, cwd resolution, and session log. Terminal metadata is presentation only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Represent sandbox and approval as ACP session modes** — rejected. They are independent composable settings, while a single current mode is mutually exclusive. ACP config options represent both without a cross-product and match the protocol's forward direction.
|
||||
**Represent permission presets as ACP session modes** — rejected. The deployment-defined preset is already one config-option select, while session modes are the legacy surface slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hijack stdout defensively** — rejected. Process-wide monkey-patching is outside Cordis effect ownership and races the protocol transport. The app composition owns stdout purity.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ One `cordis.yml` entry mounts the seam. Not loading it is the fail-closed opt-ou
|
||||
# policy: never # deployment default for sessions without an override; 'ask' when omitted
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The entry alone provides mechanism, not a channel: with no answerer composed, every ask resolves `unavailable` and the asking tool call denies — fail-closed needs no configuration. Composing the ACP app (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`, as in [the sandbox example](../../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/README.md)) completes the loop: its bridge registers an answerer that prompts the owning editor session via `session/request_permission`, so a hook's `ask` or an escalation request surfaces as a one-shot Allow/Reject prompt attached to the already-streamed tool call. `policy: never` is the unattended stance — every ask auto-rejects deterministically, stated in the system prompt, no human in the loop. `policy` is validated against the closed list at plugin load; anything else throws.
|
||||
The entry alone provides mechanism, not a channel: with no answerer composed, every ask resolves `unavailable` and the asking tool call denies — fail-closed needs no configuration. Composing the ACP app (`@deepseek-ai/dsh-acp-agent`, as in [the acp-agent example's default tree](../../../../examples/acp-agent/README.md)) completes the loop: its bridge registers an answerer that prompts the owning editor session via `session/request_permission`, so a hook's `ask` or an escalation request surfaces as a one-shot Allow/Reject prompt attached to the already-streamed tool call. `policy: never` is the unattended stance — every ask auto-rejects deterministically, stated in the system prompt, no human in the loop. `policy` is validated against the closed list at plugin load; anything else throws.
|
||||
|
||||
What a composed deployment observes: `allowed-once` lets exactly that call proceed; rejection, dismissal, and channel absence deny with three distinct reasons the model can tell apart; every ask lands a durable `approval/asked`/`approval/decided` pair on the asking agent's session log; nothing about a grant persists past the call that asked.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ One seam, one per-platform chain of local backends, one consumer, and two levers
|
||||
|
||||
### How a deployment uses it
|
||||
|
||||
Three `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed product path; [`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`](../../../../examples/sandbox-acp-agent/README.md) is this composition, live:
|
||||
Four `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed product path; [`examples/acp-agent`](../../../../examples/acp-agent/README.md) uses this composition by default:
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
- id: sandbox
|
||||
@@ -24,17 +24,21 @@ Three `cordis.yml` entries turn an unconfined coding agent into the sandboxed pr
|
||||
- id: bash
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-sandbox' # the confined executor, replacing dsh-bash-local behind ctx.bash
|
||||
config:
|
||||
mode: read-only # the deployment default every session starts from
|
||||
mode: workspace-write # the deployment default every session starts from
|
||||
workspaceRoot: !!js process.cwd() # the boundary workspace-write may write under
|
||||
- id: approval
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval' # the escalation gate's channel (the approval RFC)
|
||||
config:
|
||||
policy: ask
|
||||
- id: permission
|
||||
name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-permission' # one product-facing select over both mechanism knobs
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before, spawned through the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `bash` entries and loading `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` instead is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text.
|
||||
The swap is invisible to every consumer of `ctx.bash`: the bash tools, hook commands, and background tasks run exactly as before, spawned through the wrapped argv the provider returns. Deleting the `sandbox` and `permission` entries and replacing `bash` with `@deepseek-ai/dsh-bash-local` is the opt-out — execution is unconfined again and the escalation fields vanish from the tool schema, because they are capability-gated on the mounted executor, not on configuration. Omitting only `approval` keeps confinement but fails every escalation closed with its own error text; `permission` also requires the approval seam and a confining executor, so a partially composed preset layer fails loud at load.
|
||||
|
||||
Misconfiguration fails loud: `mode` outside the closed vocabulary is rejected at plugin load, and a host with no usable backend throws the structured `SANDBOX_UNAVAILABLE` — at `confine()` before the command ever spawns — rather than degrading to unconfined execution. `runnerCommand` on `dsh-sandbox-local` is the operator's explicit assertion of a bwrap-compatible runner (chain and probes skipped); it doubles as the deterministic fake-runner seam for keyless tests.
|
||||
|
||||
What the model then experiences: denied file effects come back as result facts with a `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus standing instructions not to retry around them; under a confining executor the schema offers `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` for the one-approval escalated retry (validated strictly wider than the session's effective mode at execution); the system prompt deliberately does NOT state the sandbox mode — the model learns the boundary from the marker (which names the mode) when it hits it, instead of preemptively refusing work a standing declaration discourages. What an ACP editor experiences: a `sandbox-mode` and an `approval-policy` config-option select per session (each advertised only when its knob is composable), switchable at runtime; a sandbox switch simply changes what subsequent commands may do, while an approval-policy switch to `'never'` is stated in the prompt and narrated.
|
||||
What the model then experiences: denied file effects come back as result facts with a `[sandbox: file access denied under <mode> mode]` marker plus standing instructions not to retry around them; under a confining executor the schema offers `sandbox_permissions` + `justification` for the one-approval escalated retry (validated strictly wider than the session's effective mode at execution); the system prompt deliberately does NOT state the sandbox mode — the model learns the boundary from the marker (which names the mode) when it hits it, instead of preemptively refusing work a standing declaration discourages. What an ACP editor experiences: one `Permissions` config-option select per session (advertised when the `dsh-permission` preset layer is composed; each preset bundles a sandbox mode and an approval policy and writes through to both knob events — a knob state outside the table derives a switch-away-only `custom` current), switchable at runtime; a sandbox switch simply changes what subsequent commands may do, while an approval-policy switch to `'never'` is stated in the prompt and narrated.
|
||||
|
||||
The product path, concretely (the escalation arc is verbatim from the recorded `escalation-approved` scenario; the denial leg is pinned on the real-kernel e2e tier):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ Reject instead and nothing executes: the result is the verbatim `the user reject
|
||||
- Everything else executes inside the harness process (fs is in-process `node:fs`, web is in-process `fetch`, every `ToolDefinition.execute()` closes over `ctx`): an OS sandbox wraps `execve` and cannot wrap an in-process function call, so "sandbox any tool" is policy at each tool's seam, never a mechanical transport change.
|
||||
- `tools/pre-execute` (`allow`/`deny`/`ask`) exists, with `ask` serviced by [the approval seam](2026-07-06-approval-seam.md); the fs intent gates are version guards with no mode input yet.
|
||||
- `dsh-bash`'s request/spec split (`BashExecRequest` → `resolve()` → `BashExecSpec`) carries per-call fields the way escalation needs — `owner` is the template: request-optional, spec required-but-nullable, carried verbatim — and the result types already speak `SandboxMode`, so a per-call policy field adds no dependency edge.
|
||||
- The pinned-header snapshot design means a schema/description change churns at most one pinning fixture per suite, and the escalation fields are advertised only under a sandboxing executor — so they live in exactly one pinned header, the sandbox example suite's `mode-switching` fixture.
|
||||
- The pinned-header snapshot design means a schema/description change churns at most one pinning fixture per suite, and the escalation fields are advertised only under a sandboxing executor — so they live in exactly one pinned header, the acp example suite's `permission-switching` fixture.
|
||||
|
||||
#### The seam: `ctx.sandbox`
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -120,7 +124,7 @@ Each owner exports the same three-piece kit: the event declaration, a pure fold
|
||||
|
||||
**Visibility is deliberately asymmetric between the knobs.** The SANDBOX mode is stated nowhere and its switches are not narrated: a standing "you are read-only" declaration teaches the model to refuse preemptively (observed live: sessions where the model would not even attempt a write it could have escalated), while the denial marker already names the mode the command ran under at exactly the moment the boundary matters — behavior, not belief, carries the state, and a switch simply changes what the next command does. The APPROVAL policy keeps both layers, because its failure mode is the opposite: an auto-rejected ask under `'never'` returns "the user rejected …" wording no behavior can disambiguate, so the prompt states `'never'` (and ONLY `'never'` — an `'ask'` promise is unknowable without asking, and absence under a logged header is how the narrator reads `'ask'` back), and an `agent/pre-step` narrator injects at most one coalesced notice per policy switch: idle flip-flops collapse to one notice at the next turn's first step, a net-zero round trip to none, and a mid-turn change is narrated no later than the next step. Its "last told" is in-memory with a log-derived fallback (the folded header's system text parsed against the closed candidate sentence; LAST occurrence wins, so a persona quoting it cannot shadow the real section), so restarts lose nothing; attribution is positional (a knob event after the log's last `request/header*` reads `changed by the user`, a drift with no such event reads `changed by the operator/config`).
|
||||
|
||||
**The editor surface** is protocol-native [Session Config Options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — the spec's replacement for session modes (slated for removal in ACP v2), already SDK-typed. The bridge advertises one independent `select` per composable knob — `sandbox-mode` (category `mode`) iff the mounted executor confines, `approval-policy` iff the approval seam is composed — with `currentValue` folded from each session's own log, in `session/new` and `session/load` responses. `session/set_config_option` validates against the same closed lists, routes to the domain setter, and returns the complete refreshed state (the spec contract).
|
||||
**The editor surface** is protocol-native [Session Config Options](https://agentclientprotocol.com/protocol/session-config-options) — the spec's replacement for session modes (slated for removal in ACP v2), already SDK-typed. When `ctx.permission` is composed, the bridge advertises one `permission` select (category `mode`) in `session/new` and `session/load`; its options are the deployment's preset table, and its `currentValue` is `PermissionService.current()` over the session log plus composition defaults. The shipped `workspace-write` and `danger-full-access` presets each bundle a sandbox mode with an approval policy and write through to both domain setters; a knob combination outside the table is reported as switch-away-only `custom`. `session/set_config_option` validates and switches through the permission service, then returns the complete refreshed state (the spec contract).
|
||||
|
||||
**Anchoring: turn-enclosure is the commit boundary.** The turn-enclosure contract makes a bare between-turns append invalid (the JSONL backend treats a post-`turn/end` tail as crash garbage; dev invariants throw). A switch while a turn is open appends immediately — openness read from the LOG (last boundary event is `turn/start`), not `agent.status`, which stays `running` between queued turns. An idle switch is held on the bridge's session record and anchored at the next turn's `agent/prompt-submit` — inside the turn, before anything in it assembles or executes, last write per knob, and OUTSIDE any `session/event` emit (appending from inside that feed reorders events for later-registered listeners — a bug the dev invariants caught live). Until anchored, the switch exists only in bridge memory: responses overlay it truthfully, and a crash before the next turn reverts it — `session/load` then reports the fold's truth, so the editor UI self-corrects rather than lies.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -133,9 +137,9 @@ FIXME: Revisit this tool-local boundary. The follow-up design needs to determine
|
||||
### Testing
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit tier (no real runner anywhere): profile dialects, per-platform chain selection (sole candidate unprobed, no chain fails closed, multi-candidate probe order), verdict caching, the fail-closed end, probe-report parsing, and the launcher/`sandbox-exec` CLI contracts via fake runner scripts in `dsh-sandbox-local`; wrapping, policy hand-off, fact stamping, and runner-failure-outranks-denial classification (foreground throw, background `runnerFailed` fact) against a fake provider in `dsh-bash-sandbox`; the error's structured identity in `dsh-sandbox`. The escalation matrix spans the three bash packages: verbatim carry-through in `dsh-bash-local`, stamp/branch/per-task-facts in `dsh-bash-sandbox`, and the capability gate, `justification` pairing, fail-closed texts (pinned verbatim), and grant stamping in `dsh-tool-bash`. The switching surface pins the folds, the stamping precedence, the `'never'` gate, per-session section rendering, the full narrator matrix (cold start, coalescing, net-zero, resume drift with operator wording, positional attribution, persona-shadow hardening), and the bridge's advertisement gating, validation rejections, idle-vs-mid-turn anchoring (dev invariants mounted), and `session/load` reporting over a real two-process JSONL round trip.
|
||||
- Keyless real-runner e2e, split along the seam and per rung: CI's `sandbox-e2e` matrix runs bwrap and Landlock on Linux (the Landlock leg once per architecture, each confining through the registry-installed launcher) and Seatbelt on macOS against real kernels, failing on a silent all-skip. World-proofs live in `dsh-sandbox-local` (denied writes absent on disk, workspace writes landing, temp-area grants pinned, kernel denial text matching the advertised dialect) and `dsh-bash-sandbox` (the through-`ctx.bash` consumer proofs, including denied-then-overridden-write-lands). This package's own publish path is rehearsed without publishing (`packed-install.e2e.ts`): `pnpm pack`, tarballs installed into a throwaway consumer with the launcher family resolving from the registry, plain `node` confining through the INSTALLED launcher — asserted executable apart, so a mode-stripped binary can never masquerade as a non-enforcing kernel. The switching surface has its own keyless e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent`): the real `cordis.yml` tree advertises both options, honors switches end to end, and rejects out-of-vocabulary values.
|
||||
- With-key e2e (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/escalation.e2e.ts`): real model + real runner + the REAL bridge answerer, world-verified — denied under `read-only`, escalates with justification, the scripted editor grants and the retried write lands on disk, while a rejected escalation leaves no write. Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` or a usable runner (e2e.yml installs bubblewrap so it actually executes in CI).
|
||||
- Snapshot tier (`examples/sandbox-acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded mode-switching arc as the suite's pinned header — necessarily, since mid-session switches emit the `request/header-delta`s the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing both switches, the prompt-section delta and one "changed by the user" notice per knob, and a confined write landing under the switched mode; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs confined under `workspace-write`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Replay re-executes every fixture's bash calls under the host's real runner (ci.yml's snapshot lane installs bubblewrap). Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the tiers above.
|
||||
- Keyless real-runner e2e, split along the seam and per rung: CI's `sandbox-e2e` matrix runs bwrap and Landlock on Linux (the Landlock leg once per architecture, each confining through the registry-installed launcher) and Seatbelt on macOS against real kernels, failing on a silent all-skip. World-proofs live in `dsh-sandbox-local` (denied writes absent on disk, workspace writes landing, temp-area grants pinned, kernel denial text matching the advertised dialect) and `dsh-bash-sandbox` (the through-`ctx.bash` consumer proofs, including denied-then-overridden-write-lands). This package's own publish path is rehearsed without publishing (`packed-install.e2e.ts`): `pnpm pack`, tarballs installed into a throwaway consumer with the launcher family resolving from the registry, plain `node` confining through the INSTALLED launcher — asserted executable apart, so a mode-stripped binary can never masquerade as a non-enforcing kernel. The switching surface has its own keyless e2e (the acp-agent example's `escalation.e2e.ts`): the real default `cordis.yml` tree advertises the one permission option, honors switches end to end, and rejects out-of-vocabulary values.
|
||||
- With-key e2e (`examples/acp-agent/tests/escalation.e2e.ts`): real model + real runner + the REAL bridge answerer, world-verified — denied under `read-only`, escalates with justification, the scripted editor grants and the retried write lands on disk, while a rejected escalation leaves no write. Self-skips without `DEEPSEEK_API_KEY` or a usable runner (e2e.yml installs bubblewrap so it actually executes in CI).
|
||||
- Snapshot tier (`examples/acp-agent/tests/acp.snapshot.ts`): the keyless config-option wire; the recorded permission-switching arc as the pinned header of its class — necessarily, since mid-session switches emit the `request/header-delta`s the uniformity guard licenses only in the pin — committing one `workspace-write`→`danger-full-access` preset switch (the `permission/preset` event written through to both knobs), the approval prompt-section delta and its "changed by the user" notice; and both recorded escalation branches over scripted `permissionAnswers` (grant runs under the granted `danger-full-access`; rejection executes nothing and pins the fail-closed text). Snapshot mode starts the shared example tree at `danger-full-access` so established fixtures remain runner-independent; the switching and escalation inputs explicitly select `workspace-write` before exercising the policy path. Deliberately absent: a fixture carrying a real DENIAL — denial stderr is the backend's dialect and would pin a fixture to its recording platform; the escalation prompts assert the prior denial instead, and the denial→marker path stays on the real-runner tiers above.
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred phases
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -169,7 +173,7 @@ Each phase gets its full design when picked up, validated against the code at th
|
||||
- **Narrate via `agent/user-message` + a bus event** — rejected: it presupposes a turn-entry seam that does not exist (the real seam is `agent/prompt-submit`), and pre-step's position serves both the coalesced turn-entry notice and the mid-turn immediacy bound with one listener.
|
||||
- **A standing prompt statement of the sandbox mode (+ a switch narrator)** — shipped first, then removed on live evidence: with `Bash commands run under the "read-only" file sandbox.` in every request, the model refused to ATTEMPT denied-then-escalatable work (five of twelve turns in the first manual session ended with zero tool calls), turning the sandbox into a soft lockout. The denial marker names the mode at the moment it matters and the escalation fields carry the recovery; the approval knob keeps its statement because an auto-rejection is behaviorally indistinguishable from a human "no".
|
||||
- **Track "last told" with its own bookkeeping events** — rejected: the `request/header*` fold already records the exact prompt the model saw; parsing the closed candidate sentences back replaces a second bookkeeping stream — events are needed only where they ARE the store.
|
||||
- **ACP session modes instead of config options** — rejected: one mode list cannot carry two orthogonal knobs; config options are the spec's designed surface and modes are slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
- **ACP session modes instead of config options** — rejected: the preset is already one deployment-defined config-option select, and modes are slated for removal in ACP v2.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
|
||||
# RFC: Exact session query service
|
||||
|
||||
Status: implemented
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
Session history exists in two places: current `SessionStore` objects and an optional persistence backend. Consumers that need exact inspection would otherwise duplicate live-versus-persisted precedence, persistence lifecycle handling, raw-event surface classification, and defensive cloning. Durable state can lag the live log between checkpoints, so persistence alone is not a truthful current source.
|
||||
|
||||
Full-text search is related but materially larger. Designing provider registration, extraction, synchronization, invalidation, ranking, and cursor contracts before a real backend exists creates two speculative state machines: one in the interface service and another in the eventual database package.
|
||||
|
||||
## Decision
|
||||
|
||||
`@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-query` owns `ctx.sessionQuery`, a small trusted exact-read service over one logical corpus. It exposes `listSessions()`, `listEvents(sessionId)`, and bounded `readEvent(request)`. It does not expose filters, lineage or provenance traversals, text extractors, search requests, provider registration, or derived-index synchronization.
|
||||
|
||||
The service observes the optional `ctx.sessionPersistence` binding dynamically but retains no persisted cache or invalidation listener. Each cross-corpus list asks the active backend for authoritative metadata, then overlays a fresh live-store list. Matching ids become one `SessionRecord`: the live header wins and `live`/`persisted` independently report source availability. Immutable header disagreement is `SESSION_QUERY_SOURCE_CONFLICT`.
|
||||
|
||||
An exact target read first checks the live store and snapshots the live header and event log. This path never consults persistence, so a failing durable backend cannot make known live history unreadable. With no live target, the service lists current persistence metadata, proves the id exists, loads it, and rejects a list/load header mismatch. All returned headers and events cross one structured-clone boundary.
|
||||
|
||||
## Surface semantics
|
||||
|
||||
`dsh-session` exports `foldSurface(events)`, and `SurfaceManager` uses the same transition functions for its incremental cache. The fold returns detached current nodes and each replacement's actual removed seqs. `listEvents()` uses that result to classify every raw event as `current`, `shadowed`, or `log-only`, so inspection cannot disagree with model-history derivation about positional replacement semantics.
|
||||
|
||||
`readEvent()` returns the complete target plus raw neighbors by contiguous seq. `before` and `after` default to zero and are independently bounded by `readWindowMax`, default 50. The result carries a cloned `SessionHeader`, not a source-availability record, because determining a live target's persisted flag would violate the guarantee that live exact reads do not depend on persistence health.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security boundary
|
||||
|
||||
The service is context-wide trusted infrastructure, not an authorization layer. A future model-facing history tool or human UI applies explicit caller/session scope. This phase adds no model-facing tool and changes no transcript or snapshot surface.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **Put logical-corpus resolution directly in every consumer** — rejected because source precedence, conflicts, optional-service lifecycle, cloning, and surface classification are shared correctness rules.
|
||||
- **Query only persistence** — rejected because checkpoints can lag the current live log.
|
||||
- **Cache persisted metadata and listen for writes/removals** — rejected because exact reads can ask the authoritative sources directly, while cache invalidation adds lifecycle and concurrency state before scale requires it.
|
||||
- **Define a provider-neutral search protocol now** — rejected because no provider consumes it. The first SQLite FTS package should own one reconciliation/transaction state machine; a smaller shared seam can be extracted later only when a second implementation proves the boundary.
|
||||
- **Include lineage, provenance, and generic filters in phase one** — rejected because no current consumer requires them and canonical logs remain sufficient to add them with evidence later.
|
||||
|
||||
## Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
Phase one has one source-resolution state variable: the currently mounted persistence service. There are no provider queues, fingerprints, extractor registries, observation generations, or derived index updates. Exact reads remain usable in live-only deployments and deterministic when persistence is present.
|
||||
|
||||
Cross-corpus listing and persisted exact reads perform backend I/O on each call. That is deliberate: correctness comes from current authoritative state, and scale-oriented search belongs to the phase-two database. Full-text search is unavailable until that package defines and implements its complete contract.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
||||
# RFC: SQLite FTS5 session search
|
||||
|
||||
Status: proposed
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
The exact-read `ctx.sessionQuery` service deliberately has no derived index. Large persisted histories need full-text search without scanning every event on every query, while current live sessions need an overlay newer than the last durability checkpoint. Search also needs concrete ranking, snippets, filters, pagination, cancellation, and rebuild behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
Splitting those concerns across a speculative provider coordinator and a database implementation would create two coupled reconciliation state machines. The first real implementation should own the source observation, extraction, SQLite transaction, generation, and query as one lifecycle.
|
||||
|
||||
## Proposal
|
||||
|
||||
Add `@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-query-sqlite` beside the exact-read package. The package will expose a search service or extend the family with the smallest API required by its actual consumers; phase one does not pre-commit a provider-registration protocol. It will depend on `ctx.sessions` and optional `ctx.sessionPersistence`, own a separate derived SQLite database, and reuse the canonical `foldSurface()` classification.
|
||||
|
||||
The implementation owns one serialized reconciliation/DB transaction state machine. A transaction observes authoritative persisted metadata and live snapshots, extracts semantic documents, updates derived tables, advances relevant cursor generations, and executes or enables the corresponding query. No second service maintains parallel fingerprints, dirty flags, live-id sets, or invalidation generations.
|
||||
|
||||
Persisted documents survive restarts. Live overrides are connection-local and shadow the persisted rows for the same session, then disappear when the live owner or database closes. The derived database remains separate from canonical persistence so index reset, corruption, tokenizer changes, and schema churn cannot endanger durable conversation logs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Search semantics to decide with implementation
|
||||
|
||||
The implementation must define both cross-session and within-session scopes from executable use cases. Each searchable event is one document with session metadata, event metadata, surface classification, normalized semantic text, and a bounded plain-text snippet. Session results group by their strongest matching event; numeric backend scores remain private.
|
||||
|
||||
Filters compile to parameterized SQL before ranking. Query syntax is treated as data. Ordering includes stable tie fields. Opaque cursors bind to normalized request shape and the smallest relevant generation; unrelated session changes should not invalidate a within-session cursor. Cancellation must stop caller waiting and interrupt SQLite work where the runtime permits.
|
||||
|
||||
Tokenizer choice remains an implementation experiment. FTS5 trigram supports substring recall but rejects useful terms shorter than three characters and increases index size; the proposal must benchmark that tradeoff against the default Unicode tokenizer before making it contract.
|
||||
|
||||
## Extraction and reconciliation
|
||||
|
||||
The package starts with first-party semantic extraction for messages, reasoning, tool calls/results, blocked prompts, context, steering, todos, and error/status detail. Structural events and stream chunks contribute no document. Unknown declaration-merged event/content types remain non-searchable unless a real extension consumer demonstrates the need for a public extractor registry.
|
||||
|
||||
Reconciliation may use stable fingerprints to avoid rewriting unchanged persisted sessions, but the database package owns their calculation and storage. It must never report a row current when source observation or extraction failed. Provider-schema mismatch may reset only the derived database; ordinary source changes use transactional upsert/delete. Mounted but unreadable persistence fails affected searches without affecting canonical writes or known live exact reads.
|
||||
|
||||
## Alternatives considered
|
||||
|
||||
- **Add FTS tables to the canonical persistence database** — rejected because a rebuildable index must not share the authoritative log's schema/reset/failure boundary.
|
||||
- **Reintroduce phase-one provider coordination** — rejected because there is one planned implementation and no evidence for a stable multi-provider seam.
|
||||
- **Persist live overrides immediately** — rejected because live events are not canonical until the existing checkpoint commits.
|
||||
- **Return BM25 scores** — rejected because provider-specific numeric scales are unstable across corpus changes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Acceptance criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- Restart tests cover unchanged, new, changed, and deleted persisted sessions without rebuilding the whole index.
|
||||
- Reopening preserves persisted rows and removes live rows; live rows shadow and then reveal their persisted base.
|
||||
- Tests cover both search scopes, metadata filters, surface defaults, snippets, escaping, deterministic ties, pagination, scoped stale cursors, cancellation, dynamic persistence mount/unmount, and recovery after a failed transaction.
|
||||
- A schema mismatch resets only the derived database.
|
||||
- A keyless end-to-end test combines a real persistence backend with the real SQLite search package.
|
||||
- The RFC is amended to the measured tokenizer and public API actually implemented before moving to `implemented/`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Risks
|
||||
|
||||
A single owner is simpler but initially less reusable than a provider-neutral seam. That is intentional: a second real backend can reveal what to extract. SQLite runtime differences can affect FTS ranking and snippets, so tests must pin only contract-controlled ordering and presentation. The separate database adds configuration and lifecycle work, but preserves the canonical store's safety boundary.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user