dropbear/keyimport.c

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/*
* Based on PuTTY's import.c for importing/exporting OpenSSH and SSH.com
* keyfiles.
*
* Modifications copyright 2003-2022 Matt Johnston
*
* PuTTY is copyright 1997-2003 Simon Tatham.
*
* Portions copyright Robert de Bath, Joris van Rantwijk, Delian
* Delchev, Andreas Schultz, Jeroen Massar, Wez Furlong, Nicolas Barry,
* Justin Bradford, and CORE SDI S.A.
*
* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
* obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation files
* (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction,
* including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge,
* publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software,
* and to permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so,
* subject to the following conditions:
*
* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
* included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
* NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF
* CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
* WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "keyimport.h"
#include "bignum.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "dbutil.h"
#include "ecc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
2020-04-06 15:18:26 +00:00
#include "rsa.h"
#include "dss.h"
#include "ed25519.h"
#include "ecdsa.h"
#include "signkey_ossh.h"
static const unsigned char OSSH_PKEY_BLOB[] =
"openssh-key-v1\0" /* AUTH_MAGIC */
"\0\0\0\4none" /* cipher name*/
"\0\0\0\4none" /* kdf name */
"\0\0\0\0" /* kdf */
"\0\0\0\1"; /* key num */
#define OSSH_PKEY_BLOBLEN (sizeof(OSSH_PKEY_BLOB) - 1)
#if DROPBEAR_ECDSA
static const unsigned char OID_SEC256R1_BLOB[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07};
static const unsigned char OID_SEC384R1_BLOB[] = {0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22};
static const unsigned char OID_SEC521R1_BLOB[] = {0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23};
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#endif
#define PUT_32BIT(cp, value) do { \
(cp)[3] = (unsigned char)(value); \
(cp)[2] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 8); \
(cp)[1] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 16); \
(cp)[0] = (unsigned char)((value) >> 24); } while (0)
#define GET_32BIT(cp) \
(((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[0] << 24) | \
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[1] << 16) | \
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
((unsigned long)(unsigned char)(cp)[3]))
static int openssh_encrypted(const char *filename);
static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, const char *passphrase);
static int openssh_write(const char *filename, sign_key *key,
const char *passphrase);
static int dropbear_write(const char*filename, sign_key * key);
static sign_key *dropbear_read(const char* filename);
merge fixes from PuTTY import.c toint() from misc.c (revids are from hggit conversion) changeset: 4620:60a336a6c85c user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Feb 25 20:26:33 2016 +0000 files: import.c description: Fix potential segfaults in reading OpenSSH's ASN.1 key format. The length coming back from ber_read_id_len might have overflowed, so treat it as potentially negative. Also, while I'm here, accumulate it inside ber_read_id_len as an unsigned, so as to avoid undefined behaviour on integer overflow, and toint() it before return. Thanks to Hanno Böck for spotting this, with the aid of AFL. (cherry picked from commit 5b7833cd474a24ec098654dcba8cb9509f3bf2c1) Conflicts: import.c (cherry-picker's note: resolving the conflict involved removing an entire section of the original commit which fixed ECDSA code not present on this branch) changeset: 4619:9c6c638d98d8 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Sun Jul 14 10:45:54 2013 +0000 files: import.c ssh.c sshdss.c sshpubk.c sshrsa.c description: Tighten up a lot of casts from unsigned to int which are read by one of the GET_32BIT macros and then used as length fields. Missing bounds checks against zero have been added, and also I've introduced a helper function toint() which casts from unsigned to int in such a way as to avoid C undefined behaviour, since I'm not sure I trust compilers any more to do the obviously sensible thing. [originally from svn r9918] changeset: 4618:3957829f24d3 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Mon Jul 08 22:36:04 2013 +0000 files: import.c sshdss.c sshrsa.c description: Add an assortment of extra safety checks. [originally from svn r9896] changeset: 4617:2cddee0bce12 user: Jacob Nevins <jacobn@chiark.greenend.org.uk> date: Wed Dec 07 00:24:45 2005 +0000 files: import.c description: Institutional failure to memset() things pointed at rather than pointers. Things should now be zeroed and memory not leaked. Spotted by Brant Thomsen. [originally from svn r6476] changeset: 4616:24ac78a9c71d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Wed Feb 11 13:58:27 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Jacob's last-minute testing found a couple of trivial bugs in import.c, and my attempts to reproduce them in cmdgen found another one there :-) [originally from svn r3847] changeset: 4615:088d39a73db0 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Jan 22 18:52:49 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Placate some gcc warnings. [originally from svn r3761] changeset: 4614:e4288bad4d93 parent: 1758:108b8924593d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Fri Oct 03 21:21:23 2003 +0000 files: import.c description: My ASN.1 decoder returned wrong IDs for anything above 0x1E! Good job it's never had to yet. Ahem. [originally from svn r3479]
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static int toint(unsigned u);
#if 0
static int sshcom_encrypted(const char *filename, char **comment);
static struct ssh2_userkey *sshcom_read(const char *filename, char *passphrase);
static int sshcom_write(const char *filename, struct ssh2_userkey *key,
char *passphrase);
#endif
int import_encrypted(const char* filename, int filetype) {
if (filetype == KEYFILE_OPENSSH) {
return openssh_encrypted(filename);
#if 0
} else if (filetype == KEYFILE_SSHCOM) {
return sshcom_encrypted(filename, NULL);
#endif
}
return 0;
}
sign_key *import_read(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, int filetype) {
if (filetype == KEYFILE_OPENSSH) {
return openssh_read(filename, passphrase);
} else if (filetype == KEYFILE_DROPBEAR) {
return dropbear_read(filename);
#if 0
} else if (filetype == KEYFILE_SSHCOM) {
return sshcom_read(filename, passphrase);
#endif
}
return NULL;
}
int import_write(const char *filename, sign_key *key, const char *passphrase,
int filetype) {
if (filetype == KEYFILE_OPENSSH) {
return openssh_write(filename, key, passphrase);
} else if (filetype == KEYFILE_DROPBEAR) {
return dropbear_write(filename, key);
#if 0
} else if (filetype == KEYFILE_SSHCOM) {
return sshcom_write(filename, key, passphrase);
#endif
}
return 0;
}
static sign_key *dropbear_read(const char* filename) {
buffer * buf = NULL;
sign_key *ret = NULL;
enum signkey_type type;
buf = buf_new(MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE);
if (buf_readfile(buf, filename) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
goto error;
}
buf_setpos(buf, 0);
ret = new_sign_key();
type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY;
if (buf_get_priv_key(buf, ret, &type) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE){
goto error;
}
buf_free(buf);
ret->type = type;
return ret;
error:
if (buf) {
buf_free(buf);
}
if (ret) {
sign_key_free(ret);
}
return NULL;
}
/* returns 0 on fail, 1 on success */
static int dropbear_write(const char*filename, sign_key * key) {
buffer * buf;
FILE*fp;
int len;
int ret;
buf = buf_new(MAX_PRIVKEY_SIZE);
buf_put_priv_key(buf, key, key->type);
fp = fopen(filename, "w");
if (!fp) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
buf_setpos(buf, 0);
do {
len = fwrite(buf_getptr(buf, buf->len - buf->pos),
1, buf->len - buf->pos, fp);
buf_incrpos(buf, len);
} while (len > 0 && buf->len != buf->pos);
fclose(fp);
if (buf->pos != buf->len) {
ret = 0;
} else {
ret = 1;
}
out:
buf_free(buf);
return ret;
}
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Helper routines. (The base64 ones are defined in sshpubk.c.)
*/
#define isbase64(c) ( ((c) >= 'A' && (c) <= 'Z') || \
((c) >= 'a' && (c) <= 'z') || \
((c) >= '0' && (c) <= '9') || \
(c) == '+' || (c) == '/' || (c) == '=' \
)
/* cpl has to be less than 100 */
static void base64_encode_fp(FILE * fp, const unsigned char *data,
int datalen, int cpl)
{
unsigned char out[100];
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int n;
unsigned long outlen;
int rawcpl;
rawcpl = cpl * 3 / 4;
dropbear_assert((unsigned int)cpl < sizeof(out));
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while (datalen > 0) {
n = (datalen < rawcpl ? datalen : rawcpl);
outlen = sizeof(out);
base64_encode(data, n, out, &outlen);
data += n;
datalen -= n;
fwrite(out, 1, outlen, fp);
fputc('\n', fp);
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}
}
/*
* Read an ASN.1/BER identifier and length pair.
*
* Flags are a combination of the #defines listed below.
*
* Returns -1 if unsuccessful; otherwise returns the number of
* bytes used out of the source data.
*/
/* ASN.1 tag classes. */
#define ASN1_CLASS_UNIVERSAL (0 << 6)
#define ASN1_CLASS_APPLICATION (1 << 6)
#define ASN1_CLASS_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC (2 << 6)
#define ASN1_CLASS_PRIVATE (3 << 6)
#define ASN1_CLASS_MASK (3 << 6)
/* Primitive versus constructed bit. */
#define ASN1_CONSTRUCTED (1 << 5)
static int ber_read_id_len(void *source, int sourcelen,
int *id, int *length, int *flags)
{
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) source;
if (sourcelen == 0)
return -1;
*flags = (*p & 0xE0);
if ((*p & 0x1F) == 0x1F) {
*id = 0;
while (*p & 0x80) {
p++, sourcelen--;
if (sourcelen == 0)
return -1;
2016-07-12 15:33:15 +00:00
*id = (*id << 7) | (*p & 0x7F);
}
p++, sourcelen--;
} else {
*id = *p & 0x1F;
p++, sourcelen--;
}
if (sourcelen == 0)
return -1;
if (*p & 0x80) {
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unsigned len;
int n = *p & 0x7F;
p++, sourcelen--;
if (sourcelen < n)
return -1;
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len = 0;
while (n--)
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len = (len << 8) | (*p++);
sourcelen -= n;
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*length = toint(len);
} else {
*length = *p;
p++, sourcelen--;
}
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if (*length < 0) {
printf("Negative ASN.1 length\n");
return -1;
merge fixes from PuTTY import.c toint() from misc.c (revids are from hggit conversion) changeset: 4620:60a336a6c85c user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Feb 25 20:26:33 2016 +0000 files: import.c description: Fix potential segfaults in reading OpenSSH's ASN.1 key format. The length coming back from ber_read_id_len might have overflowed, so treat it as potentially negative. Also, while I'm here, accumulate it inside ber_read_id_len as an unsigned, so as to avoid undefined behaviour on integer overflow, and toint() it before return. Thanks to Hanno Böck for spotting this, with the aid of AFL. (cherry picked from commit 5b7833cd474a24ec098654dcba8cb9509f3bf2c1) Conflicts: import.c (cherry-picker's note: resolving the conflict involved removing an entire section of the original commit which fixed ECDSA code not present on this branch) changeset: 4619:9c6c638d98d8 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Sun Jul 14 10:45:54 2013 +0000 files: import.c ssh.c sshdss.c sshpubk.c sshrsa.c description: Tighten up a lot of casts from unsigned to int which are read by one of the GET_32BIT macros and then used as length fields. Missing bounds checks against zero have been added, and also I've introduced a helper function toint() which casts from unsigned to int in such a way as to avoid C undefined behaviour, since I'm not sure I trust compilers any more to do the obviously sensible thing. [originally from svn r9918] changeset: 4618:3957829f24d3 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Mon Jul 08 22:36:04 2013 +0000 files: import.c sshdss.c sshrsa.c description: Add an assortment of extra safety checks. [originally from svn r9896] changeset: 4617:2cddee0bce12 user: Jacob Nevins <jacobn@chiark.greenend.org.uk> date: Wed Dec 07 00:24:45 2005 +0000 files: import.c description: Institutional failure to memset() things pointed at rather than pointers. Things should now be zeroed and memory not leaked. Spotted by Brant Thomsen. [originally from svn r6476] changeset: 4616:24ac78a9c71d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Wed Feb 11 13:58:27 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Jacob's last-minute testing found a couple of trivial bugs in import.c, and my attempts to reproduce them in cmdgen found another one there :-) [originally from svn r3847] changeset: 4615:088d39a73db0 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Jan 22 18:52:49 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Placate some gcc warnings. [originally from svn r3761] changeset: 4614:e4288bad4d93 parent: 1758:108b8924593d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Fri Oct 03 21:21:23 2003 +0000 files: import.c description: My ASN.1 decoder returned wrong IDs for anything above 0x1E! Good job it's never had to yet. Ahem. [originally from svn r3479]
2016-07-12 15:00:01 +00:00
}
2016-07-12 15:33:15 +00:00
return p - (unsigned char *) source;
}
/*
* Write an ASN.1/BER identifier and length pair. Returns the
* number of bytes consumed. Assumes dest contains enough space.
* Will avoid writing anything if dest is NULL, but still return
* amount of space required.
*/
static int ber_write_id_len(void *dest, int id, int length, int flags)
{
unsigned char *d = (unsigned char *)dest;
int len = 0;
if (id <= 30) {
/*
* Identifier is one byte.
*/
len++;
if (d) *d++ = id | flags;
} else {
int n;
/*
* Identifier is multiple bytes: the first byte is 11111
* plus the flags, and subsequent bytes encode the value of
* the identifier, 7 bits at a time, with the top bit of
* each byte 1 except the last one which is 0.
*/
len++;
if (d) *d++ = 0x1F | flags;
for (n = 1; (id >> (7*n)) > 0; n++)
continue; /* count the bytes */
while (n--) {
len++;
if (d) *d++ = (n ? 0x80 : 0) | ((id >> (7*n)) & 0x7F);
}
}
if (length < 128) {
/*
* Length is one byte.
*/
len++;
if (d) *d++ = length;
} else {
int n;
/*
* Length is multiple bytes. The first is 0x80 plus the
* number of subsequent bytes, and the subsequent bytes
* encode the actual length.
*/
for (n = 1; (length >> (8*n)) > 0; n++)
continue; /* count the bytes */
len++;
if (d) *d++ = 0x80 | n;
while (n--) {
len++;
if (d) *d++ = (length >> (8*n)) & 0xFF;
}
}
return len;
}
/* Simple structure to point to an mp-int within a blob. */
struct mpint_pos { void *start; int bytes; };
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------
* Code to read and write OpenSSH private keys.
*/
enum { OSSH_DSA, OSSH_RSA, OSSH_EC, OSSH_PKEY };
struct openssh_key {
int type;
int encrypted;
char iv[32];
/* keyblob is publickey1 onwards (ref OpenSSH PROTOCOL.key) */
unsigned char *keyblob;
unsigned int keyblob_len, keyblob_size;
};
static struct openssh_key *load_openssh_key(const char *filename)
{
struct openssh_key *ret;
buffer *buf = NULL;
FILE *fp = NULL;
char buffer[256];
char *errmsg = NULL, *p = NULL;
int headers_done;
unsigned long len;
ret = (struct openssh_key*)m_malloc(sizeof(struct openssh_key));
ret->keyblob = NULL;
ret->keyblob_len = ret->keyblob_size = 0;
ret->encrypted = 0;
memset(ret->iv, 0, sizeof(ret->iv));
if (strlen(filename) == 1 && filename[0] == '-') {
fp = stdin;
} else {
fp = fopen(filename, "r");
}
if (!fp) {
errmsg = "Unable to open key file";
goto error;
}
if (!fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fp) ||
0 != strncmp(buffer, "-----BEGIN ", 11) ||
0 != strcmp(buffer+strlen(buffer)-17, "PRIVATE KEY-----\n")) {
errmsg = "File does not begin with OpenSSH key header";
goto error;
}
if (!strcmp(buffer, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"))
ret->type = OSSH_RSA;
else if (!strcmp(buffer, "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"))
ret->type = OSSH_DSA;
else if (!strcmp(buffer, "-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"))
ret->type = OSSH_EC;
else if (!strcmp(buffer, "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"))
ret->type = OSSH_PKEY;
else {
errmsg = "Unrecognised key type";
goto error;
}
headers_done = 0;
buf = buf_new(0);
while (1) {
if (!fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fp)) {
errmsg = "Unexpected end of file";
goto error;
}
if (0 == strncmp(buffer, "-----END ", 9) &&
0 == strcmp(buffer+strlen(buffer)-17, "PRIVATE KEY-----\n"))
break; /* done */
if ((p = strchr(buffer, ':')) != NULL) {
if (headers_done) {
errmsg = "Header found in body of key data";
goto error;
}
*p++ = '\0';
while (*p && isspace((unsigned char)*p)) p++;
if (!strcmp(buffer, "Proc-Type")) {
if (p[0] != '4' || p[1] != ',') {
errmsg = "Proc-Type is not 4 (only 4 is supported)";
goto error;
}
p += 2;
if (!strcmp(p, "ENCRYPTED\n"))
ret->encrypted = 1;
} else if (!strcmp(buffer, "DEK-Info")) {
int i, j;
if (strncmp(p, "DES-EDE3-CBC,", 13)) {
errmsg = "Ciphers other than DES-EDE3-CBC not supported";
goto error;
}
p += 13;
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (1 != sscanf(p, "%2x", &j))
break;
ret->iv[i] = j;
p += 2;
}
if (i < 8) {
errmsg = "Expected 16-digit iv in DEK-Info";
goto error;
}
}
} else {
headers_done = 1;
len = strlen(buffer);
buf = buf_resize(buf, buf->size + len);
buf_putbytes(buf, buffer, len);
}
}
if (buf && buf->len) {
ret->keyblob_size = ret->keyblob_len + buf->len*4/3 + 256;
ret->keyblob = (unsigned char*)m_realloc(ret->keyblob, ret->keyblob_size);
len = ret->keyblob_size;
if (base64_decode((const unsigned char *)buf->data, buf->len,
ret->keyblob, &len) != CRYPT_OK){
errmsg = "Error decoding base64";
goto error;
}
ret->keyblob_len = len;
}
if (ret->type == OSSH_PKEY) {
if (ret->keyblob_len < OSSH_PKEY_BLOBLEN ||
memcmp(ret->keyblob, OSSH_PKEY_BLOB, OSSH_PKEY_BLOBLEN)) {
errmsg = "Error decoding OpenSSH key";
goto error;
}
ret->keyblob_len -= OSSH_PKEY_BLOBLEN;
memmove(ret->keyblob, ret->keyblob + OSSH_PKEY_BLOBLEN, ret->keyblob_len);
}
if (ret->keyblob_len == 0 || !ret->keyblob) {
errmsg = "Key body not present";
goto error;
}
if (ret->encrypted && ret->keyblob_len % 8 != 0) {
errmsg = "Encrypted key blob is not a multiple of cipher block size";
goto error;
}
if (buf) {
buf_burn_free(buf);
}
2015-02-24 14:48:14 +00:00
m_burn(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
return ret;
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error:
if (buf) {
buf_burn_free(buf);
}
2015-02-24 14:48:14 +00:00
m_burn(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if (ret) {
if (ret->keyblob) {
2015-02-24 14:48:14 +00:00
m_burn(ret->keyblob, ret->keyblob_size);
m_free(ret->keyblob);
}
m_free(ret);
}
if (fp) {
fclose(fp);
}
if (errmsg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", errmsg);
}
return NULL;
}
static int openssh_encrypted(const char *filename)
{
struct openssh_key *key = load_openssh_key(filename);
int ret;
if (!key)
return 0;
ret = key->encrypted;
2015-02-24 14:48:14 +00:00
m_burn(key->keyblob, key->keyblob_size);
m_free(key->keyblob);
m_free(key);
return ret;
}
static sign_key *openssh_read(const char *filename, const char * UNUSED(passphrase))
{
struct openssh_key *key;
unsigned char *p;
int ret, id, len, flags;
int i, num_integers = 0;
sign_key *retval = NULL;
char *errmsg;
unsigned char *modptr = NULL;
int modlen = -9999;
enum signkey_type type;
sign_key *retkey;
buffer * blobbuf = NULL;
retkey = new_sign_key();
key = load_openssh_key(filename);
if (!key)
return NULL;
if (key->encrypted) {
errmsg = "Encrypted keys are not supported. Please convert with ssh-keygen first";
goto error;
}
/*
* Now we have a decrypted key blob, which contains OpenSSH
* encoded private key. We must now untangle the OpenSSH format.
*/
if (key->type == OSSH_PKEY) {
blobbuf = buf_new(key->keyblob_len);
buf_putbytes(blobbuf, key->keyblob, key->keyblob_len);
buf_setpos(blobbuf, 0);
/* limit length of public key blob */
len = buf_getint(blobbuf);
type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY;
if (buf_get_pub_key(blobbuf, retkey, &type)
!= DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
errmsg = "Error parsing OpenSSH key";
goto ossh_error;
}
/* restore full length */
buf_setlen(blobbuf, key->keyblob_len);
/* length of private key part. we can discard it */
buf_getint(blobbuf);
/* discard checkkey1 */
buf_getint(blobbuf);
/* discard checkkey2 */
buf_getint(blobbuf);
errmsg = "Unsupported OpenSSH key type";
retkey->type = type;
ret = DROPBEAR_FAILURE;
/* Parse private key part */
#if DROPBEAR_RSA
if (type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA) {
errmsg = "Error parsing OpenSSH RSA key";
ret = buf_get_rsa_priv_ossh(blobbuf, retkey);
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ED25519
if (type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ED25519) {
errmsg = "Error parsing OpenSSH ed25519 key";
ret = buf_get_ed25519_priv_ossh(blobbuf, retkey);
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ECDSA
if (signkey_is_ecdsa(type)) {
errmsg = "Error parsing OpenSSH ecdsa key";
ret = buf_get_ecdsa_priv_ossh(blobbuf, retkey);
}
#endif
if (ret == DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
errmsg = NULL;
retval = retkey;
goto error;
}
ossh_error:
sign_key_free(retkey);
retkey = NULL;
goto error;
}
/*
* Now we have a decrypted key blob, which contains an ASN.1
* encoded private key. We must now untangle the ASN.1.
*
* We expect the whole key blob to be formatted as a SEQUENCE
* (0x30 followed by a length code indicating that the rest of
* the blob is part of the sequence). Within that SEQUENCE we
* expect to see a bunch of INTEGERs. What those integers mean
* depends on the key type:
*
* - For RSA, we expect the integers to be 0, n, e, d, p, q,
* dmp1, dmq1, iqmp in that order. (The last three are d mod
* (p-1), d mod (q-1), inverse of q mod p respectively.)
*
* - For DSA, we expect them to be 0, p, q, g, y, x in that
* order.
*/
p = key->keyblob;
/* Expect the SEQUENCE header. Take its absence as a failure to decrypt. */
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob_len, &id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2016-07-12 15:33:15 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 16 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
/* Expect a load of INTEGERs. */
if (key->type == OSSH_RSA)
num_integers = 9;
else if (key->type == OSSH_DSA)
num_integers = 6;
else if (key->type == OSSH_EC)
num_integers = 1;
/*
* Space to create key blob in.
*/
blobbuf = buf_new(3000);
#if DROPBEAR_DSS
if (key->type == OSSH_DSA) {
buf_putstring(blobbuf, "ssh-dss", 7);
retkey->type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS;
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_RSA
if (key->type == OSSH_RSA) {
buf_putstring(blobbuf, "ssh-rsa", 7);
retkey->type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA;
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < num_integers; i++) {
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2016-07-12 15:33:15 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 2 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
if (i == 0) {
/* First integer is a version indicator */
int expected = -1;
switch (key->type) {
case OSSH_RSA:
case OSSH_DSA:
expected = 0;
break;
case OSSH_EC:
expected = 1;
break;
}
if (len != 1 || p[0] != expected) {
errmsg = "Version number mismatch";
goto error;
}
} else if (key->type == OSSH_RSA) {
/*
* OpenSSH key order is n, e, d, p, q, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp
* but we want e, n, d, p, q
*/
if (i == 1) {
/* Save the details for after we deal with number 2. */
modptr = p;
modlen = len;
} else if (i >= 2 && i <= 5) {
buf_putstring(blobbuf, (const char*)p, len);
if (i == 2) {
buf_putstring(blobbuf, (const char*)modptr, modlen);
}
}
} else if (key->type == OSSH_DSA) {
/*
* OpenSSH key order is p, q, g, y, x,
* we want the same.
*/
buf_putstring(blobbuf, (const char*)p, len);
}
/* Skip past the number. */
p += len;
}
#if DROPBEAR_ECDSA
if (key->type == OSSH_EC) {
unsigned char* private_key_bytes = NULL;
int private_key_len = 0;
unsigned char* public_key_bytes = NULL;
int public_key_len = 0;
ecc_key *ecc = NULL;
const struct dropbear_ecc_curve *curve = NULL;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* See SEC1 v2, Appendix C.4 */
/* OpenSSL (so OpenSSH) seems to include the optional parts. */
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* privateKey OCTET STRING, */
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* id==4 for octet string */
2016-11-18 16:59:50 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 4 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
private_key_bytes = p;
private_key_len = len;
p += len;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* parameters [0] ECDomainParameters {{ SECGCurveNames }} OPTIONAL, */
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* id==0 */
2016-11-18 16:59:50 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 0 || len < 0) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* id==6 for object */
2016-11-18 16:59:50 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 6 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
if (0) {}
#if DROPBEAR_ECC_256
else if (len == sizeof(OID_SEC256R1_BLOB)
&& memcmp(p, OID_SEC256R1_BLOB, len) == 0) {
retkey->type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ECDSA_NISTP256;
curve = &ecc_curve_nistp256;
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ECC_384
else if (len == sizeof(OID_SEC384R1_BLOB)
&& memcmp(p, OID_SEC384R1_BLOB, len) == 0) {
retkey->type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ECDSA_NISTP384;
curve = &ecc_curve_nistp384;
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ECC_521
else if (len == sizeof(OID_SEC521R1_BLOB)
&& memcmp(p, OID_SEC521R1_BLOB, len) == 0) {
retkey->type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ECDSA_NISTP521;
curve = &ecc_curve_nistp521;
}
#endif
else {
errmsg = "Unknown ECC key type";
goto error;
}
p += len;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* publicKey [1] BIT STRING OPTIONAL */
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* id==1 */
2016-11-18 16:59:50 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 1 || len < 0) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
ret = ber_read_id_len(p, key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p,
&id, &len, &flags);
p += ret;
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
/* id==3 for bit string */
2016-11-18 16:59:50 +00:00
if (ret < 0 || id != 3 || len < 0 ||
key->keyblob+key->keyblob_len-p < len) {
errmsg = "ASN.1 decoding failure";
goto error;
}
public_key_bytes = p+1;
public_key_len = len-1;
p += len;
buf_putbytes(blobbuf, public_key_bytes, public_key_len);
ecc = buf_get_ecc_raw_pubkey(blobbuf, curve);
if (!ecc) {
errmsg = "Error parsing ECC key";
goto error;
}
m_mp_alloc_init_multi((mp_int**)&ecc->k, NULL);
if (mp_from_ubin(ecc->k, private_key_bytes, private_key_len)
!= MP_OKAY) {
errmsg = "Error parsing ECC key";
goto error;
}
*signkey_key_ptr(retkey, retkey->type) = ecc;
}
2013-11-14 14:03:30 +00:00
#endif /* DROPBEAR_ECDSA */
/*
* Now put together the actual key. Simplest way to do this is
* to assemble our own key blobs and feed them to the createkey
* functions; this is a bit faffy but it does mean we get all
* the sanity checks for free.
*/
if (key->type == OSSH_RSA || key->type == OSSH_DSA) {
buf_setpos(blobbuf, 0);
type = DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ANY;
if (buf_get_priv_key(blobbuf, retkey, &type)
!= DROPBEAR_SUCCESS) {
errmsg = "unable to create key structure";
sign_key_free(retkey);
retkey = NULL;
goto error;
}
}
errmsg = NULL; /* no error */
retval = retkey;
error:
if (blobbuf) {
buf_burn_free(blobbuf);
}
m_burn(key->keyblob, key->keyblob_size);
m_free(key->keyblob);
m_burn(key, sizeof(*key));
m_free(key);
if (errmsg) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", errmsg);
}
return retval;
}
static int openssh_write(const char *filename, sign_key *key,
const char *passphrase)
{
buffer * keyblob = NULL;
buffer * extrablob = NULL; /* used for calculated values to write */
unsigned char *outblob = NULL;
int outlen = -9999;
struct mpint_pos numbers[9];
int nnumbers = -1, pos = 0, len = 0, seqlen, i;
char *header = NULL, *footer = NULL;
char zero[1];
int ret = 0;
FILE *fp;
#if DROPBEAR_DSS
if (key->type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) {
/*
* Fetch the key blobs.
*/
keyblob = buf_new(3000);
buf_put_priv_key(keyblob, key, key->type);
buf_setpos(keyblob, 0);
/* skip the "ssh-rsa" or "ssh-dss" header */
buf_incrpos(keyblob, buf_getint(keyblob));
/*
* Find the sequence of integers to be encoded into the OpenSSH
* key blob, and also decide on the header line.
*/
numbers[0].start = zero; numbers[0].bytes = 1; zero[0] = '\0';
options: Complete the transition to numeric toggles (`#if') For the sake of review, this commit alters only the code; the affiliated comments within the source files also need to be updated, but doing so now would obscure the operational changes that have been made here. * All on/off options have been switched to the numeric `#if' variant; that is the only way to make this `default_options.h.in' thing work in a reasonable manner. * There is now some very minor compile-time checking of the user's choice of options. * NO_FAST_EXPTMOD doesn't seem to be used, so it has been removed. * ENABLE_USER_ALGO_LIST was supposed to be renamed DROPBEAR_USER_ALGO_LIST, and this commit completes that work. * DROPBEAR_FUZZ seems to be a relatively new, as-yet undocumented option, which was added by the following commit: commit 6e0b539e9ca0b5628c6c5a3d118ad6a2e79e8039 Author: Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au> Date: Tue May 23 22:29:21 2017 +0800 split out checkpubkey_line() separately It has now been added to `sysoptions.h' and defined as `0' by default. * The configuration option `DROPBEAR_PASSWORD_ENV' is no longer listed in `default_options.h.in'; it is no longer meant to be set by the user, and is instead left to be defined in `sysoptions.h' (where it was already being defined) as merely the name of the environment variable in question: DROPBEAR_PASSWORD To enable or disable use of that environment variable, the user must now toggle `DROPBEAR_USE_DROPBEAR_PASSWORD'. * The sFTP support is now toggled by setting `DROPBEAR_SFTPSERVER', and the path of the sFTP server program is set independently through the usual SFTPSERVER_PATH.
2017-07-20 19:38:26 +00:00
#if DROPBEAR_DSS
if (key->type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_DSS) {
/* p */
numbers[1].bytes = buf_getint(keyblob);
numbers[1].start = buf_getptr(keyblob, numbers[1].bytes);
buf_incrpos(keyblob, numbers[1].bytes);
/* q */
numbers[2].bytes = buf_getint(keyblob);
numbers[2].start = buf_getptr(keyblob, numbers[2].bytes);
buf_incrpos(keyblob, numbers[2].bytes);
/* g */
numbers[3].bytes = buf_getint(keyblob);
numbers[3].start = buf_getptr(keyblob, numbers[3].bytes);
buf_incrpos(keyblob, numbers[3].bytes);
/* y */
numbers[4].bytes = buf_getint(keyblob);
numbers[4].start = buf_getptr(keyblob, numbers[4].bytes);
buf_incrpos(keyblob, numbers[4].bytes);
/* x */
numbers[5].bytes = buf_getint(keyblob);
numbers[5].start = buf_getptr(keyblob, numbers[5].bytes);
buf_incrpos(keyblob, numbers[5].bytes);
nnumbers = 6;
header = "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
footer = "-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
}
#endif /* DROPBEAR_DSS */
/*
* Now count up the total size of the ASN.1 encoded integers,
* so as to determine the length of the containing SEQUENCE.
*/
len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nnumbers; i++) {
len += ber_write_id_len(NULL, 2, numbers[i].bytes, 0);
len += numbers[i].bytes;
}
seqlen = len;
/* Now add on the SEQUENCE header. */
len += ber_write_id_len(NULL, 16, seqlen, ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
/* Round up to the cipher block size, ensuring we have at least one
* byte of padding (see below). */
outlen = len;
if (passphrase)
outlen = (outlen+8) &~ 7;
/*
* Now we know how big outblob needs to be. Allocate it.
*/
outblob = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(outlen);
/*
* And write the data into it.
*/
pos = 0;
pos += ber_write_id_len(outblob+pos, 16, seqlen, ASN1_CONSTRUCTED);
for (i = 0; i < nnumbers; i++) {
pos += ber_write_id_len(outblob+pos, 2, numbers[i].bytes, 0);
memcpy(outblob+pos, numbers[i].start, numbers[i].bytes);
pos += numbers[i].bytes;
}
} /* end DSS handling */
#endif /* DROPBEAR_DSS */
if (0
#if DROPBEAR_RSA
|| key->type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ED25519
|| key->type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ED25519
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ECDSA
|| signkey_is_ecdsa(key->type)
#endif
) {
buffer *buf = buf_new(3200);
keyblob = buf_new(3000);
extrablob = buf_new(3100);
/* private key blob w/o header */
#if DROPBEAR_RSA
if (key->type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_RSA) {
buf_put_rsa_priv_ossh(keyblob, key);
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ED25519
if (key->type == DROPBEAR_SIGNKEY_ED25519) {
buf_put_ed25519_priv_ossh(keyblob, key);
}
#endif
#if DROPBEAR_ECDSA
if (signkey_is_ecdsa(key->type)) {
buf_put_ecdsa_priv_ossh(keyblob, key);
}
#endif
/* header */
buf_putbytes(buf, OSSH_PKEY_BLOB, OSSH_PKEY_BLOBLEN);
/* public key */
buf_put_pub_key(buf, key, key->type);
/* private key */
buf_putint(extrablob, 0); /* checkint 1 */
buf_putint(extrablob, 0); /* checkint 2 */
/* raw openssh private key */
buf_putbytes(extrablob, keyblob->data, keyblob->len);
/* comment */
buf_putstring(extrablob, "", 0);
/* padding to cipher block length */
len = (extrablob->len+8) & ~7;
for (i = 1; len - extrablob->len > 0; i++)
buf_putbyte(extrablob, i);
buf_setpos(extrablob, 0);
buf_putbytes(extrablob, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8);
buf_putbufstring(buf, extrablob);
outlen = len = pos = buf->len;
outblob = (unsigned char*)m_malloc(outlen);
memcpy(outblob, buf->data, buf->len);
buf_burn_free(buf);
buf = NULL;
header = "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
footer = "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
}
/*
* Padding on OpenSSH keys is deterministic. The number of
* padding bytes is always more than zero, and always at most
* the cipher block length. The value of each padding byte is
* equal to the number of padding bytes. So a plaintext that's
* an exact multiple of the block size will be padded with 08
* 08 08 08 08 08 08 08 (assuming a 64-bit block cipher); a
* plaintext one byte less than a multiple of the block size
* will be padded with just 01.
*
* This enables the OpenSSL key decryption function to strip
* off the padding algorithmically and return the unpadded
* plaintext to the next layer: it looks at the final byte, and
* then expects to find that many bytes at the end of the data
* with the same value. Those are all removed and the rest is
* returned.
*/
dropbear_assert(pos == len);
while (pos < outlen) {
outblob[pos++] = outlen - len;
}
/*
* Encrypt the key.
*/
if (passphrase) {
fprintf(stderr, "Encrypted keys aren't supported currently\n");
goto error;
}
/*
* And save it. We'll use Unix line endings just in case it's
* subsequently transferred in binary mode.
*/
if (strlen(filename) == 1 && filename[0] == '-') {
fp = stdout;
} else {
fp = fopen(filename, "wb"); /* ensure Unix line endings */
}
if (!fp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed opening output file\n");
goto error;
}
fputs(header, fp);
base64_encode_fp(fp, outblob, outlen, 64);
fputs(footer, fp);
fclose(fp);
ret = 1;
error:
if (outblob) {
memset(outblob, 0, outlen);
m_free(outblob);
}
if (keyblob) {
buf_burn_free(keyblob);
}
if (extrablob) {
buf_burn_free(extrablob);
}
return ret;
}
merge fixes from PuTTY import.c toint() from misc.c (revids are from hggit conversion) changeset: 4620:60a336a6c85c user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Feb 25 20:26:33 2016 +0000 files: import.c description: Fix potential segfaults in reading OpenSSH's ASN.1 key format. The length coming back from ber_read_id_len might have overflowed, so treat it as potentially negative. Also, while I'm here, accumulate it inside ber_read_id_len as an unsigned, so as to avoid undefined behaviour on integer overflow, and toint() it before return. Thanks to Hanno Böck for spotting this, with the aid of AFL. (cherry picked from commit 5b7833cd474a24ec098654dcba8cb9509f3bf2c1) Conflicts: import.c (cherry-picker's note: resolving the conflict involved removing an entire section of the original commit which fixed ECDSA code not present on this branch) changeset: 4619:9c6c638d98d8 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Sun Jul 14 10:45:54 2013 +0000 files: import.c ssh.c sshdss.c sshpubk.c sshrsa.c description: Tighten up a lot of casts from unsigned to int which are read by one of the GET_32BIT macros and then used as length fields. Missing bounds checks against zero have been added, and also I've introduced a helper function toint() which casts from unsigned to int in such a way as to avoid C undefined behaviour, since I'm not sure I trust compilers any more to do the obviously sensible thing. [originally from svn r9918] changeset: 4618:3957829f24d3 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Mon Jul 08 22:36:04 2013 +0000 files: import.c sshdss.c sshrsa.c description: Add an assortment of extra safety checks. [originally from svn r9896] changeset: 4617:2cddee0bce12 user: Jacob Nevins <jacobn@chiark.greenend.org.uk> date: Wed Dec 07 00:24:45 2005 +0000 files: import.c description: Institutional failure to memset() things pointed at rather than pointers. Things should now be zeroed and memory not leaked. Spotted by Brant Thomsen. [originally from svn r6476] changeset: 4616:24ac78a9c71d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Wed Feb 11 13:58:27 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Jacob's last-minute testing found a couple of trivial bugs in import.c, and my attempts to reproduce them in cmdgen found another one there :-) [originally from svn r3847] changeset: 4615:088d39a73db0 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Jan 22 18:52:49 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Placate some gcc warnings. [originally from svn r3761] changeset: 4614:e4288bad4d93 parent: 1758:108b8924593d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Fri Oct 03 21:21:23 2003 +0000 files: import.c description: My ASN.1 decoder returned wrong IDs for anything above 0x1E! Good job it's never had to yet. Ahem. [originally from svn r3479]
2016-07-12 15:00:01 +00:00
/* From PuTTY misc.c */
static int toint(unsigned u)
{
2016-07-12 15:33:15 +00:00
/*
* Convert an unsigned to an int, without running into the
* undefined behaviour which happens by the strict C standard if
* the value overflows. You'd hope that sensible compilers would
* do the sensible thing in response to a cast, but actually I
* don't trust modern compilers not to do silly things like
* assuming that _obviously_ you wouldn't have caused an overflow
* and so they can elide an 'if (i < 0)' test immediately after
* the cast.
*
* Sensible compilers ought of course to optimise this entire
* function into 'just return the input value'!
*/
if (u <= (unsigned)INT_MAX)
return (int)u;
else if (u >= (unsigned)INT_MIN) /* wrap in cast _to_ unsigned is OK */
return INT_MIN + (int)(u - (unsigned)INT_MIN);
else
return INT_MIN; /* fallback; should never occur on binary machines */
merge fixes from PuTTY import.c toint() from misc.c (revids are from hggit conversion) changeset: 4620:60a336a6c85c user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Feb 25 20:26:33 2016 +0000 files: import.c description: Fix potential segfaults in reading OpenSSH's ASN.1 key format. The length coming back from ber_read_id_len might have overflowed, so treat it as potentially negative. Also, while I'm here, accumulate it inside ber_read_id_len as an unsigned, so as to avoid undefined behaviour on integer overflow, and toint() it before return. Thanks to Hanno Böck for spotting this, with the aid of AFL. (cherry picked from commit 5b7833cd474a24ec098654dcba8cb9509f3bf2c1) Conflicts: import.c (cherry-picker's note: resolving the conflict involved removing an entire section of the original commit which fixed ECDSA code not present on this branch) changeset: 4619:9c6c638d98d8 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Sun Jul 14 10:45:54 2013 +0000 files: import.c ssh.c sshdss.c sshpubk.c sshrsa.c description: Tighten up a lot of casts from unsigned to int which are read by one of the GET_32BIT macros and then used as length fields. Missing bounds checks against zero have been added, and also I've introduced a helper function toint() which casts from unsigned to int in such a way as to avoid C undefined behaviour, since I'm not sure I trust compilers any more to do the obviously sensible thing. [originally from svn r9918] changeset: 4618:3957829f24d3 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Mon Jul 08 22:36:04 2013 +0000 files: import.c sshdss.c sshrsa.c description: Add an assortment of extra safety checks. [originally from svn r9896] changeset: 4617:2cddee0bce12 user: Jacob Nevins <jacobn@chiark.greenend.org.uk> date: Wed Dec 07 00:24:45 2005 +0000 files: import.c description: Institutional failure to memset() things pointed at rather than pointers. Things should now be zeroed and memory not leaked. Spotted by Brant Thomsen. [originally from svn r6476] changeset: 4616:24ac78a9c71d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Wed Feb 11 13:58:27 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Jacob's last-minute testing found a couple of trivial bugs in import.c, and my attempts to reproduce them in cmdgen found another one there :-) [originally from svn r3847] changeset: 4615:088d39a73db0 user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Thu Jan 22 18:52:49 2004 +0000 files: import.c description: Placate some gcc warnings. [originally from svn r3761] changeset: 4614:e4288bad4d93 parent: 1758:108b8924593d user: Simon Tatham <anakin@pobox.com> date: Fri Oct 03 21:21:23 2003 +0000 files: import.c description: My ASN.1 decoder returned wrong IDs for anything above 0x1E! Good job it's never had to yet. Ahem. [originally from svn r3479]
2016-07-12 15:00:01 +00:00
}