Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into cross-family-fs-sandbox

# Conflicts: # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.i18n.yaml # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.md # .agents/notes/implemented/feature/2026-07-14-cross-family-fs-sandbox.zh.md # docs/capability-seams.md # docs/cordis-catalog/events.md # docs/cordis-catalog/services.md # docs/event-producer-consumer.md # docs/module-graph.md # docs/persistence-catalog.md # docs/rfc/INDEX.md # examples/acp-agent/README.md # examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.snapshot.yml # examples/acp-agent/fs.cordis.yml # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-approved/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/escalation-rejected/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/hook-cc-pretool-ask/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/permission-switching/session.jsonl # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-context/tool-schemas.expected.json # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/system-prompt.expected.md # examples/acp-agent/tests/snapshots/workspace-edit/tool-schemas.expected.json # packages/bash/bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/package.json # packages/bash/tool-bash/src/index.ts # packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts # packages/cordis/tool-cordis/src/api-catalog.ts # packages/fs/README.md # packages/fs/tool-fs/src/edit.ts # packages/fs/tool-fs/src/write.ts # packages/sandbox/README.md # pnpm-lock.yaml
2026-08-15 21:04:50 +00:00 · 2026-07-20 11:40:29 +08:00
parent 9a2ef4e229 023bed1a83
commit 2e7cdddb89
1293 changed files with 74019 additions and 16297 deletions
--- a/packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts
+++ b/packages/bash/tool-bash/tests/tools.spec.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ import SystemPrompt from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-system-prompt'
 import ToolRegistry from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tools'
 import AgentRegistry from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
 import type { Agent } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-agent'
+import SessionStore, { SessionId } from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session'
+import SessionPersistenceJsonl from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-session-persistence-jsonl'
 import TaskService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tasks'
 import * as ToolTasks from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-tool-tasks'
 import ApprovalService from '@deepseek-ai/dsh-user-approval'
@@ -48,18 +50,17 @@ async function setupWithTasks() {
 }

 /**
- * Build a fake {@link Agent} whose session token is `sessionId`, give it a
+ * Build a fake {@link Agent} with the shared agent/session identity, give it a
 * dedicated lifecycle fiber for `Agent.ctx`, and register it in `ctx.agents`.
- * The agent id is deliberately different from the session token so a
- * wrong-field ownership match fails the test.
 */
 function registerFakeAgent(ctx: Context, sessionId: string, inject: (...args: unknown[]) => void = () => {}): Agent {
  const scopeFiber = ctx.plugin(() => {})
+  const id = SessionId(sessionId)
  const agent = {
-    id: `agent-${sessionId}`,
+    id,
    ctx: scopeFiber.ctx,
    inject,
-    session: { header: { version: 0, id: sessionId, createdAt: 0 } },
+    session: { id, header: { version: 0, id, createdAt: 0 } },
  } as unknown as Agent
  ctx.agents.register(agent)
  return agent
@@ -101,6 +102,7 @@ class RecordingSandboxExecutor extends BashExecutor {
    return {
      command: request.command,
      workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
+      stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
      timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 1000,
      ...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
      sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode ?? 'read-only',
@@ -140,7 +142,13 @@ class CountingStartExecutor extends BashExecutor {
  starts = 0

  resolve(request: BashExecRequest): BashExecSpec {
-    return { command: request.command, workdir: request.workdir ?? '/x', timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0, sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode }
+    return {
+      command: request.command,
+      workdir: request.workdir ?? '/x',
+      timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
+      stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
+      sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
+    }
  }

  run(): Promise<BashRunResult> { return Promise.reject(new Error('unused')) }
@@ -174,11 +182,13 @@ async function setupSandboxed(withApproval = false) {
 function sandboxAgent(mode?: 'read-only' | 'workspace-write' | 'danger-full-access', ctx?: Context): Agent {
  const events: Array<{ type: string; data?: Record<string, unknown> }> = [{ type: 'turn/start' }]
  if (mode !== undefined) events.push({ type: 'sandbox/mode', data: { mode } })
+  const id = SessionId('sandbox-session')
  return {
-    id: 'sandbox-agent',
+    id,
    ...ctx === undefined ? {} : { ctx: ctx.plugin(() => {}).ctx },
    session: {
-      header: { version: 0, id: 'sandbox-session', createdAt: 0 },
+      id,
+      header: { version: 0, id, createdAt: 0 },
      events,
      append: (type: string, data: Record<string, unknown>) => {
        const event = { type, data }
@@ -277,7 +287,7 @@ describe('bash tool', () => {
  })

  // Type and required-key violations are rejected by the harness
-  // (defineTool validates against the SchemaSpec — the arg-validation RFC) before execute.
+  // (defineTool validates against the SchemaSpec — the arg-validation Agent Note) before execute.
  it.each([
    [{}, /missing required property "command"/],
    [{ command: 42, description: 'd' }, /"command" must be a string/],
@@ -924,16 +934,19 @@ describe('tool-owned UI presentation (presentCall / presentResult)', () => {
 })

 describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no {...args} forward)', () => {
+  const recordingDshHome = join(spillDir, 'dsh-home')
+
  /**
   * Records every {@link BashExecRequest} the consumer hands to `resolve()`, so a
   * test can assert what the model-facing tool DID and DID NOT forward. The `bash`
-   * tool does not expose `stdin`/`env` as parameters (bash syntax already gives a
-   * model that power), so it must build its request from named args only and
+   * tool does not expose trusted-plugin fields (`stdoutMaxBytes`, `stdin`, or
+   * `env`) as parameters, so it must build its request from named args only and
   * never spread unknown tool-call keys into it. This guard's job is to catch a
   * future refactor that blindly forwards `...args` — which would silently thread
-   * model input into the post-scrub `env` merge — NOT to defend a trust boundary
+   * model input into the post-scrub `env` merge or per-run capture budget — NOT
+   * to defend a trust boundary
   * (the credential scrub in dsh-bash-local is the security control; see the
-   * bash-stdin-env RFC). Foreground `run()` returns a canned result; `start()`
+   * bash-stdin-env Agent Note). Foreground `run()` returns a canned result; `start()`
   * hands back an already-settled fake handle so the task registration completes.
   */
  class RecordingBashExecutor extends BashExecutor {
@@ -944,9 +957,11 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
        command: request.command,
        workdir: request.workdir ?? process.cwd(),
        timeoutMs: request.timeoutMs ?? 0,
+        stdoutMaxBytes: request.stdoutMaxBytes ?? 64_000,
        ...request.signal ? { signal: request.signal } : {},
        ...request.stdin !== undefined ? { stdin: request.stdin } : {},
        ...request.env !== undefined ? { env: request.env } : {},
+        ...request.dshEnv !== undefined ? { dshEnv: request.dshEnv } : {},
        sandboxMode: request.sandboxMode,
      }
    }
@@ -968,19 +983,127 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
    }
  }

-  async function setupRecording() {
+  async function setupRecording(withJsonl = false) {
    const ctx = new Context()
    await ctx.plugin(SystemPrompt)
    await ctx.plugin(ToolRegistry)
    await ctx.plugin(AgentRegistry)
+    if (withJsonl) {
+      await ctx.plugin(SessionStore)
+      await ctx.plugin(SessionPersistenceJsonl, { root: join(spillDir, 'jsonl') })
+    }
    await ctx.plugin(TaskService)
    await ctx.plugin(ToolTasks)
    await ctx.plugin(RecordingBashExecutor)
-    await ctx.plugin(ToolBash)
+    await ctx.plugin(ToolBash, { dshHome: recordingDshHome })
    return { ctx, bash: ctx.bash as RecordingBashExecutor }
  }

-  it('does not forward env/stdin even when the model includes them as extra arguments', async () => {
+  it('describes the managed harness environment namespace to the model', async () => {
+    const { ctx } = await setupRecording()
+    const description = ctx.tools.get('bash')?.description ?? ''
+    expect(description).toContain('$DSH_*')
+    expect(description).not.toContain('DSH_SESSION_JSONL')
+  })
+
+  it('injects the session id and JSONL target path into a foreground request', async () => {
+    const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording(true)
+    const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-fg', () => undefined)
+    const path = ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(agent.session.header)?.path
+
+    await ctx.tools.execute({
+      callId: CallId('session-env-fg'),
+      name: 'bash',
+      arguments: { command: 'true', description: 'run command' },
+      agent,
+    })
+
+    expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv).toEqual({
+      DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
+      DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-fg',
+      DSH_SESSION_JSONL: path,
+      DSH_SHELL: '1',
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('injects the same trusted variables into a background request without forwarding model env', async () => {
+    const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording(true)
+    const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-bg', () => undefined)
+    const path = ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(agent.session.header)?.path
+
+    await ctx.tools.execute({
+      callId: CallId('session-env-bg'),
+      name: 'bash',
+      arguments: {
+        command: 'sleep 1',
+        description: 'run command',
+        run_in_background: true,
+        env: { DSH_SESSION_ID: 'spoofed', DSH_SESSION_JSONL: '/tmp/spoofed' },
+      },
+      agent,
+    })
+
+    expect(bash.requests[0]?.env).toBeUndefined()
+    expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv).toEqual({
+      DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
+      DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-bg',
+      DSH_SESSION_JSONL: path,
+      DSH_SHELL: '1',
+    })
+  })
+
+  it('injects built-ins and the stable session id when no JSONL locator is available', async () => {
+    const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
+    const agent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-id-only', () => undefined)
+    const ambient = process.env.DSH_SESSION_ID
+
+    await ctx.tools.execute({
+      callId: CallId('session-env-id-only'),
+      name: 'bash',
+      arguments: { command: 'true', description: 'run command' },
+      agent,
+    })
+
+    expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv).toEqual({
+      DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
+      DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-id-only',
+      DSH_SHELL: '1',
+    })
+    expect(process.env.DSH_SESSION_ID).toBe(ambient)
+  })
+
+  it('keeps parent and child agent session environments isolated', async () => {
+    const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording(true)
+    const parent = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-parent', () => undefined)
+    const child = registerFakeAgent(ctx, 'request-child', () => undefined)
+
+    for (const [callId, agent] of [['parent', parent], ['child', child]] as const) {
+      await ctx.tools.execute({
+        callId: CallId(`session-env-${callId}`),
+        name: 'bash',
+        arguments: { command: 'true', description: 'run command' },
+        agent,
+      })
+    }
+
+    expect(bash.requests.map(request => request.dshEnv)).toEqual([
+      {
+        DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
+        DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-parent',
+        DSH_SESSION_JSONL: ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(parent.session.header)?.path,
+        DSH_SHELL: '1',
+      },
+      {
+        DSH_HOME: recordingDshHome,
+        DSH_SESSION_ID: 'request-child',
+        DSH_SESSION_JSONL: ctx.sessionPersistence.locate(child.session.header)?.path,
+        DSH_SHELL: '1',
+      },
+    ])
+    expect(bash.requests[0]?.dshEnv?.DSH_SESSION_JSONL).not.toBe(bash.requests[1]?.dshEnv?.DSH_SESSION_JSONL)
+  })
+
+  it('does not forward trusted-only fields even when the model includes them as extra arguments', async () => {
    const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
    // Unknown `env` and `stdin` keys are ignored by the schema and named request construction.
    // This preserves the request shape; it is not a security boundary because shell syntax can
@@ -993,6 +1116,7 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
        description: 'echo',
        env: { SNEAKY_API_KEY: 'leak' },
        stdin: 'malicious payload',
+        stdoutMaxBytes: 999_999,
      },
    })
    expect(bash.requests).toHaveLength(1)
@@ -1000,9 +1124,10 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
    expect(request.command).toBe('echo hi')
    expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
    expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
+    expect('stdoutMaxBytes' in request).toBe(false)
  })

-  it('a background bash call likewise carries no env/stdin', async () => {
+  it('a background bash call likewise carries no trusted-only fields', async () => {
    const { ctx, bash } = await setupRecording()
    const result = await ctx.tools.execute({
      callId: CallId('no-forward-2'),
@@ -1013,6 +1138,7 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
        run_in_background: true,
        env: { TOKEN: 'leak' },
        stdin: 'x',
+        stdoutMaxBytes: 999_999,
      },
    })
    // The call really went down the background path (the recorder sees the real
@@ -1024,5 +1150,6 @@ describe('the model-facing bash tool builds its request from named args only (no
    expect(request.command).toBe('sleep 1')
    expect('env' in request).toBe(false)
    expect('stdin' in request).toBe(false)
+    expect('stdoutMaxBytes' in request).toBe(false)
  })
 })