Change secure.ucc.asn.au/hg to hg.ucc.asn.au

This commit is contained in:
Matt Johnston 2020-07-28 18:53:48 +08:00
parent 926c477188
commit 80e9281701
2 changed files with 12 additions and 12 deletions

22
CHANGES
View File

@ -215,7 +215,7 @@
dropbear is running with -a (Allow connections to forwarded ports from any host)
This could potentially allow arbitrary code execution as root by an authenticated user.
Affects versions 2013.56 to 2016.74. Thanks to Mark Shepard for reporting the crash.
CVE-2017-9078 https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/c8114a48837c
CVE-2017-9078 https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/c8114a48837c
- Security: Fix information disclosure with ~/.ssh/authorized_keys symlink.
Dropbear parsed authorized_keys as root, even if it were a symlink. The fix
@ -227,7 +227,7 @@
contents of that file.
This information disclosure is to an already authenticated user.
Thanks to Jann Horn of Google Project Zero for reporting this.
CVE-2017-9079 https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/0d889b068123
CVE-2017-9079 https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/0d889b068123
- Generate hostkeys with dropbearkey atomically and flush to disk with fsync
Thanks to Andrei Gherzan for a patch
@ -247,23 +247,23 @@
run arbitrary code as the dbclient user. This could be a problem if scripts
or webpages pass untrusted input to the dbclient program.
CVE-2016-7406
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/b66a483f3dcb
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/b66a483f3dcb
- Security: dropbearconvert import of OpenSSH keys could run arbitrary code as
the local dropbearconvert user when parsing malicious key files
CVE-2016-7407
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/34e6127ef02e
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/34e6127ef02e
- Security: dbclient could run arbitrary code as the local dbclient user if
particular -m or -c arguments are provided. This could be an issue where
dbclient is used in scripts.
CVE-2016-7408
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/eed9376a4ad6
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/eed9376a4ad6
- Security: dbclient or dropbear server could expose process memory to the
running user if compiled with DEBUG_TRACE and running with -v
CVE-2016-7409
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/6a14b1f6dc04
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/6a14b1f6dc04
The security issues were reported by an anonymous researcher working with
Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure www.beyondsecurity.com/ssd.html
@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
- Validate X11 forwarding input. Could allow bypass of authorized_keys command= restrictions,
found by github.com/tintinweb. Thanks for Damien Miller for a patch. CVE-2016-3116
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/a3e8389e01ff
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/a3e8389e01ff
2015.71 - 3 December 2015
@ -590,11 +590,11 @@ kernels, from Steve Dover
- Limit the size of decompressed payloads, avoids memory exhaustion denial
of service
Thanks to Logan Lamb for reporting and investigating it. CVE-2013-4421
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/0bf76f54de6f
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/0bf76f54de6f
- Avoid disclosing existence of valid users through inconsistent delays
Thanks to Logan Lamb for reporting. CVE-2013-4434
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/d7784616409a
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/d7784616409a
- Update config.guess and config.sub for newer architectures
@ -697,7 +697,7 @@ though probably will be soon
This bug affects releases 0.52 onwards. Ref CVE-2012-0920.
Thanks to Danny Fullerton of Mantor Organization for reporting
the bug.
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/rev/818108bf7749
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/rev/818108bf7749
- Compile fix, only apply IPV6 socket options if they are available in headers
Thanks to Gustavo Zacarias for the patch
@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ though probably will be soon
- New version numbering scheme.
Source repository has now migrated to Mercurial at
https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear/graph/default
https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/graph/default
0.53.1 - Wednesday 2 March 2011

View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
result=0
test -d fuzzcorpus && hg --repository fuzzcorpus/ pull || hg clone https://secure.ucc.asn.au/hg/dropbear-fuzzcorpus fuzzcorpus || exit 1
test -d fuzzcorpus && hg --repository fuzzcorpus/ pull || hg clone https://hg.ucc.asn.au/dropbear-fuzzcorpus fuzzcorpus || exit 1
for f in `make list-fuzz-targets`; do
./$f fuzzcorpus/$f/* || result=1
done