propagate from branch 'au.asn.ucc.matt.dropbear' (head 7ad1775ed65e75dbece27fe6b65bf1a234db386a)

to branch 'au.asn.ucc.matt.dropbear.insecure-nocrypto' (head 88ed2b94d9bfec9a4f661caf592ed01da5eb3b6a)

--HG--
branch : insecure-nocrypto
extra : convert_revision : 2b954d406290e6a2be8eb4a262d3675ac95ac544
This commit is contained in:
Matt Johnston 2006-03-10 06:30:52 +00:00
commit ba869e5601
4 changed files with 58 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -251,7 +251,10 @@ void cli_auth_try() {
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_CLI_INTERACT_AUTH
if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_INTERACT) {
if (ses.keys->trans_algo_crypt->cipherdesc == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, I won't let you use interactive auth unencrypted.\n");
}
else if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_INTERACT) {
if (cli_ses.auth_interact_failed) {
finished = 0;
} else {
@ -263,7 +266,10 @@ void cli_auth_try() {
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_CLI_PASSWORD_AUTH
if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD) {
if (ses.keys->trans_algo_crypt->cipherdesc == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, I won't let you use password auth unencrypted.\n");
}
else if (!finished && ses.authstate.authtypes & AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD) {
cli_auth_password();
finished = 1;
cli_ses.lastauthtype = AUTH_TYPE_PASSWORD;

View File

@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ algo_type sshciphers[] = {
#endif
#ifdef DROPBEAR_BLOWFISH_CBC
{"blowfish-cbc", 0, (void*)&dropbear_blowfish, 1},
#endif
#ifdef DROPBEAR_NONE_CIPHER
{"none", 0, (void*)&dropbear_nocipher, 1},
#endif
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0}
};
@ -115,6 +118,9 @@ algo_type sshhashes[] = {
#endif
#ifdef DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC
{"hmac-md5", 0, (void*)&dropbear_md5, 1},
#endif
#ifdef DROPBEAR_NONE_INTEGRITY
{"none", 0, (void*)&dropbear_nohash, 1},
#endif
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0}
};

View File

@ -298,27 +298,35 @@ void gen_new_keys() {
hashkeys(C2S_key, C2S_keysize, &hs, 'C');
hashkeys(S2C_key, S2C_keysize, &hs, 'D');
if (cbc_start(
find_cipher(ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name),
recv_IV, recv_key,
ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->keysize, 0,
&ses.newkeys->recv_symmetric_struct) != CRYPT_OK) {
dropbear_exit("crypto error");
if (ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->cipherdesc != NULL) {
if (cbc_start(
find_cipher(ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name),
recv_IV, recv_key,
ses.newkeys->recv_algo_crypt->keysize, 0,
&ses.newkeys->recv_symmetric_struct) != CRYPT_OK) {
dropbear_exit("crypto error");
}
}
if (cbc_start(
find_cipher(ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name),
trans_IV, trans_key,
ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->keysize, 0,
&ses.newkeys->trans_symmetric_struct) != CRYPT_OK) {
dropbear_exit("crypto error");
if (ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->cipherdesc != NULL) {
if (cbc_start(
find_cipher(ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->cipherdesc->name),
trans_IV, trans_key,
ses.newkeys->trans_algo_crypt->keysize, 0,
&ses.newkeys->trans_symmetric_struct) != CRYPT_OK) {
dropbear_exit("crypto error");
}
}
/* MAC keys */
hashkeys(ses.newkeys->transmackey,
ses.newkeys->trans_algo_mac->keysize, &hs, mactransletter);
hashkeys(ses.newkeys->recvmackey,
ses.newkeys->recv_algo_mac->keysize, &hs, macrecvletter);
if (ses.newkeys->trans_algo_mac->hashdesc != NULL) {
hashkeys(ses.newkeys->transmackey,
ses.newkeys->trans_algo_mac->keysize, &hs, mactransletter);
}
if (ses.newkeys->recv_algo_mac->hashdesc != NULL) {
hashkeys(ses.newkeys->recvmackey,
ses.newkeys->recv_algo_mac->keysize, &hs, macrecvletter);
}
#ifndef DISABLE_ZLIB
gen_new_zstreams();

View File

@ -65,12 +65,26 @@ etc) slower (perhaps by 50%). Recommended for most small systems. */
* RFC Draft requires 3DES and recommends AES128 for interoperability.
* Including multiple keysize variants the same cipher
* (eg AES256 as well as AES128) will result in a minimal size increase.*/
/*
#define DROPBEAR_AES128_CBC
#define DROPBEAR_3DES_CBC
#define DROPBEAR_AES256_CBC
#define DROPBEAR_BLOWFISH_CBC
#define DROPBEAR_TWOFISH256_CBC
#define DROPBEAR_TWOFISH128_CBC
*/
/* You can compile with no encryption if you want. In some circumstances
* this could be safe securitywise, though make sure you know what
* you're doing. Anyone can see everything that goes over the wire, so
* the only safe auth method is public key. You'll have to disable all other
* ciphers above in the client if you want to use this, or implement cipher
* prioritisation in cli-runopts.
*
* The best way to do things is probably make normal compile of dropbear with all
* ciphers including "none" as the server, then recompile a special
* "dbclient-insecure" client. */
#define DROPBEAR_NONE_CIPHER
/* Message Integrity - at least one required.
* RFC Draft requires sha1 and recommends sha1-96.
@ -88,6 +102,12 @@ etc) slower (perhaps by 50%). Recommended for most small systems. */
#define DROPBEAR_SHA1_96_HMAC
#define DROPBEAR_MD5_HMAC
/* You can also disable integrity. Don't bother disabling this if you're
* still using a cipher, it's relatively cheap. Don't disable this if you're
* using 'none' cipher, since it's dead simple to run arbitrary commands
* on the remote host. Go ahead. Hang yourself with your own rope. */
/*#define DROPBEAR_NONE_INTEGRITY*/
/* Hostkey/public key algorithms - at least one required, these are used
* for hostkey as well as for verifying signatures with pubkey auth.
* Removing either of these won't save very much space.